

Joint Pub 5-00.2



Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures



13 January 1999



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental guidance and procedures for the formation and employment of a joint task force to command and control joint operations throughout the range of military operations.

2. Purpose


This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



V. E. CLARK
Vice Admiral, US Navy
Director, Joint Staff

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides Introductory Remarks Concerning the Establishment of a Joint Task Force**
 - **Outlines the Organization and Staffing of a Joint Task Force**
 - **Highlights Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands**
 - **Discusses General Considerations for Command and Control of Forces Assigned or Attached to a Joint Task Force**
 - **Describes Functions and Responsibilities of the Joint Task Force Staff Directorates**
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Introduction

A joint task force (JTF) is a joint force constituted and so designated by a JTF establishing authority.

A joint task force (JTF) establishing authority may be the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or existing JTF.

A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.

The mission assigned a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. Execution of responsibilities may involve air, land, sea, space, and special operations in any combination, executed unilaterally or in cooperation with friendly nations.

A JTF normally is dissolved by the establishing authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

Multinational considerations.

US-led JTFs should expect to participate as part of a multinational force in most future military endeavors throughout the range of military operations. Such participation with multinational forces may complicate normal unilateral organization, planning, and operations.

Joint Task Force Organization and Staffing

A commander, joint task force (CJTF) has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders.

The intent is to meet the needs of a commander, joint task force (CJTF), while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations. The manner in which a CJTF organizes the forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. The CJTF organizes forces to accomplish the mission based on the CJTF's vision and concept of operations.

The CJTF may organize the JTF headquarters as necessary to carry out all duties and responsibilities.

The options that may be used to form a JTF headquarters (HQ) are: use of a standing JTF HQ, augmentation of a core Service component HQ, or formation of an ad hoc HQ from various contributors.

When fully formed, the JTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component or subordinate task force, having significant forces assigned to the command.

The CJTF will make the final decision on the composition of the JTF HQ, to include the establishment of boards, centers, cells, and bureaus.

A CJTF makes recommendations to the establishing authority on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for the accomplishment of assigned missions.

The organizational structure of the force will depend on the mission to be fulfilled, the capabilities and strength of the component elements of the forces assigned and attached, and the phasing of the contemplated operations.

The CJTF must identify the requirements for additional forces or personnel to the establishing authority.


Personal staff and special staff of the commander.

Personal staff and special staff of the commander perform duties as prescribed by the CJTF and handles special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close control. This staff may include the public affairs officer, legal officer, chaplain, surgeon, inspector general, provost marshal, comptroller, political advisor, and others as directed.

Some JTFs may evolve into semi-permanent JTFs.

Missions of JTFs may change. A decision may be made not to dissolve these JTFs, but rather have them continue with a revised mission for an undetermined period of time.

TYPICAL JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF ORGANIZATION



	Recommended	As Required	CJTF Determines Staff Relationship
CJTF	commander, joint task force		
DCJTF	deputy commander, joint task force		
J-1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staff		
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff		
J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff		
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a joint staff		
J-5	Plans Directorate of a joint staff		
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate of a joint staff		

Executive Summary

The CJTF must identify the requirement for liaison personnel and request them at the earliest opportunity.

Liaison personnel should be established between the JTF HQ and higher commands, between the JTF HQ and component and subordinate task force commands, between adjacent units, between supporting, attached, and assigned forces and the JTF HQ, and between the nongovernmental organizations and/or private voluntary organizations and the JTFHQ.


The CJTF must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall cognizance of all liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ.

Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands

A JTF may contain Service or functional components and/or special purpose subordinate task forces.

Administrative and logistic support for a JTF is provided through Service component commands. Service components are appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components.

Functional components are appropriate when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. **Functional components do not constitute a joint force.**



Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands and subordinate task forces with operational responsibilities.

Because of the special nature of psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA), a CJTF may establish special task forces for these activities. In certain circumstances PSYOP and CA staff planners may be assigned to the JTF Operations Directorate (J-3).

Command and Control

A CJTF exercises operational control over assigned (and normally over attached) forces.

The CJTF determines the most appropriate command relationships. A CJTF may delegate operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) to, or place forces in support of, subordinate commanders to accomplish specified tasks or missions. OPCON is normally exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and the Service and/or functional component commanders.

Support

The four categories of support are: mutual, general, direct, and close.

Support is a command relationship established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another. A CJTF may establish support relationships within the JTF to enhance unity of effort. Supported and supporting command relationships afford an effective means to weigh (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations. The CJTF must define the amount, timing, and intent of the establishment of the supported and/or supporting relationship between components.

Other Authorities

Two categories of other authority are coordinating authority and direct liaison authorized.

The CJTF may decide to delegate to a JTF component or subordinate task force commander authority different from that associated with OPCON, TACON, or support.

Coordinating authority is authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service.

Direct liaison authorized is authority granted by a commander to a subordinate to consult or coordinate directly an action with a command or agency inside or outside of the granting command.

Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement impose political, tactical, and legal limitations upon commanders; they delineate how commanders intend to use force and maneuver to protect JTF forces and prosecute the JTF mission.

Rules of engagement (ROE) must be distinguished from command and control measures, threat conditions, and arming orders.

The CJTF must ensure that initial ROE and all subsequent changes or modifications are known and understood by all JTF members, especially the lower levels who directly apply combat power and deadly force.

Combat Identification

Combat identification measures must be established early in the JTF planning cycle.

Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE. These measures also must allow units and individuals to conduct actions appropriate for self-defense.

Joint Task Force Staff Directorates

JTF staff directorates.

The joint staff is made up of staff directorates corresponding to the major functions of exercising command such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and command, control, communications, and computers (C4).

The Directors or Assistant Chiefs of Staff of each staff directorate provide supervision of all activities pertaining to their respective functional responsibilities.

JTF Manpower and Personnel Directorate.

JTF's Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1) is charged with joint manpower management, the formulation of joint personnel policies, supervision of the administration of joint personnel of the command (including civilians under the supervision or control of the command), and enemy prisoners of war.

J-1 is the focal point for all personnel support to joint operations.

Joint personnel reception center.

J-1 establishes the joint personnel reception center to facilitate the rapid integration of individual replacements, augmentees, civilian employees, and units into the JTF.

JTF Intelligence Directorate.

JTF Intelligence Directorate's (J-2's) primary function is to support the CJTF and staff by ensuring the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warnings on the characteristics and the enemy situation in the joint operations area (JOA). The JTF J-2 additionally provides support to the CJTF's force protection mission.

Joint intelligence support element.

J-2 establishes the joint intelligence support element (JISE), which is responsible for providing the CJTF, JTF staff, and JTF components and subordinate task forces with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation by integrating and adding to the adversary situations developed by the combatant commander's intelligence organization.

JTF Operations Directorate.

JTF J-3 assists the CJTF in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed.

Joint Operations Center.

J-3 is responsible for the operation of the Joint Operations Center for the CJTF which serves as a focal point for all operational matters and, in the absence of a JISE, intelligence matters.

JTF Logistics Directorate.

JTF Logistics Directorate (J-4) is charged with the formulation of logistics plans and with the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, mortuary affairs, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistics activities.

Logistics directive authority.

It is critical that the JTF J-4 determine what, if any, logistics directive authority for a common support capability the supported combatant commander has delegated to the CJTF and if the scope of the authority meets the JTF requirements.

Logistics readiness center.

JTF J-4 may establish a logistics readiness center to coordinate logistic support, maintain total assets capability, monitor logistics capability, and provide a central point for logistics-related boards, offices, and centers.

JTF Plans Directorate.

JTF Plans Directorate assists the CJTF in long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint operation plans, and associated estimates of the situation.

Joint Task Force Planning

The CJTF will make the decision on how planning will be accomplished for the JTF.

A JTF performs joint planning functions similar to those of the supported combatant command for a specified mission or designated JOA.


Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

Joint operation planning employs an integrated process entailing similar policies and procedures throughout the range of military operations, providing for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making.

Joint planning group.

To enhance the planning effort, a joint planning group (JPG) should be established. **Responsibilities and authority of the JPG are assigned by the CJTF.**

Responsibilities of the JPG may include crisis action planning (CAP), coordination of joint force operation order development, and planning for future operations.



Crisis action planning.

CAP is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources.

CAP involves a structured process and provides for the transition from planning of military operations to their execution.

CAP ends when the crisis is resolved or forces are withdrawn.

Campaign plan or operation order.

The CJTF can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation.

An operation order is prepared by the JTF staff using joint procedures in prescribed formats during CAP. It is in the form of a directive issued by the CJTF to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

JTF Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate.

JTF C4 Systems Directorate (J-6) assists the CJTF in all responsibilities for communications, electronics, and automated information systems.

A command and control support system, which includes supporting a C4 system, is the CJTF's principal tool used to collect, transport, process, disseminate, and protect data and information.

Joint communications control center.

J-6 establishes a joint communications control center (JCCC) to manage tactical communications systems deployed in support of joint operations.

JCCC exercises staff supervision over C4 control centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental guidance and procedures for the formation and employment of a JTF to command and control joint operations throughout the range of military operations. Throughout this publication are various "checklists" to assist the CJTF and JTF staff in accomplishing their tasks.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT TASK FORCE

"No other nation can match our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and fight jointly."

GEN J. M. Shalikashvili, USA
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. General

a. **A joint task force (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by a JTF establishing authority.** A JTF establishing authority may be the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or existing JTF. In most situations, the JTF establishing authority will be a combatant commander. Figure I-1 illustrates JTF organizational options. Figure I-2 outlines key JTF establishing authority responsibilities.

b. **JTFs are established on a geographical area or functional basis** when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.

- The mission assigned should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination of local defense of a subordinate area.
- Execution of responsibilities may involve air, land, sea, space, and special operations in any combination executed unilaterally or in cooperation with friendly nations.

c. Normally, a JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required. Some recent JTFs have evolved to semi-permanent JTFs which stay behind to maintain end state conditions or




Figure I-1. Joint Task Force Organizational Options

JOINT TASK FORCE ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITIES

- Appointing the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assigning the mission and forces, and exercising command and control of the JTF.
 - In coordination with the CJTF, determining the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission.
 - Allocating or requesting forces required.
- Defining the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography and/or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified.)
- Ensuring the development and approval of rules of engagement tailored to the situation.
- Monitoring the operational situation and keeping superiors informed through periodic reports.
- Providing guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execution orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).
- Promulgating changes in plans and modifying mission and forces as necessary.
- Ensuring administrative and logistic support.
- Recommending to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.
- Establishing or assisting in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation.
- Determining supporting force requirements.
- Preparing a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).
- Approving CJTF plans.
- Delegating the directive authority for common support capabilities (if required).

Figure I-2. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities



Sea, air, and land forces support Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

accomplish a specified follow-on or modified mission for an undetermined period.

JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” provide policy and doctrine for organizing joint forces.

2. JTF Organization

a. JTFs may take many forms and sizes and be employed across the range of military operations in air, land, or maritime environments. The specific organization and staffing of a JTF will vary based on the mission assigned, the environment within which operations must be conducted, the makeup of existing and potential enemy forces, and the time available to reach the desired end state.

b. Specific guidance for **organizing and staffing a JTF is in Chapter II**, “Joint Task Force Organization and Staffing.”

c. Information and guidance concerning the various **components and subordinate task forces** that may comprise a JTF is in

Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands.”

3. Command and Control

a. **Command and control (C2) guidance, both internal and external to the JTF, should be established as early as possible.** Initial C2 guidance should come from the JTF establishing authority. The commander, joint task force (CJTF) should aggressively establish JTF internal C2 guidance and, in a like manner, seek clarification when C2 guidance external to the JTF is not thoroughly understood.

b. Supported and supporting commander(s) relationships should be delineated clearly and succinctly.

c. **Definitive guidance concerning JTF C2 is in Chapter IV**, “Joint Task Force Command and Control.”

4. Manpower and Personnel

Background information and guidance on personnel and administration matters

pertaining to a JTF are in **Chapter V**, “Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel.”

5. Intelligence

a. **Intelligence concerns must be addressed from the earliest stages of JTF planning through the redeployment stage of operations.**

b. **Specific guidance concerning JTF intelligence support** is in **Chapter VI**, “Joint Task Force Intelligence.”

6. Planning and Operations

a. **The expeditionary nature of most recent and probably most future JTF operations requires great flexibility in both planning and execution of these operations.** The joint staff’s Operations Directorate (J-3) and Plans Directorate (J-5) personnel in particular must work together closely to ensure the CJTF’s intent is captured in planning and implemented in execution.

b. **Formation of a joint planning group (JPG) will facilitate these efforts.** JPG staffing should include representation from all JTF principal and special staff sections and components as required.

c. JTF operations of the future must include the evolving area of information operations (IO). **Selected unclassified guidance and responsibilities for conducting IO are in Chapter II**, “Joint Task Force Organization and Staffing,” **and Chapter VII**, “Joint Task Force Operations.”

d. **Guidance concerning JTF operations**, to include selected types of operations, is in **Chapter VII**, “Joint Task Force Operations.”

e. **Guidance concerning JTF planning and policy**, to include a detailed discussion

of the JPG, is in **Chapter IX**, “Joint Task Force Plans and Policy.”

7. Logistics

a. Logistics, like intelligence, **will play a key role in JTF operations from the earliest stage of planning through the final stage of redeployment of forces.**

b. The joint staff’s Logistics Directorate (J-4) organization should be tailored to the operation. Organizing factors include but are not limited to the nature of anticipated operations, composition of JTF forces, geographical and seasonal conditions, operational environment, existing logistics arrangements, and quality and quantity of potential host-nation support (HNS) and acquisition cross-service agreements (ACSAs). JTF J-4 should consider forming a JTF logistics readiness center (LRC) and a joint movement center (JMC).

c. **Logistics plans must be developed with a degree of flexibility that allows for needed changes as JTF operations commence.** A J-4 logistics staff representative must be included in all JTF planning, to include permanent membership in the JPG.

d. J-4 responsibilities and authority must be clearly delineated to ensure uninterrupted sustainability of ongoing and future operations. **The often austere environment in which JTFs will probably operate may require coordination of those common logistics efforts necessary for the accomplishment of the JTF mission.**

e. **Explicit guidance for JTF logistic support**, to include information on forming an LRC, is in **Chapter VIII**, “Joint Task Force Logistics.”

8. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support

a. **Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems must provide rapid, reliable, and secure flow and processing of data to ensure continuous information exchange throughout the JTF, from the earliest stages of planning until redeployment.**

b. **Based on operational C4 procedures developed by the JTF establishing authority,** the CJTF must develop operational procedures that provide interoperable, compatible JTF C4 networks.

c. C4 resources may require the CJTF to adjudicate or assign subordinate command responsibilities for providing C4 systems support.

d. **Specific guidance for JTF C4 systems support** is located in **Chapter X**, “Joint Task Force Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.”

9. Multinational Considerations

a. **US-led JTFs should expect to participate as part of a multinational force in most future military endeavors**

throughout the range of military operations. Such participation with multinational forces may complicate normal unilateral organization, planning, and operations.

b. Complex matters (e.g., command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence as well as logistic support) may be complicated further when planned and executed in conjunction with multinational forces. **JTF multinational considerations are in relevant chapters throughout this publication.**

Additional multinational guidance is available in JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations,” and JP 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.”

10. Checklists

Throughout this publication are various “checklists” to assist the CJTF and JTF staff in accomplishing their tasks. **These “checklists” should be used only as general guidelines, since they do not cover all contingencies and related tasks.**

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CHAPTER II

JOINT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

“A [joint force commander] has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.”

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SECTION A. JOINT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION PRINCIPLES

1. General

a. CJTFs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. CJTFs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of CJTFs, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations. The manner in which CJTFs organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. **The first principle in joint force organization is that CJTFs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and concept of operations.** Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations. CJTFs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. Organization of joint forces also needs to take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command relationships and organizations can be counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.

“As a prudent military commander...you plan to use a combination of your air forces, sea forces, and land forces, and you want to make sure all of them are capable of doing everything you think they need to....”

GEN H. N. Schwarzkopf, USA
Commander in Chief
US Central Command

b. Sound command organization includes the following.

- **Unity of effort** — necessary for effectiveness and efficiency.
- **Unity of command** — essential to ensure employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible. In that case, unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — becomes paramount.
- **Centralized planning** — vital for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces and normally can be achieved by clear communication of the CJTF’s intent to the JTF staff and subordinate commands.

- **Decentralized execution** — essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals.
- **Common doctrine** — necessary for mutual understanding and confidence between a commander and assigned subordinates, and among the subordinates themselves, so that timely and effective action will be taken by all concerned in the absence of specific instructions.
- **Command emphasis on interoperability** — essential to enhance joint warfighting capabilities.
- **Other factors** in determining the organizational structure of a JTF include the following.
 - Level of authority granted and/or delegated.
 - Restraints, constraints, or operational limitations imposed or discerned during JTF mission analysis.
 - Responsibilities, missions, and tasks assigned to the CJTF.
 - The nature and scope of the operations.
 - The forces (by characteristic, Service, and identity) available or to be made available.
 - Composition, location, and facilities of the JTF headquarters (HQ)—an afloat JTF HQ may have limitations of space and equipment which could affect staffing levels and equipment capabilities.
 - Geography and weather.

- Enemy forces.
- Time available.
- Desired end state.
- Acceptable level of risk.
- Concept of operations, or the manner in which the commander decides to accomplish the mission.
- Political situation.

2. Staff Organization

a. A CJTF may organize the JTF HQ as necessary to carry out all duties and responsibilities.

b. There are several options that may be used to form a JTF HQ (e.g., use a standing JTF HQ, augment a core Service component HQ, form ad hoc from various contributors). Whatever option is used, a building process will be necessary. Additionally, this process must support the mission and provide the best opportunity for success.

c. **When fully formed, the JTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command.** The CJTF will make the final decision on the composition of the JTF HQ, to include the establishment of boards, centers, cells, and bureaus. Figure II-1 depicts a typical JTF staff organization.

- The following factors should be considered when creating a staff.
 - Reasonably representative of force makeup as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of members among the participating




Figure II-1. Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization

Services, functional components, and subordinate task forces.

- Filling key positions of responsibility with members from Service and functional components; subordinate task forces will be based in part on the mission and type of operations to be conducted (e.g., predominantly ground operations — J-3 should be from the United States Army or United States Marine Corps).
- Force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support.
- The importance of knowing, trusting, and being able to rely on key players may require the CJTF to hand-pick some members of the JTF staff (e.g., chief of staff or J-3). This is important because personalities often play a significant role on a staff, and the CJTF must be able to quickly reach a comfort level with key staff members.

“Trust — defined as total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another — is one of the most important ingredients in building strong teams.”

**Joint Pub 1,
Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces
of the United States**

d. When mission requirements exceed the JTF staff’s capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment), the CJTF must request assistance through the JTF establishing authority.

- The JTF establishing authority should make provision to furnish the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment.
- **Often an establishing authority has a “cell” of experts prepared to augment a JTF to provide assistance in**

the early stages of organization and planning (e.g., United States Pacific Command’s [USPACOM’s], United States Atlantic Command’s [USACOM’s], and United States Southern Command’s Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cells [DJTFACs], and United States European Command’s [USEUCOM’s] core JTF cell).

- In most situations, this “cell” is prepared to provide as much assistance as desired by the CJTF.
- Staff officers who augment the JTF nucleus from combatant commands or the Services should be trained as part of a joint training and exercise program (e.g., USACOM’s training program for JTFs).
- The Services and combatant commands should ensure **qualified personnel** are nominated to fill JTF augmentation billets.
- e. **A staff and facilities orientation program should be established to ensure that all individuals joining the JTF staff become thoroughly familiar with their surroundings (e.g., work and HQ area, living area, key personnel).**

- This could be accomplished through establishment of a joint personnel reception center (JPRC) under the Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1) — further discussed in Chapter V, “Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel,” of this publication.
- Another program that could be established in conjunction with the JPRC or by itself is the “buddy system” — an experienced JTF staff member is assigned to a new staff member to assist in the familiarization process.

- Whatever the program, it should improve the efficiency of the staff and lead to **building the joint team**.
- Providing information to supporting or adjacent commands.

f. JTF components will be discussed in detail in Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Subordinate Commands.”

3. JTF Headquarters Functions

a. **Collective Staff.** Responsibilities of the collective staff may include the following.

- Conducting or participating in crisis action planning (CAP).
- Planning for deployment, employment, and redeployment of the JTF.
- Assisting the CJTF to direct, control, and coordinate operations of assigned and attached forces and to coordinate planning activities of subordinate component commands.
- Developing and analyzing courses of action (COAs) and conducting staff estimates.
- Preparing operation plans (OPLANs), campaign plans, or operation orders (OPORDs) based on the CJTF’s decisions concerning COAs and tasking by the establishing authority.
- Positioning air operations planning and coordination as tasked by the CJTF when the conflict or situation is of such limited duration, scope, and/or complexity that the CJTF elects not to designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC).

See JP 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.”

- Coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned.
- Coordinating with friendly forces and/or foreign governments when required by the order establishing the JTF.
- Monitoring accomplishment of the CJTF’s decisions.

b. The remainder of this chapter will provide a more precise overview of the functions and responsibilities of a number of the JTF’s key individuals, staff sections, and selected others.

“The best means of organizing the command of an army...is to: (1) Give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight and of unshaken firmness in danger. (2) Assign as his chief of staff a man of high ability, of open and faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect harmony.”

Jomini
Precis de l’ Art de la Guerre,
1836

SECTION B. KEY FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Commander, JTF

Some of the many responsibilities of the CJTF outlined below relate directly and indirectly to JTF organization and functioning.

a. The CJTF makes recommendations to the establishing authority on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces

and for the accomplishment of such operational missions as may be assigned by the establishing commander.

b. Although normally not recommended, the CJTF also may be a Service component commander.

- When this is the case, the commander retains all the responsibilities associated with the Service component command.
- Dual-hatting a Service component commander as the CJTF may place this commander in an unwieldy position, foster a parochial single-Service or component view of overall joint operations and component contributions, and create potential conflicts of interest.

c. Other CJTF responsibilities may include the following.

- Exercising directive authority for logistics for those common support capabilities delegated by the combatant commander deemed essential to the accomplishment of the mission. If the combatant commander has not delegated this authority to the JTF commander by way of a warning order, OPORD, or other formal communique, then the JTF commander should initiate a request for this capability.
- Exercising operational control (OPCON) over assigned and normally over attached forces. The CJTF must determine when OPCON of forces will be transferred (e.g., upon arrival in the joint operations area [JOA]). Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command and Control,” contains a detailed discussion of C2.
- Developing a detailed OPORD and supporting time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) or campaign plan within the Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System (JOPES) crisis action planning (CAP) guidelines as directed by the establishing authority. The CJTF determines applicability of existing OPLANs, operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), functional plans, and campaign plans, if any, to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning.

- **Providing the commander’s intent.** Chapter IX, “Joint Task Force Plans and Policy,” provides an indepth discussion concerning commander’s intent.

- Additionally, the CJTF should provide **commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)** to the JTF staff and components.

- CCIR are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect successful mission accomplishment.

- Requesting supplemental rules of engagement (ROE) needed to accomplish the assigned mission.
- **Establishing combat identification measures.**
- Validating the adequacy of the JOA and notifying the establishing authority when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned JOA.
- Ensuring that cross-Service support is provided and the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting joint team.
- **Determining the requirement for and providing guidance on the establishment of the necessary boards, offices, centers, and bureaus (e.g., Joint**

KEY TERMS

Joint Operations Area

- Land, sea, and airspace defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander.
- Area where a commander, joint task force (CJTF) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission.

Area of Operations

- Operational area defined by the CJTF for land and naval forces.
- Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area, but are large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their Forces.

Joint Special Operations Area

- Restricted area of land, sea, and airspace.
- Assigned to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities.
- It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations.

Amphibious Objective Area

- Includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force.
- Needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations.

Visitors Bureau [JVB], JMC, Joint Targeting Coordination Board [JTCB], civil-military operations center [CMOC], IO cell) to enhance operational efficiency. The CJTF should require that the JTF proponent of a joint board, center, cell, or bureau provide an analysis of the requirement

for a joint activity, with rationale supporting a decision for or against establishing a board. If a subordinate Service or functional component command performs all or most functions of one of these activities, consideration should be given to assigning the board or cell to that component.

- **Defining the area of operations (AO) within the JOA for land and naval force commanders and a joint special operations area (JSOA) for use by a joint force special operations component.** Figure II-2 depicts typical JTF organizational areas.
- **Establishing force protection policies and guidelines.** An inherent part of this responsibility includes an active

counterintelligence (CI) effort to protect the JTF from foreign intelligence gathering activities, sabotage, and terrorism directed against personnel, facilities, or equipment.

- **Using assigned and attached forces to best perform the mission.** The organizational structure of the force will depend on the mission to be fulfilled, the capabilities and strength of the




Figure II-2. Typical Joint Task Force Organizational Areas

component elements of the forces assigned and attached, and the phasing of the contemplated operation.

•• **Identifying the requirement for additional forces or personnel to the JTF establishing authority.** (1) The establishing authority is essential in the process of obtaining additional forces, equipment, information, and other assets or data for the JTF. (2) **Regular contact with the establishing authority or representative is critical in order to stay abreast of and keep fully informed of the situation.**

“Close contact (more than on a daily basis) with the supported combatant command is a must.”

**RADM M. D. Haskins, USN
CJTF 160**

- The requirement for units and personnel that are found primarily in the Reserve Components (RC) (such as civil affairs [CA], psychological operations [PSYOP], and historians) also should be considered even though they may not be readily available for deployment or employment.
- Providing guidance to subordinate forces for planning and conducting operations, to include responsibilities with respect to supporting forces as directed by the JTF establishing authority.
- Monitoring the operational situation and, as required, keeping the JTF establishing authority informed.
- Coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs), as appropriate.

•• **Interagency Coordination. In certain situations, interagency coordination must be a top priority of the CJTF. During interagency operations, the JTF HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized planning and decentralized execution. It is the operational focal point for interagency coordination.**

•• This, in part, is due to the increased involvement of JTFs in civil activity both in the United States and abroad. This civil activity requires the skills and resources of many organizations (e.g., United States Government [USG] agencies, partner nations, NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations such as the United Nations [UN] and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]).

•• By understanding the interagency process, the CJTF will be better able to appreciate how the skills and resources of the above can assist in mission accomplishment. (1) Part of the educative process for the CJTF and staff is to understand that each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table. (2) The CJTF must ensure an atmosphere of cooperation exists so that both the skills and resources of the JTF and interagency organizations can be more effectively and efficiently utilized. **Unity of effort must be achieved.**

•• The CJTF must determine how best to coordinate with interagency organizations. For example: (1) Direct coordination by the CJTF or representative (e.g., deputy commander, JTF [DCJTF]); (2) Coordination by JTF staff directorate(s); and/or (3) Coordination through an organization such as CMOC. CMOC is discussed in more detail subsequently in this chapter.

- When appropriate, the CJTF should involve representatives from the interagency organizations in JTF staff meetings and briefings.

For further details, see JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.”

- Establishing, if necessary, a coordinating procedure for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces.
- Establishing the succession of command.
- Assigning to subordinate commanders, as necessary, those missions needed to accomplish the plan.
- Providing guidance to subordinate forces for the planning and execution of redeployment operations.
- **Requesting through the supported combatant commander the necessary discipline and courts-martial authority to ensure “good order and discipline” can be maintained throughout the operation.**
- The CJTF must determine how best to ensure that space capabilities are incorporated throughout the plan and that the staff is organized to represent these planning and operational requirements.
- **Ensuring that the JTF HQ is organized to support the basic tenets of IO.**
 - IO focuses on the vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the increasing dependence by the United States and some of its adversaries on information and information systems. At the tactical and operational levels, the target of IO is

the information-dependent process, whether human or automated.

- Chapter VII, “Joint Task Force Operations,” provides additional information concerning IO.

“Perhaps no single factor has as much potential as the information explosion for changing the way in which military organizations function, both during peace and in war.”

**Lt Gen E. J. Rokke, USAF
President of the National
Defense University**

For further details, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy,” (classified secret) and JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”

5. Deputy Commander, JTF

- a. Normally, the DCJTF is not from the same Service as the CJTF. DCJTF selection may be based on the type of mission assigned and/or the number and type of forces comprising the JTF.
- b. Usually the DCJTF is of equal rank or senior in rank to the component commanders.
- c. The DCJTF should possess a broad understanding of the type of operation to be conducted.
- d. The DCJTF may be dual-hatted as the chief of staff.
- e. Responsibilities of the DCJTF may include the following.
 - Assuming command if the commander becomes a casualty or is otherwise incapacitated or unavailable to exercise command.

- Serving as principal assistant to the commander.
 - Performing special duties as directed by the CJTF (e.g., chairs the JTCCB, has cognizance of liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ, interagency coordination).
 - Working with the components to keep the CJTF updated.
 - Refining the relationship with the components to ensure the most efficient and effective command relationships.
 - Tracking the CCIR of the CJTF to ensure compliance.
- preparation of staff estimates, OPLANs, or OPORDs. A JTF also may develop a campaign plan and **ensure staff coordination**.
- c. Ensuring staff training is conducted, when appropriate.
 - d. Establishing a scheme to develop a daily schedule for the JTF staff that emphasizes coordination, logic, and the CJTF's CCIR. It is important for the staff to be on a daily schedule that allows them to accomplish all tasks in the most effective and efficient manner.
- This schedule should depict a step-by-step approach that leads to accomplishing the tasks. Daily events (briefings, meetings, shift changes) should support each other and follow a consistent pattern.
 - Often, **this daily schedule is referred to as the “daily operations cycle,” or “battle rhythm.”** The JTF daily operations cycle or battle rhythm is an essential element in ensuring that information is available when and where it is required. Staff members can use this schedule to

6. Chief of Staff

Chief of staff responsibilities may include the following.

- a. Functioning as the principal staff officer and advisor to the CJTF.
- b. Coordinating and directing the work of the staff divisions and supervising the



Daily briefings are part of the joint task force's daily operations cycle.

develop an information requirements flow chart, backward planned from major events, to assure that information is

available when it is required. Figure II-3 depicts (strictly for illustrative purposes) a JTF “daily operations cycle.”

JOINT TASK FORCE DAILY OPERATIONS CYCLE

<i>TIME</i>	<i>EVENT</i>	<i>LOCATION</i>	<i>PARTICIPANTS</i>
<i>NOTE:</i>	SHIFT CHANGE	JOC	BATTLE STAFF/OTHERS AS REQUIRED
<i>EVENT</i>	TARGETING MTG	BRIEFING ROOM	AS REQUIRED
<i>TIME</i>	SITUATION UPDATE TO CJTF	BRIEFING ROOM	CJTF, DCJTF, CofS, IG, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's PERSONAL STAFF, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
<i>IS</i>	PLANS UPDATE TO CJTF	BRIEFING ROOM	CJTF, DCJTF, CofS, IG, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's PERSONAL STAFF, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
<i>SITUATIONALLY</i>	CJTF's CONF CALL TO COMPONENTS	BRIEFING ROOM	CJTF, COMPONENT COMMANDERS
<i>DEPENDENT</i>	JPG	JPG	JPG
	JTCB MEETING	BRIEFING ROOM	DCJTF, J-2, J-3, JFACC, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	DAILY STAFF BRIEF	BRIEFING ROOM	CJTF, DCJTF, CofS, IG, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's PERSONAL STAFF, COMPONENT LIAISON, OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	SHIFT CHANGE	JOC	BATTLE STAFF/OTHERS AS REQUIRED
	JPG	JPG	JPG

CJTF	commander, joint task force	J-5	Plans Directorate of a joint staff
CofS	chief of staff	J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate of a joint staff
DCJTF	deputy commander, joint task force		
IG	inspector general		
J-1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staff	JFACC	joint force air component commander
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff	JOC	Joint Operations Center
J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff	JPG	joint planning group
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a joint staff	JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board

Figure II-3. Joint Task Force Daily Operations Cycle

- e. Representing the CJTF when authorized.
- f. Ensuring the CJTF's decisions and concepts are implemented by directing and assigning staff responsibilities when necessary and reviewing staff actions.

g. **Formulating and announcing staff policies (e.g., message releasing authority; procedures for developing, tracking, and resolution of requests for information [RFIs]; and appointment of a security manager).**

h. Maintaining a master policy file and monitoring standing operating procedures (SOP).

i. **Ensuring required liaison is established.** Liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ may fall under the cognizance of the chief of staff. Liaison personnel from the JTF HQ that are assigned to other headquarters represent the JTF commander. As such, these officers may also fall under the cognizance of the chief of staff. The chief of staff may also be assigned responsibility for information management, establishing policies and procedures that ensure the volumes of information entering and being generated by the staff are being collected, processed, and disseminated in a manner that enhances the functioning of the HQ staff and the JTF as a whole.

7. Personal Staff of the Commander

a. Personal staff and special staff of the commander perform duties as prescribed by the CJTF and handle special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control.

b. This staff may include (based on CJTF guidance) the public affairs officer (PAO), legal officer, chaplain, surgeon, inspector

general (IG), provost marshal (PM), comptroller, political advisors, and others as directed. Further explanation of the responsibilities of a number of these offices follows.

• Public Affairs (PA)

"From their inception, contingency operations are high visibility. The American/world publics, families of Service members, the news media, and the government have an insatiable demand for information that must be made readily and immediately available."

Joint Universal Lessons Learned No. 70344-88264 (06186)

• All operations conducted today will have some type of media coverage; thus the CJTF must be prepared for a tidal wave of media representatives upon arrival in the JOA — television cameras are everywhere. (1) **The CJTF or representative should rehearse what is going to be said to the media prior to arrival in the JOA.** (2) A predeployment media relations "refresher" will enhance the CJTF's ability to address varied interests and agendas of both US and international media. (3) Figure II-4 highlights lessons learned for working with media representatives based on experiences during Operations RESTORE HOPE and UNITED SHIELD in Somalia. These lessons learned lay a solid foundation for working with media representatives in future JTF operations.

• **A media policy must be developed before deployment.** The media can be an asset when dealt with on a professional level.

• To help in handling the media and providing maximum coverage of all

MEDIA GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS, JOINT TASK FORCES

- Understand and Appreciate the Role of the Media in Military Operations.
 - The CJTF must have an objective view of the media.
 - Patience will be required.
 - Some time must be spent [with media representatives] on fundamental education in military terms and doctrine.
 - Most important, realize that media representatives are generally responsible people who will comply with reasonable limitations set by the commander — they can be trusted.
 - They represent the people of the world who have a right to know what is going on, subject to valid security concerns.
- Never Attempt to Manipulate the Media.
 - The CJTF must be forthright and open in dealings with media representatives; anything less is sure to backfire.
 - If there is bad news, it is best to deliver it immediately rather than to be accused later of a cover up.
 - Careful preparation for media interviews is essential.
 - Use members of your staff to assemble pertinent facts and be aware in advance of what you *cannot* reveal due to security reasons.
 - Always consult with the operations officer, the public affairs officer (PAO), and the staff judge advocate in advance of important interviews.
 - Honesty is the best policy.
- Encourage Confidence in Your Subordinates in Their Dealings with the Media.
 - There is no substitute for preparation when it becomes clear that there will be media interest in your operation.
 - Training is indispensable.
 - The best advice to subordinates is to look your best, remember you are representing your Service, and to be honest with media representatives.
 - It may be helpful to remind the troops to 'stay in their lane' and not to speculate about policies that are beyond their pay grade, or to make predictions of upcoming events.
- Use Your PAO Effectively.
 - The PAO is the subject matter expert.
 - The PAO needs to be part of the crisis action team and remain a key part of the planning for the operation.
- The Media Should Have Access, Subject to Mission Limitations.
 - Media representatives need access to the right people and places to be effective.
- Don't Neglect Media Logistics.
 - Support to the media cannot impede the mission or compromise operational security.

Figure II-4. Media Guidance for Commanders, Joint Task Forces

important events, **the JTF should deploy with PA assets as part of the command group.**

"From the beginning of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, media representatives were in the mountains reporting on the plight of displaced Kurds. We decided from the outset that President Bush's objectives for this humanitarian relief operation could be met best by ensuring full access for the media. Therefore, we placed members of the media on our helicopters, in our C-130 aircraft, on our convoys, in our relocation camps, and with our ground forces, including SOF units. Interestingly enough, even though we made several mistakes that were observed by the media, those mistakes never made it to the nightly news. Apparently, our evident commitment to relieving human suffering and our openness to coverage of all aspects of the operation persuaded the media to provide well-balanced, objective coverage of our endeavors and to place in proper perspective those mistakes we did make."

**Gen J. P. McCarthy, USAF
Deputy Commander in Chief
US European Command**

- PAO should be viewed as a force multiplier and be involved during each step of the operational planning process — PA activities should be tailored to support missions across the entire range of military operations. (1) PAO should establish information goals based on guidance from the CJTF. (2) PAO is responsible for developing Annex F (Public Affairs) of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans. (3) PA, CA, and PSYOP staffs must ensure their efforts are coordinated. The formation of an information coordination committee or an Interagency Working Group, under the supervision of the deputies or principals committees, may be necessary to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize information dissemination

plans and activities derived from PA, PSYOP, and other government agencies (OGA) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. (a) A continual exchange of information must exist during execution. (b) **Although PA, CA, and PSYOP messages are different, they must not contradict one another or the credibility of all three will be lost.** Even though each has its own specific audiences, information often will overlap — making message deconfliction crucial. (c) PSYOP can use PA announcements and releases, while PA can highlight PSYOP efforts.

For further details, see JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."

- Establishment of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) should facilitate and control PA coverage within the JOA. (1) The JIB may help improve dissemination of information to internal and external audiences. (2) Additionally, it provides a central location for news and media access and support.

- Depending on the scope and duration of the operation, establishment of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service may be a way to provide news and communicate with members of the JTF.

- Combat Camera is an asset that may be useful to the CJTF. It can enhance both operational and PA missions.

For further details, see JP 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations."

- **Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)**

- **Responsibilities.** Legal services provided to the CJTF and staff include operational law (including law of armed conflict, ROE, law of the sea, airspace law, status-of-forces agreements

(SOFAs), and general international law), military justice, claims, legal assistance, and administrative law (including environmental law, contracts, and fiscal law). The SJA can develop legal guidance concerning the definition and treatment of detained personnel, civilian internees, and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). Many of the subject areas overlap one another, requiring knowledgeable and effective planning by the SJA. SJA drafts Appendix 4 to Annex E (Personnel) of the CJTF's OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan (legal services support plan), drafts general and restrictive orders (such as Desert Shield General Order No. 1 or JTF 190 [Haiti] General Order No. 1), provides advice and assistance in the development, interpretation, and modification of ROE (see Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control," paragraph 9 for more details on ROE), and oversees execution of the legal services support plan at the JTF and component level (component judge advocates are primarily responsible for the execution of the legal services support plan, except as concerns JTF staff members). SJA should review the entire OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan for legal sufficiency. In the role of operational and international law advisor, the SJA will be responsible for providing advice to the various staff sections and boards as requested on the entire range of operational and politico-military issues. The SJA or a representative should be a member of the JTTCB, if one is established (see Chapter VII, "Joint Task Force Operations," paragraph 4c for more details on the JTTCB). The SJA or a representative is a member of the ROE planning cell (see Chapter VII, "Joint Task Force Operations," paragraph 4e for more details on the ROE planning cell).

•• **The planning process.** The SJA should not be called upon simply in the review of OPLANs, OPORDs, and campaign plans. SJA involvement in the planning process from the beginning is especially important to the issues of EPWs, detainees, CA, targeting, and ROE. (1) Sources of law. Law which influences and governs operations is a complex web of foreign and domestic statutes and regulations as well as international treaties and customs. (2) Subject matter. The law impacting military operations goes far beyond traditional military justice matters and legal assistance. It includes the law of war and human rights, claims, contracts and procurement, HNS, fiscal law, environmental law, and SOFAs. (3) Services provided. In addition to providing or coordinating military justice and legal assistance support, the SJA can provide essential services as point of contact with international and NGOs, as negotiator with foreign officials, and as draftsman for command policies, orders, and international agreements.

- **Chaplain**

•• The JTF chaplain has the responsibility to plan, coordinate, and implement all the religious support within the JTF for the commander of the JTF. In addition to advising the CJTF on moral, ethical, and quality of life issues, the chaplain advises on all religious matters relating to religious ministry support. The JTF chaplain is also responsible for the following: (1) Developing joint religious ministry support plans in support of the operation. (This includes preparation of the Appendix 6, Chaplain Activities, under Annex E [Personnel] of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans,

to include appropriate tabs.) (2) Identifying religious ministry support team requirements, including: (a) Personnel staffing and augmentation requirements; and (b) Facilities, equipment, transportation and communication requirements. (3) Organizing the religious ministry support teams to provide comprehensive religious ministry support, which includes: (a) Coordinating religious ministry with Service component command chaplains; (b) Coordinating logistic support requirements; (c) Maintaining liaison with chaplains of international forces and appropriate host nation (HN) civilian religious leaders; and (d) Coordinating appropriate training for religious support personnel. (4) Coordinating with the other staff sections to ensure sufficient religious assets are available to support combat forces, medical services, civilian detainees, prisoners of war, and other related areas. (5) Recommending JTF religious ministry support policy. (6) When appropriate, and in coordination with the CMOC, the JTF chaplain may conduct liaison with NGOs and PVOs that have religious affiliation. The JTF chaplain assists by providing advice on the distribution of humanitarian assistance supplies arriving from churches and other religious organizations. Chaplains should work with the CMOC in providing advice to the commander in situations where religious groups want to send in representatives to work with detained persons. (7) Providing religious support and pastoral care to the JTF staff. (8) Interacting with local religious leaders. (9) Providing assessment to the CJTF and staff on cultural and religious influences on mission accomplishment.

More detailed responsibilities of the JTF chaplain are found in JP 1-05, "Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations."

- **Surgeon**

- The surgeon is responsible for establishing, monitoring, or evaluating jointforce health service support (HSS).

- Responsibilities of the surgeon may include: (1) Advising the CJTF on HSS aspects of the operation; intratheater rest, rotation, and reconstitution; preventive medicine; blood policy and distribution system; and other medical factors that could affect operations. (2) Informing the CJTF on the status of HSS units and assistance required by and provided to the civilian populace, US nationals, and EPW. (3) Advising CA forces on humanitarian and civic assistance activities within the JOA. (4) Coordinating HSS provided to or received from other nations. (5) Establishing and coordinating a comprehensive medical logistics system for Class VIII A and B. (6) Supervising the activities of the necessary medical cells, boards, and centers established at the JTF level. For example: (a) The **Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC)** is under the control of the JTF surgeon, to coordinate and control patient movement (in terms of identifying bed space requirements) within and out of the JOA. JPMRC also generates JTF plans and schedules to execute JTF's patient evacuation to medical treatment facilities in accordance with the supported combatant commander's Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC). JPMRC is established in conjunction with the Global and Theater Patient

Movement Requirements Centers. (b) The **JTF Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO)** is activated on order of the supported combatant command and is within the office of the JTF surgeon. JTF's JBPO is task-organized to plan, coordinate, and direct the handling, storage, and distribution of blood within the JOA. (c) There is a corresponding patient movement center (TPMRC) and JBPO located at the supported combatant command level to assist the JTF. (7) Developing a plan for tactical aeromedical evacuation. (8) Coordinating medical intelligence support for HSS organizations. (9) Developing an extensive preventive medicine program, to include pre- and post-surveillance programs. (10) Ensuring liaison is established with each component surgeon. (11) Preparing the

HSS plan and Annex Q (Medical Services) of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans. (12) Establishing the JTF evacuation policy.

- The surgeon staff should be joint and of sufficient size to accomplish joint coordination of HSS initiatives, standardization and interoperability, and review of component medical plans and operations.

- All aspects of HSS support will have to be coordinated through the JTF staff.

See JP 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations," for more details concerning HSS.

- **Checklist.** The following checklist may be of assistance to the JTF surgeon.

CHECKLIST FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT (HSS)

- Are the medical tasks, functions, and responsibilities delineated and assigned?
- Is a comprehensive medical surveillance plan developed? Predeployment (threat assessment conducted and preventive medicine countermeasures integrated into the plan); deployment (environmental monitoring and disease and nonbattle injury statistics collected); and post-deployment (health assessments) actions?
- Are there any specific plans, policies, agreements, or treaties to consider?
- Are provisions made to provide emergency medical assistance to US nationals in the joint operations area (JOA) and to enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, displaced civilians, and other detained persons?
- Has the theater evacuation policy been established? If so, have requirements for hospitals and patient movement workload been identified?
- Is sufficient medical support available for deploying forces to ensure a continuum of care for those ill, injured, or wounded? Are all units on the time-phased force and deployment data and scheduled for timely arrival?
- Have estimates of medical sustainability and anticipated resupply requirements been established?

CHECKLIST FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT (HSS) (cont'd)

- Have resupply channels been determined? If applicable, have provisions been made to establish a single integrated medical logistics item manager for medical equipment and supplies?
- Has a joint task force (JTF) Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center been established to coordinate movement of patients within and out of the assigned JOA?
- Has a blood program system been established?
- Has a Joint Blood Program Office been activated to plan and coordinate the handling, storage, and distribution of whole blood within the assigned JOA and consolidate and forward resupply requirements to the Armed Services Blood Program Office?
- Have medical personnel augmentation packages been identified and requirements submitted? Do hospitals have enough personnel and equipment to support movement of critical patients? Are there sufficient litters, straps, blankets, and other supplies as required, to support anticipated workload?
- Has a medical evacuation policy been established?
- Have the numbers, types, and locations of patient evacuation conveyances been identified? Are they sufficient to meet projected workload?
- Has an evacuation plan for ground and air ambulances been prepared?
- Are noncombatant evacuees a consideration for HSS?
- Have primary and secondary aeromedical airfields been identified?
 - Are sufficient aeromedical staging assets planned or in place?
 - Are aeromedical evacuation liaison teams located at key locations within each component's medical system?
- Have preventive medicine procedures been established and sufficient personnel identified to ensure protection of the health and well-being of personnel assigned to the JTF?
- Have medical communications channels, frequencies to be used by medical personnel, and any dedicated or medical-unique communication nets, operating procedures, or requirements been identified?
- What does medical intelligence indicate?

CHECKLIST FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT (HSS) (cont'd)

- Has the supported combatant commander requested that Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center be tasked to provide an area medical threat assessment?
- What military forces are involved? What are their organic medical capabilities?
- If other nations are involved, what are their unique medical requirements?
- Are host-nation medical support systems in place?
- What are the HSS reporting requirements?
- Should civilian contracts for medical support be considered?
- Is pre-regulation of patients to specific hospitals required?
- Are sufficient supplies and equipment in place; has a program for sustainability and resupply been established; is a single integrated medical logistics system required?
- Has liaison or coordination with other agencies been established?
- Have all other areas of joint HSS been addressed such as dental, mental health, and veterinary support?

- **Inspector General.** The role of the IG is as important across the range of military operations as it is in a garrison-type environment. The CJTF should strive to have this function as part of the JTF. The IG should be experienced in joint operations and be of a grade (particular rank) that is commensurate with the overall JTF organization.

- Basic IG functions are inspecting, assisting, and investigating.

- IG responsibilities may include: (1) Checking and instilling discipline, ethics, and standards in the JTF; (2) Serving as the CJTF's unbiased consultant for evaluating management and leadership procedures and practices; (3) Improving the force (while protecting the rights of individuals) through timely, complete and impartial inquiries, investigations,

and inspections; (4) Conducting investigations and inquiries to determine the state of readiness, economy, efficiency, discipline, and morale of all JTF-level and subordinate units; (5) Providing reports and assessments on matters relating to C2 and support of assigned forces and joint operational readiness; and (6) Interfacing with interagency organizations to assist in resolving differences with the JTF.

- **Provost Marshal**

- The JTF PM is capable of developing and issuing policies, programs, and guidance for the planning and conduct of military police operations.

- Responsibilities of the PM may include: (1) Assisting with the collection, processing, and reporting of

EPWs; (2) Force protection and physical security policy. (Based on unique experience and training, the PM advises the CJTF on technical and procedural aspects of physical security and force protection.); (3) Law enforcement policy and civilian police liaison. (The PM provides the CJTF with a focal point on all matters of law enforcement planning, policy, and reporting, and provides a liaison for the CJTF with civilian law enforcement authorities.); and (4) Military and security police planning. (Based on the CJTF's intent and operational concept, the PM can recommend ways in which military and security police capabilities can best support the JTF's mission.)

- **Comptroller**

- Finance management support to the JTF includes financial services and resource management functions.
- Responsibilities of the JTF comptroller may include: (1) Serving as the principal financial management advisor to the CJTF; (2) Representing the CJTF in identifying JTF resource and financial service needs to the supported combatant commander, components, and others as required; (3) Establishing JOA financial management responsibilities and coordinating the designation of lead executive agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements; (4) Providing estimates of resource requirements to the supported combatant commander, component commands, and others as required; (5) Establishing positive controls over funding authority received; (6) Coordinating with the JTF J-4 and IG to develop a system for prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse; and (7) Preparing Appendix 3 (Finance and Disbursing) of

Annex E (Personnel) of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

8. Special Staff Group

- a. The special staff group consists of representatives of technical and administrative services and may include representatives from government or nongovernmental agencies.

- b. It furnishes technical, administrative, and tactical advice and recommendations to the CJTF and staff officers.

- c. In addition, it prepares the parts of OPLANs, OPORDs, campaign plans, or estimates in which they have primary interests.

9. JTF Staff Directorates

- a. The joint staff group is made up of staff directorates corresponding to the major functions of command such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and C4.

- b. The Directors or Assistant Chiefs of Staff of each staff directorate provide supervision for the CJTF of all activities pertaining to their respective functions.

- c. Subsequent chapters (Chapters V-X) of this publication discuss each staff directorate and the responsibilities associated with them.

10. Additional Organizational Considerations

- a. Each operation will have peculiar organizational requirements. The following is a synopsis of selected organizational considerations that may be of importance to the CJTF.

- **Special Operations Forces (SOF).** SOF are very valuable assets to a JTF. They possess unique capabilities and often are

capable of achieving success where more conventional forces may falter. SOF are area oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures found in the JOA.

- SOF units can assist the JTF with liaison and coalition support teams to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces.

For further details on SOF-unique capabilities and limitations, see JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,” JP 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,” and JP 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.”

“Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a tremendous success, and JTF-Alpha’s Special Forces Teams were the only ones who could have accomplished the mission in the mountains.”

**Center for Army Lessons Learned
Number 92-6 Dec 92**

- Two very unique and distinct SOF capabilities are PSYOP and CA. In order to maximize PSYOP and CA support to a JTF and fully integrate them into overall JTF missions, they both must be included in planning from the very beginning. (1) Based on mission requirements and planning recommendations, the JTF commander must determine if these functions are required. (2) When deployed to support a JTF, PSYOP and CA may become subordinate task forces under the JTF commander. (3) PSYOP and CA staff officers should also be assigned to the JTF Operations Directorate to conduct staff coordination and planning functions.

- US Army PSYOP and CA forces are all based in the continental United States (CONUS) and are part of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), with the exception of one CA Reserve unit based in Hawaii. US Marine Corps CA forces are organic assets of the Marine air-ground task force. (1) PSYOP and CA forces from the Active Component (AC) normally are the first to deploy to support geographic combatant commands and JTF operations. (2) Reserve Component’s PSYOP and CA forces will provide sustainment forces for longer-term operations for which Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority (PSRC) has been exercised. The RC can provide individual volunteers to augment AC forces during operations without PSRC. (3) Approximately 66 percent of PSYOP forces are in the Army Reserves and 97 percent of CA forces are in the Army and Marine Corps Reserves. (4) Supported geographic combatant commands and JTF commanders must coordinate sourcing and deployment timelines for PSYOP and CA requirements with USSOCOM and the appropriate Services and National Guard Bureau.

- PSYOP is the JTF commander’s voice to foreign target audiences, including foreign friendly and hostile governments, militaries, and populations in the JOA. (1) PSYOP provides the JTF commander with the capability to influence target audiences to support USG and JTF objectives. (2) PSYOP helps to maximize the impact of JTF messages and actions on designated target audiences. (3) PSYOP planners and units develop the PSYOP portions of the geographic combatant commander’s and JTF

commander's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans which include PSYOP objectives and themes for the various phases of the operation, target audiences, types of messages and actions, and dissemination means.

For further details, see JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."

- CA provides the JTF commander with the link between US forces and the civilian government, populace, and various international organizations. (1) In conjunction with the SJA, CA may apprise the JTF commander of the legal and moral obligations with respect to the civilian populace, thereby enhancing the mission's legitimacy. (2) CA personnel must be involved in dealing with civilian issues during combat operations if they are to be optimally effective in post hostilities. (3) CA personnel are responsible for developing Annex G (Civil Affairs) of the JTF commander's OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plans.

For further details, see JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

• **Linguists and Interpreters**

- **Linguists and interpreters are critical to a JTF.** They can support most activities across the range of military operations and are particularly **important in peace operations and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations.**

- The CJTF must identify the requirement for linguists and interpreters as early as possible because of the scarcity of these assets and the long-lead time required to deploy them. **(Historically, the timely and complete sourcing of linguists and interpreters**

has been a problem that significantly impacted both personnel tempo and JTF operations.)

- These assets often are in the RC and must be requested early to ensure availability and timeliness for deployment and employment.

- In past operations (e.g., Operations DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, and JOINT ENDEAVOR), the US military used contracted interpreters to support operations. While this is acceptable for many requirements, some sensitive positions will invariably require military linguists with appropriate security clearances. In cases of less common languages, JTF components may require parent Service or other Service augmentation.

- **Command Historian.** All too often, key events, important decisions, and "how to's" of an operation are not recorded and thus not available for use as learning tools for future JTFs.

- To remedy this situation, consideration should be given to establishing a small staff section to collect historical information covering the many aspects of an operation, from the initial planning process to redeployment.

- This section would be headed by a command historian who could be responsible for capturing and recording JTF events for historical purposes, collecting lessons learned, ensuring turnover files are properly developed, and assisting in the development of SOP. (1) This process would include collecting and cataloguing photographs. (2) Additionally, the historian would ensure a daily record was kept on all important events.

- Cognizance of this staff section will be as directed by the CJTF. (1) This staff section probably would require some independence to be effective. (2) It also should not become entangled in the decision making process.
 - Other methods may be available to record historical data, but having a single staff section dedicated to accomplishing this task would appear to be more productive and practical.
 - **Joint Visitors Bureau.** The anticipated influx of visitors to a JOA may warrant the establishment of a JTF JVB.
 - This bureau can assist the CJTF in handling all visitors but especially distinguished visitors — usually a full-time responsibility.
 - A senior officer should be the director of the JVB. Reservists with a protocol background have been used in this position in past operations.
 - JVB should be established as a separate entity and not as part of the JIB or PA office. It can work directly for the CJTF, DCJTF, or chief of staff.
 - It should be comprised of representatives from the components.
 - Possessing sufficient communications capability is vital to the JVB.
 - Personnel assigned to the JVB may require security training (e.g., executive protection, antiterrorism, patrolling, communications) and training in the proper handling of distinguished visitors.
 - **Civil-Military Operations Center.** Depending on the scope of the operation, the CJTF may have to coordinate and
 - work with OGA, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations that will be operating within the affected area. Promoting unity of effort is paramount to successful mission accomplishment.
 - If this is the situation, the establishment of an organization such as a CMOC may be warranted.
 - A CMOC serves as the primary interface between OGA, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations within the JOA.
 - It should coordinate US and multinational forces' goals and operations with those of HN and "in-sector" relief and Service organizations.
 - Overall management of a CMOC may be assigned to a multinational force commander, shared by a US and a multinational commander, or shared by a US commander and a civilian agency head. In a US military-managed CMOC, the J-3 normally is responsible for the management of, or participation in the CMOC. CMOC may be a suborganization of the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF), and the CMOC may have suborganizations to accommodate military or geographic requirements. The director of the CMOC must have unlimited access to the CJTF.
- For further details, see JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs," and JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations."*
- **Joint Planning Group.** A JPG would be used to assist in the planning and other directed tasks. Chapter IX, "Joint Task Force Plans and Policy," discusses JPGs in detail.
 - **Assessment Team**

- **If practicable**, deployment of an assessment team to the projected JOA may be a valuable tool, especially in the mission analysis process.
- The purpose of the assessment team is normally liaison with the Ambassador or Chief of Mission. This team can validate the mission analysis process, reduce duplication of effort, and provide a rational division of labor. In addition, it can assist in clarifying the mission, determine force requirements to accomplish the mission, establish a sequence for force deployment, evaluate HNS, and determine if there are any ongoing operations being conducted by other than military forces.
- The CJTF determines the composition of the assessment team. (1) It should contain members who are “subject matter experts” and that represent Service components expected to participate in the actual operation. (2) When possible, the CJTF or personal representative should be a member of this team.
- **Contracting Officer**
 - The JTF would be well served to have contracting personnel as part of its organization.
 - Contracting is essential in providing supplies, services, and equipment that cannot be deployed from home station.
 - For the JTF to successfully conduct contracting, highly trained contracting personnel are required.
 - See Chapter VIII, “Joint Task Force Logistics,” for more detail on contracting.
- **Multinational Forces.** It is imperative that the CJTF determine at what level multinational participation is expected, whether as actual operational participation or for coordination purposes only.
 - When multinational forces are part of the JTF, members of these forces should be integrated into the staff. (1) A CJTF may gain insight into the capabilities of these forces by the above action. (2) Integration of these members into the JTF staff also promotes an atmosphere of trust and respect. (3) The CJTF should ensure that appropriate liaison personnel are provided to all multinational forces (SOF could provide this capability).
 - One of the most important tasks the CJTF will have in working with multinational forces is consensus building. There must be compatibility between all multinational partners. (1) Compatibility must be attained at the political, military, and cultural levels. (2) Following are areas that may impact on compatibility: (a) Political reasons for participation in the operation may vary from country to country; (b) Interoperability (e.g., command, control, and communications and logistics); and (c) Cultural differences.
 - Other Considerations: (1) Promulgate guidance on the dissemination of classified material to multinational staff members. The local policy must conform to the National Disclosure Policy and can be coordinated through the intelligence directorate of the combatant command. Will there be workspace restrictions? (2) Language barriers with some multinational staff members may inhibit a smooth working relationship. (3) Differences in force capabilities and doctrine may play a role in how well multinational members can assist the JTF staff. (4) As mentioned above, political differences and what each multinational force is actually willing to do may prevent

that force's staff representative from being totally cooperative without first obtaining home-country concurrence.

(5) Differences in each nation's ROE must be identified early and considered when assigning missions to forces. (6) Other factors may impact on how well multinational forces can operate, but many of these can be overcome by the CJTF making each multinational force feel like a contributor. This applies to multinational members as part of the JTF staff as well ("team building").

For further details, see JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations."

b. As previously discussed, the CJTF must identify specific staff requirements and how the JTF staff will be organized.

SECTION C. SEMI-PERMANENT JTFs

11. General

Some JTFs may evolve into semi-permanent JTFs. This means that, at some point, missions of these JTFs will change. A decision will be made not to dissolve these JTFs, but rather to have them continue with a revised mission. These types of JTFs will be designated as semi-permanent JTFs.

An example of a JTF that could have transitioned to a semi-permanent JTF was during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT when the humanitarian mission changed to a security and humanitarian mission, then to a security mission, largely as a result of events occurring in northern Iraq.

a. Once a decision has been reached to continue a JTF with a follow-on or expanded

mission, the CJTF must provide guidance to the staff to commence planning for this transition.

b. A top priority will be to conduct an indepth mission analysis. Once this analysis is complete, all areas (e.g., concept of operations, force security, training, force structure and requirements, command relationships, ROE) associated with the JTF must be evaluated.

c. Time is a significant factor, affecting semi-permanent JTFs in at least two ways.

- There may not be much time allotted to planning for transition to a semi-permanent JTF with respect to organization, staffing, and execution of initial responsibilities. Use of the original JTF organization and staffing to the greatest extent possible will facilitate timely planning and initial execution.
- Rotation of personnel from CONUS to overseas duty in a semi-permanent JTF is another time factor. An equitable rotation policy must be planned and implemented in the early stages of forming a semi-permanent JTF. A combination of unit and individual personnel rotation provides maximum flexibility without undermining operational effectiveness.

d. From the analysis and JTF evaluation, the CJTF will be able to determine requirements and provide them to higher authority.

12. Checklist

The following checklist may assist the JTF in the transition process.

**CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION TO SEMI-PERMANENT
JOINT TASK FORCES (JTFs)**

- Review mission statement — be aware of “mission creep” (prevalent in some military operations other than war — e.g., peace operations and humanitarian assistance operations).
 - Conduct mission analysis — deploy an assessment team when practical.
 - Issue planning guidance.
 - Provide commander’s intent.
 - Determine new or adjust current rules of engagement (ROE) — request supplemental ROE.
 - Identify end state or define ongoing operations.
 - Develop courses of action (COAs) — staff estimates.
 - Analyze and compare COAs.
 - Select or modify COAs.
 - Adjust or develop time-phased force and deployment data.
 - Issue fragmentary order or operation order.
- Determine command relationships.
- Validate the joint operations area (JOA) with the supported combatant commander — establish headquarters (HQ) area.
- Assign or adjust components’ areas of operations.
- Identify (new) basing requirements, where appropriate.
- Develop information management plan.
- Seek new host-nation support agreements, when necessary.
- Coordinate with appropriate US Diplomatic Mission.
- Determine force (combat and support) requirements.
 - Determine JTF HQ structure.

CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION TO SEMI-PERMANENT JOINT TASK FORCES (JTFs) (cont'd)

- Identify critical billet requirements. Is there a requirement for additional depth on the staff? For example, is there a need for an inspector general?
- Identify critical equipment requirements — communications equipment.
- Determine JTF organization. Will functional components be required in addition to Service components?
- Identify to supported combatant commander all new requirements — forces, equipment, personnel.
- Reevaluate the JTF's and components' personnel rotation policy based on new mission.
- If they are available, plan for transition to fixed communications infrastructure and/or contracted services.
- Plan for transition to fixed communications infrastructure and/or contracted command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence services.
- Develop a redeployment plan for those units and personnel no longer required.
 - Identify what equipment must stay behind from any redeploying units.
 - Coordinate with components and supported and/or supporting combatant commander on stay-behind equipment.
- Reinforce force security requirements. Force security is of utmost importance during a transition period.
- Evaluate JTF training and exercise program for units and personnel.
 - Develop and implement joint training and theater indoctrination programs for units rotating into the JOA.
 - Establish or strengthen training programs for JTF headquarters.
 - Prioritize joint training where required — training needs to incorporate all parts of the JTF.
 - Develop or adjust exercise program — especially important for new units and personnel.

**CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION TO SEMI-PERMANENT
JOINT TASK FORCES (JTFs) (cont'd)**

- Develop a program that enhances military awareness among JTF personnel.
 - Review joint doctrine that pertains to the mission.
 - Reinforce the importance of the mission and staying abreast of the situation.
 - Highlight the importance of working as a “team.”
- Use public affairs to emphasize JTF accomplishments and to reassure the “home front.”
- Reevaluate or establish morale, welfare, and recreation requirements — means to prevent or reduce complacency.

**SECTION D. JOINT TASK
FORCE LIAISON PERSONNEL**

“During [Operation] JUST CAUSE, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to also convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general, and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit’s capabilities, and make recommendations.”

**LTG C. W. Stiner, USA
Cdr, JTF South
Operation JUST CAUSE**

13. General

a. The CJTF must identify the requirement for liaison personnel and request them at the earliest opportunity. Per this request, any specific qualifications and functions for these personnel should be noted by the CJTF.

- The CJTF should establish a familiarization program for all liaison

personnel — a JPRC could perform this requirement.

- The CJTF must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall cognizance of all liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ for duty (e.g., DCJTF, chief of staff, or J-3).
 - b. The maximum use of liaison personnel will enhance interoperability and contribute significantly to mission success.
 - c. Liaison personnel should be established between the JTF HQ and higher commands, between adjacent units, and between supporting, attached, and assigned forces and the JTF HQ.

- Liaison personnel to the JTF HQ perform their duties within the JTF staff division that is normally responsible for JTF functions related to the liaison personnel’s assigned duties.
- They are representatives of their commanders and normally will attend briefings and maintain close contact with the JTF Joint Operations Center (JOC).

LIAISON FUNCTIONS

Monitor, coordinate, advise, participate in operation planning, and assist the command to which liaison is attached.

d. Liaison personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and Services. Without these qualifications they are of little value to the gaining HQ.

- Component liaison personnel to the JTF HQ should be of sufficient rank (**recommend equal rank of JTF**

primary staff officers) to influence the decision making process.

- Liaison personnel may be authorized to answer certain routine CJTF queries on behalf of their commands.
- In addition, the CJTF should not formally task components through the component liaison personnel to the JTF HQ. Formal tasking of components by the CJTF should be accomplished through normal C2 channels.

14. Checklist

The following checklist may assist liaison personnel in performing their functions.

CHECKLIST FOR LIAISON PERSONNEL

- Before departure for the gaining headquarters (HQ), liaison personnel should:
 - Be thoroughly briefed on:
 - The current situation of their parent unit.
 - Their commander's intent, including details of the concept of operations (e.g., unit locations and combat readiness factors such as personnel strength and logistics considerations).
 - The current status and missions of the unit to which they are being sent.
 - Operations security applicable to the mission.
 - Obtain specific information and/or liaison requirements from each staff section.
 - Understand clearly their mission and responsibilities.
 - Ensure that arrangements for **communications, computer systems, and transportation** will meet mission requirements (e.g., check radios, joint communications-electronics operating instructions, challenge and passwords, rations).

CHECKLIST FOR LIAISON PERSONNEL (cont'd)

- Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances.
- If conducting liaison with a multinational unit, check language and interpreter requirements.
- Become familiar with the potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, and operational procedures of their unit and, to the extent possible, those of the unit to which they are being sent.
- Become familiar with command relationships among all major commands participating in the operation.
- On arrival at the HQ to which sent, the liaison personnel should:
 - Report to the supported commander or their representative (e.g., deputy commander, joint task force, chief of staff, or J-3), state their mission and exhibit their directive or credentials (if in writing), offer assistance, and be prepared to brief them on their unit's situation.**
 - Visit each staff section, provide information as required, and obtain all information required to be transmitted to their unit.
 - Establish communication with their unit and exchange updated information, as required.
- During the liaison tour, liaison personnel should:
 - Keep informed of the situation of their own unit and make that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which they are sent. (Such action is of special importance to liaison personnel of attached or supporting units.)
 - Find out how their parent command will be employed (e.g., mission, unit location, future locations, future operations, commander's intent).
 - Accomplish their mission without interfering with the operations of the HQ to which they are sent.
 - Report promptly to their own HQ if they are unable to accomplish their liaison mission.
 - Report to their parent command on those matters within the scope of their mission.

CHECKLIST FOR LIAISON PERSONNEL (cont'd)

- As permitted by official orders, inform the visited unit commander of the content of reports dispatched to the liaison personnel's parent HQ.
- Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or commander about:
 - Significant problems being experienced by the liaison personnel's parent unit that could affect operations of other commands and vice versa.
 - Liaison personnel suggestions to enhance the effective employment of their parent command.
 - Liaison personnel recommendations concerning improved procedures for maximizing the effectiveness of their parent commands.
- Ensure the liaison location at the HQ is known at all times (e.g., inform the joint operations center's duty officer or chief of staff of daily activities).
- Advise parent unit (if possible) of departure from the liaison location.
- Attend the commander, joint task force's daily situation update briefing and other meetings, as required.
- Keep an appropriate record of their actions and reports.
- Report their departure to the visited unit commander at the completion of their mission.
- Upon return to their own HQ, liaison personnel should:
 - Brief the commander or designated representative on all pertinent information received during their visit (e.g., detailed information concerning the mission of the higher HQ unit locations, future locations, and commander's intent).
 - Transmit promptly any request of the visited commander.
 - Transmit mission requirements and requests for information from the visited HQ.
 - Transmit information required by higher HQ in each staff area.
 - Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison requirements.

CHAPTER III

JOINT TASK FORCE SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

"To the joint force team, all forms of combat power present advantages for exploitation."

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States




1. General

a. Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands and subordinate task forces with operational responsibilities.

Figure III-1 illustrates possible JTF subordinates.

b. All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are

POSSIBLE JOINT TASK FORCE SUBORDINATES



Notes:

1. A joint force always contains Service components (because of administrative and logistic support and training responsibilities).
2. A joint force composition can be a mixture of the above. (Navy and Marine Corps forces alone will not constitute a joint force).
3. There also may be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.

ARFOR	Army forces
AFFOR	Air Force forces
MARFOR	Marine Corps forces
NAVFOR	Navy forces

Figure III-1. Possible Joint Task Force Subordinates

provided through Service component commands.

c. Both Service and functional component commanders have the following general responsibilities.

- Coordinate with commanders of other JTF components to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. In addition, coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized and as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.

- Plan and conduct operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans.

- Monitor the operational situation and, as required, pass information to the CJTF.

- **Provide liaison personnel to the CJTF, other component commanders, and supporting commanders as necessary or as directed by the CJTF.**

d. Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command and Control,” discusses C2 as it relates to subordinate commands.

e. The intent of the remainder of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of Service and functional components.

2. Service Component Commands

JTF-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all Service forces that have been assigned to the task force. Examples of Service component commands are: Army Forces, Air Force forces, Navy forces, and Marine Corps forces. Figure III-2 highlights a number of Service component commanders' responsibilities.

3. Functional Component Commands

a. **CJTFs have the authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations. Mission-type orders normally are issued by the CJTF to all components — with receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the CJTF's intent and concept of operations.**

b. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission.

c. Functional component commanders have authority over forces or military capabilities made available to them.

d. **Functional component commands may be established across the range of military operations to perform operational missions that may be of short or extended duration.**

e. CJTFs establishing a functional component command have the **authority to**

designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the CJTF will always consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander.

f. The CJTF must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise (e.g., a joint force special operations component commander [JFSOCC] normally has OPCON of assigned forces, and a JFACC normally is delegated tactical control [TACON] of the sorties or other military capability made available).

g. **The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the CJTF.** Establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the CJTF.

- The commander of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the CJTF on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.
- The functional component commander normally will be a Service component commander. As a Service component commander, the functional component commander also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces.
 - When a functional component command is composed of forces of two or more Services, the functional component commander must be

POSSIBLE SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES

- Making recommendations to the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.
- Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
- Assuming responsibility for areas of operations, if assigned (land and naval forces).
- Coordinating logistic support through Service channels for the forces of the Service component.
- Informing their CJTF of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability.
- Retaining responsibility for certain Service-specific functions such as internal administration, training, logistics, and Service component intelligence operations.
- Conducting joint training.
- Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to other subordinate forces.
- Providing, as requested, supporting joint operation and exercise plans.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.
- Planning and coordinating operations and employing Service forces in support of CJTF's concept of operations.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.
- Coordinating with other joint task force component and subordinate task forces to ensure that most efficient support is provided to the CJTF.
- Evaluating the results of operations.
- Focusing on operational-level Service core capabilities.
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.

Figure III-2. Possible Service Component Commanders' Responsibilities

cognizant of the constraints imposed by logistics factors on the capability of the assigned forces and the responsibilities retained by the Services.

•• When a functional component command will employ forces from

more than one Service, the functional component commander's staff must be joint in order to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available — this requires advance planning for efficient operations. (1)

Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill these billets should be identified, and those individuals should be used when the functional component command is formed for exercises or actual operations. (2) The number of personnel on this staff should be kept to a minimum and should be consistent with the task performed. (3) The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without loss in coordination or capability. (4) The staff should generally reflect the composition of the functional component command.

See JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," and JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," for more details on functional components.

h. Examples of Functional Component Commanders.

- **Joint Force Air Component Commander**

- The CJTF normally will designate a JFACC. The CJTF will base the decision to designate a JFACC on several factors, such as: the CJTF's overall mission, concept of operations, the missions and tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, forces available, and the duration and nature of C2 of joint air operations required. A CJTF will assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations.

- **The authority and command relationships of the JFACC are established by the CJTF.** These typically include exercising OPCON over assigned and attached forces and TACON over military capabilities and forces made available for tasking. The

CJTF also may establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations.

- **The responsibilities of the JFACC are assigned by the CJTF.** Specific JFACC responsibilities may include those in Figure III-3.

- **JFACC Staff Organization.** (1) **JFACC staff should include appropriate component representation at all levels** so that it represents the composition of the JTF. Augmentees from the other Services comprising the joint force air component command add the necessary expertise to ensure the proper conduct of operations. (2) Individuals to fill the JFACC billets should be identified and trained during peacetime and used when this type of staff is formed for exercises and actual operations to ensure an effective transition to combat operations.

For further details, see JP 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations."

- **Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)**

- When required, the CJTF designates a JFLCC and establishes this commander's authority and responsibilities.

- The designation of a JFLCC may occur when major land forces of more than one Service component will participate in a major land operation and the CJTF ascertains that this will assist in **achieving unity of command and maintaining unity of effort among land forces.**

- Consider the following when deciding upon the formation of a JFLCC: availability of ports of debarkation;

POSSIBLE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on the proper employment of all forces under control of the JFACC.
- Developing a joint air operations plan in support of the CJTF's concept of operations.
- Recommending to the CJTF apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders.
- Plan, coordinate, allocate, and task joint air operations in accordance with CJTF concept of operations and air apportionment decisions.
- Controlling execution of joint air operations as specified by the CJTF.
- Coordinating joint air operations with the other joint task force component commanders and subordinate task forces to ensure that the most efficient support is provided to the CJTF.
- Evaluating the results of joint air operations.
- Performing the duties of the airspace control authority and/or performing the duties of the area air defense commander **when assigned by the CJTF.**
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.

Figure III-3. Possible Joint Force Air Component Commander Responsibilities

amount of mutual support possible between land forces; duration of the mission; requirement for land force simultaneous or sequential operations; likelihood of land forces operating adjacent to one another; requirements for special capabilities resident in one land force being required for use by the other;

and amount, level of intensity, and requirement for coordination of other component support to land forces.

- If designated, the JFLCC is normally the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite C2 capabilities.

- Figure III-4 highlights some of the responsibilities the CJTF may assign the JFLCC.

- **JFLCC Staff Organization.** (1) This staff should be representative of the total land force that comprises the joint force land component command. (2) The “core” of the staff may be provided by the Service component commander who has been designated as the JFLCC. Augmentees from the other Services comprising the joint force land component command add the necessary expertise to ensure the proper conduct of

operations. (3) If multinational ground forces are involved in the joint force land component, individuals from the various multinational Services also should be members of this staff. (4) Personnel to fill the JFLCC billets should be identified and trained during peacetime and used when this type of staff is formed for exercises and actual operations to ensure an effective transition to combat operations.

For further details, see JP 3-56, “Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

POSSIBLE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on the proper employment of all land forces under control of the JFLCC.
- Planning and coordinating land operations and employing designated land forces in support of the CJTF’s concept of operations.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.
- Coordinating with the other joint task force component commanders and subordinate task forces to ensure the most efficient support is provided to the CJTF.
- Evaluating the results of land operations.
- Focusing on operational-level functions and their span of control.
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.

Figure III-4. Possible Joint Force Land Component Commander Responsibilities

• **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)**

- The CJTF may designate a JFMCC when joint forces are participating in joint or multinational military operations at sea (e.g., maritime forcible entry operation).

- These operations may include projection of combat power ashore, control of essential sea and maritime battlespace, joint C4, deployment and sustainment of naval and joint forces, and the deterrence and containment of crises.

- Consider the following when deciding upon the formation of a JFMCC; the nature of the joint operation as one of primarily air, land, or sea; the use of non-US Navy vessels; the requirement of other components to support maritime operations; the requirement for maritime operations to extend inland (riverine and amphibious operations); enemy capability to influence maritime operations from other environments (land and air).

- The JFMCC has functional responsibility for planning and when directed, executing maritime operations — also may be designated the JFACC.

- The authority and command relationships of the JFMCC are established by the CJTF. **Mission-type orders normally are issued by the CJTF to all components. With receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the CJTF's intent and concept of operations.** Figure III-5 depicts some possible responsibilities of the JFMCC.

- **JFMCC Staff Organization.** (1) This staff should be representative of the force to ensure that expertise in all areas of operations and proper support is

provided to other JTF components. (2) The “core” of the staff may be provided by the Service component commander who has been designated as the JFMCC. Augmentees from the other Services comprising the joint force maritime component command add the necessary expertise to ensure the proper conduct of operations. (3) Personnel to fill the JFMCC billets should be identified and trained during peacetime and used when this type of staff is formed for exercises and actual operations to ensure an effective transition to combat operations.

For further details, see JP 3-56, “Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

• **Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander**

- The CJTF may designate a JFSOCC to accomplish a specific mission or control SOF in the JOA. (1) The JFSOCC normally will be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2. (2) Normally, the JFSOCC is the commander of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF).

- Normally, the JFSOCC exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached forces.

- The JFSOCC allocates forces against strategic or operational tasks and in support of other JTF component commanders based on guidance from the CJTF.

- SOF C4 doctrine normally favors centralized planning and decentralized execution. The JFSOCC normally will delegate OPCON to the lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination.

- Figure III-6 illustrates a number of possible responsibilities of the JFSOCC.

POSSIBLE JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on the proper employment of all maritime forces under control of the JFMCC.
- Planning and coordinating maritime operations and employing designated maritime forces in support of the CJTF's concept of operations.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.
- Coordinating with the other joint task force component commanders and subordinate task forces to ensure the most efficient support is provided to the CJTF.
- Evaluating the results of maritime operations.
- Focusing on operational-level functions and their span of control.
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.

Figure III-5. Possible Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Responsibilities

•• A joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC) also may be established by the JFSOCC. (1) A JSOACC is the subordinate commander within a JSOTF responsible for planning and executing joint special operations air operations. The special operations liaison element (SOLE), in close coordination with all JFSOCC components, coordinates and deconflicts special operations surface and air operations with conventional air forces. (a) JFSOCC provides a SOLE to the JFACC or joint force commander staff or appropriate Service component air C2

facility to coordinate and synchronize SOF air and surface operations with joint air operations. (b) Shared asset coordination and fratricide prevention are the major SOLE responsibilities. SOLE must consider airborne fire support and reconnaissance, C2 platforms, aerial refueling, and deconfliction of deep operations. (c) The senior SOLE representative works directly for the JFSOCC and assigns liaison officers throughout the joint air operations center (JAOC). Under the direction of the senior SOLE representative, these **liaison officers provide SOF air and ground**

POSSIBLE JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on the proper employment of special operations forces (SOF) and assets.
- Planning and coordinating special operations (SO) and employing designated SOF in support of the CJTF's concept of operations.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.
- Coordinating the conduct of SO with the other joint task force component commanders and subordinate task forces.
- Evaluating the results of SO.
- Focusing on operational-level functions and their span of control.
- Synchronizing sustainment for SOF.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.

Figure III-6. Possible Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander Responsibilities

operations expertise throughout the JAOC. (2) Normally, the JSOACC will be the SOF aviation commander providing the preponderance of air assets or being most capable of controlling special air operations in a specific situation.

•• The CJTF may define a JSOA for use by the JSOTF. The establishment of a JSOA may delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

For further details, see JP 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," JP 3-05.3, "Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures," and JP 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures."

4. Special Purpose Subordinate Task Forces

Because of the special nature of PSYOP and CA activities and the politically high visibility of these operations, the CJTF may desire to establish separate task forces for these

KEY TERM

Joint Special Operations Task Force

- A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service.
- Formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations.
- May have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

activities. **However in certain circumstances, CA and PSYOP personnel may be attached to the JSOTF as required. Normally, the PSYOP and CA task forces work directly for the CJTF under the staff supervision of the J-3.**

- The “core” of the staff probably will be formed by CA personnel and other assets of the United States Army.

For further details, see JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

a. Commander, Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

- The JCMOTF may be established by the CJTF when the scope of civil-military operations (CMO) in the JOA require coordination and activities beyond that which CA representation on the staff could accomplish.
- It may be developed to meet a specific CMO contingency mission (e.g., supporting humanitarian or nation assistance operations or an operation of limited duration).
- Figure III-7 depicts some of the possible responsibilities of the JCMOTF.
- **JCMOTF Staff Organization**

- The composition of this organization should be representative of the forces comprising the JTF.

b. Commander, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)

- The CJTF may establish a JPOTF based on mission analysis.
- A JPOTF is capable of supporting activities across the range of military operations.
- Figure III-8 describes some of the possible JPOTF responsibilities.
- **JPOTF Staff Organization.** The composition of the JPOTF staff primarily will be filled by United States Army and Air Force personnel.

For further details, see JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

POSSIBLE JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on policy, funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
- Providing command and control or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint US forces.
- Assisting in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.
- Performing essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies, Country Team, United Nations agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and host-nation military forces and supporting logistics organizations.
- Assisting in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
- Planning and conducting joint and combined civil-military operations training exercises.
- Allocating resources and sustaining and coordinating combat support or combat service support elements, including necessary medical, transportation, military police, engineer, and associated maintenance and communications capabilities.
- Advising and assisting in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitating transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other United States Government (USG) agencies, international organizations, or host-nation responsibility.
- Assessing or identifying host-nation civil support, relief, or funding requirements to the CJTF for transmission to supporting commanders, Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.

Figure III-7. Possible Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities

POSSIBLE JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on psychological operations (PSYOP).
- Conducting PSYOP planning and execution.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.
- Producing PSYOP products.
- Coordinating with the other subordinate task forces and components to ensure that the most efficient support is provided to the CJTF.
- Conducting PSYOP dissemination operations.
- Evaluating the results of PSYOP.
- Conducting liaison with host-nation agencies and other United States Government organizations.
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.

Figure III-8. Possible Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Responsibilities

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CHAPTER IV

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

"If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well."

Stonewall Jackson, Winchester, VA, November 1861

1. General

a. JTF establishing authority exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) or OPCON of the JTF. **COCOM is exercised only by combatant commanders.**

b. JTF establishing authority will assign or attach forces to the JTF as appropriate. Forces transferred to the JTF for an unknown but long period of time will be assigned; forces transferred temporarily to the JTF will be attached.

c. **The CJTF exercises OPCON over assigned and (normally) over attached forces through designated component or subordinate task force commanders.** The CJTF may delegate OPCON or TACON of, or establish supported and/or supporting relationships for, specific JTF forces or military capability to and/or between subordinate commanders to accomplish specified tasks or missions. The CJTF also may delegate other authorities within the JTF as listed in paragraph 3 below. **Specific guidance concerning JTF command relationships will be found in Annex J (Command Relationships) of the JTF and component and subordinate task force OPORDs, OPLANS, or campaign plans.** Figure IV-1 illustrates typical JTF command relationships.

d. **The CJTF is responsible for determining the basis on which JTF component and subordinate task force commanders will exercise C2 and for clearly assigning responsibilities,**

authorities, and command relationships.

Assignment of command relationships and the establishment of coordinating instructions are particularly important when JTF component and subordinate task force commanders are assigned missions that bring their forces into common or contiguous areas.

See JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)" and JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," for detailed guidance concerning C2 of joint forces.

2. Support

Support is a command relationship established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another. The CJTF may establish support relationships within the JTF to enhance unity of effort. **The four categories of support** are as follows.

a. **Mutual Support.** Action that **units render each other against an enemy** because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.

b. **General Support.** Action given **to the supported force as a whole** rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.

c. **Direct Support.** A mission requiring a force to **support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly** the supported force's request for assistance.




Figure IV-1. Typical Joint Task Force Command Relationships

d. **Close Support.** Action of the **supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force** as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

3. Other Authorities

Other authorities outside the command relations delineated above are described below. **Three categories of such authority are administrative control, coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).**

a. **Administrative Control.** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support.

- Includes organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment,

personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

- May be **delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces** assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command.
- **Subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.**

b. **Coordinating Authority.** Authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority by which command may be exercised.

KEY TERMS

Operational Control

- authority to perform functions of command involving:
 - ■ organization and employment of commands and forces
 - ■ assignment of tasks and designation of objectives
 - ■ authoritative direction for operations and training
- normally exercised through commanders of subordinate joint force and Service and/or functional component commanders
- **does not include authoritative direction for:**
 - ■ logistics
 - ■ administration, discipline, or internal organization
 - ■ unit training

Tactical Control

- authority over assigned or attached forces or capability
- usually limited to detailed local direction and control
- typically exercised by functional component commanders over military forces or capability made available for tasking
- **does not include authoritative direction for:**
 - ■ organizational authority
 - ■ administrative and logistic support

Direct Support

- a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance

- The commander or individual has the **authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement.**
- Common **tasks to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive** without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters.
- **Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities** than to operations; it is not in any way tied to force assignment and will be assigned based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.
- c. **Direct Liaison Authorized.** Authority granted by a commander to a subordinate **to consult or coordinate**

directly an action with a command or agency inside or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed.

4. JTF Command and Control Considerations

a. Planning

- **C2 arrangements and relationships during planning should be specified in the initiating directive** (e.g., warning order, alert or planning order, and execute order) issued by the JTF establishing authority.
- If not, the designated CJTF immediately should request this guidance from the JTF establishing authority and ensure this guidance is forwarded expeditiously to designated JTF component commanders when received.
- In the continued absence of this guidance, the designated CJTF should review pertinent available OPLANs and CONPLANs for related C2 guidance in the prospective JOA.

b. Deployment. C2 of the deployment should remain with the JTF establishing authority or with the CJTF at predeployment HQ until sufficient JTF HQ deployment increments have closed at forward locations to provide C2 capabilities required to control deployed or deploying JTF forces.

c. Employment

- **C2 for employment of JTF forces should be clearly established in**

appropriate JTF and component and subordinate task force OPORDs.

- Initial C2 arrangements may be designated in OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans and modified as required during JTF operations in the JOA.

d. Termination

- **Termination C2 considerations should be included in planning from the very beginning.**
- Level of attainment of end state objectives will have some impact on the configuration of C2 arrangements and relationships, particularly the requirements to provide organic sustainment and self-protection during the termination phase in a JOA where little if any HNS is available. The CJTF should maintain C2 of assigned and attached forces in the JOA until the last increment is redeployed.

e. Transition

- Transition C2 considerations will **vary greatly from situation to situation, but should take into account the nature of envisioned continuing operations** in the former JTF JOA and the make-up of the forces involved, i.e., other US forces or a multinational force.
- The supported combatant commander should provide specific C2 guidance as soon as it is determined that JTF operations will transition to follow-on operations within the former JTF JOA.

f. Redeployment. C2 of redeploying forces should remain with the CJTF in the JOA until the CJTF is relieved of responsibility for JTF operations in the JOA, and sufficient JTF HQ redeployment

increments have closed at redeployment sites to provide C2 capabilities to control redeployed or redeploying forces.

5. Component and Subordinate Task Force Command and Control

a. **OPCON.** Service and functional component and subordinate task force commanders normally exercise OPCON of assigned and attached forces.

b. **TACON. Functional component commanders normally exercise TACON of forces and military capabilities made available to the functional component for tasking.** For example, the JFACC normally exercises TACON of sorties or other military capabilities or forces made available to the joint force air component for tasking.

6. Supported and Supporting Commanders

a. Support relationships afford **an effective means to weigh (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations, with each component or subordinate task force** typically receiving and providing support at the same time. For example, a land force may be supported for a deep maneuver, a joint force air component for theater counterair and direct attack of enemy centers of gravity, a maritime force for sea control and an amphibious forcible entry, and a special operations task force for direct action and other missions.

b. The joint force commander (JFC) organizes forces to best accomplish the mission and assigns responsibilities, establishes supported and supporting relationships, and provides any necessary coordinating instructions. The JFACC is normally the supported commander for counterair and air interdiction, and may be the supported commander for strategic attack. To coordinate and deconflict joint operations

within the JOA, and to facilitate sustained land or naval operations, a CJTF may designate AOs for the JTF's land and naval forces. Within these CJTF-designated AOs, the land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs. Within the JTF JOA, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs with JOA-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the CJTF establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the JOA, including within land and naval force commanders' AOs. In coordination with the supported land and/or naval force commander, those commanders designated by the CJTF to execute JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC-prioritized operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs.

c. Supported Commander

- **Exercises the degree of authority over supporting forces as determined by the CJTF.**
- Exercises general direction of the supporting effort as follows.
 - Designation and prioritization of targets or objectives.
 - Timing and duration of the supporting action.
 - Other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

d. Supporting Commander

- **Exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces.**

- **Prescribes the tactics, methods, communications, and procedures to be employed** by elements of the supporting force in fulfilling objectives, timing, and duration of the supporting action within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.
- **Coordinates with the supported commander and other supporting commanders as necessary** to ensure effective and efficient support.
- Monitors the operational situation and, as required, keeps the supported commander informed.
- Provides liaison personnel to the supported commander and other supporting commanders as necessary or directed by the CJTF.

7. Specialized JTF Assignments

Assignment of specialized coordination and control functions and responsibilities such as airspace control authority (ACA), area air defense commander (AADC), and joint rear area coordinator (JRAC), if used, **should be made as early as practical** in the planning cycle. In addition, the authority, duties, and responsibilities of these assignments should be articulated clearly and promulgated widely.

Additional guidance concerning the authority and responsibilities of the ACA and the AADC may be found in JP 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations,” JP 3-01, “Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats,” JP 3-01.5, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense,” and JP 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone”.

Additional guidance concerning the authority and responsibilities of the JRAC may be found

in JP 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations,” and JP 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.”

8. JTF Control and Coordination Measures

- a. **Control and coordination measures**, such as no-fire areas (NFAs), fire support coordination line (FSCL), D-day, and H-hour, **should be established as early as possible** and widely promulgated consistent with operations security (OPSEC) procedures.
- b. The sometimes frenzied pace and close proximity of various ongoing **JTF operations often dictate some of these measures (e.g., FSCLs and NFAs) be established or coordinated by the CJTF or the JTF J-3** instead of the more normal establishment or coordination by the component or subordinate task force commander(s).

9. Rules of Engagement

- a. **ROE are the directives issued by competent military authority** which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. In other words, **ROE are the means by which the National Command Authorities (NCA) and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force** in the context of applicable political and military policy and domestic and international law. More simply put, ROE are the rules that govern “when, where, against whom and how force can be used.”

- b. ROE may be used to control the use of force in three main areas: ROE implement the inherent right of self-defense; they define use of force for mission accomplishment; and they apply throughout the spectrum of conflict from peacetime to military operations other than war (MOOTW) to armed conflict.

c. ROE generally provide guidance on and impose limitations on the use of force by commanders and individuals based on three types of considerations.

- **Military.** Properly drafted ROE help accomplish the mission by ensuring the use of force in such a way that it will be used only in a manner consistent with the overall military objective. They must implement the inherent right of self-defense and they support mission accomplishment. ROE can assist the commander by preventing the unintended start of hostilities prior to achieving a desired readiness posture; by establishing economy of force considerations during hostilities; and by protecting from destruction enemy infrastructure that may prove logistically important at a later date.
- **Political.** ROE are a reflection of the political will of the government. Missions cannot be completed successfully without the popular support of the American people and their elected officials.
- **Legal.** ROE are also a reflection of international and domestic law and national policy.

d. ROE must contribute to morale and fighting spirit while accomplishing the political, military, and legal requirements of the mission. ROE may change over the duration of an operation or be different from previous operations.

e. Nothing in the ROE can limit the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense.

f. ROE issues must be considered during COA development, wargaming, analysis, and selection. The supported combatant

commander may provide ROE guidance to the CJTF via the initial planning documents, which precede COA development. The CJTF's proposed supplemental ROE should be developed, exercised, and modified as necessary to support mission planning during the COA development, wargaming, analysis, and selection processes. Mission objectives must drive the ROE formulation process and not vice versa.

g. The development, distribution, training, and modification of ROE must be timely and responsive to changing mission and threat parameters.

h. **Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE).** ROE are the primary means by which the NCA can, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and combatant commanders, provide guidance to US forces in peacetime for handling the use of force during crises and in wartime to help control the level of hostilities. **NCA have provided the SROE** as stand alone guidance for US forces worldwide that are equally applicable to all the combatant commands and can be easily and quickly amended or clarified to meet mission-specific requirements. **SROE apply in addition to specific guidance, if any, from higher authority in the form of supplemental measures.** SROE also provide lists of numbered supplemental measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular situation. SROE generally do not apply to multinational forces; civil disturbance operations; disaster relief operations; US Coast Guard units (and other units under their OPCODE) conducting law enforcement operations; and US forces in support of operations not under operational or tactical control of a combatant commander or performing missions under direct control of the NCA, Military Departments, or other USG departments or agencies. **Combatant commanders also may augment the SROE in order to properly respond to the mission**

and threat in their area of responsibility (AOR). CJTFs and staffs must understand the military, political, and legal mission objectives that necessitate ROE and be able to distill the SROE and any combatant commander specific ROE into baseline ROE for the unit commander, weapon system operator, and infantry soldier to apply in the field. **In developing ROE, it is critical that the planners consider any Service-specific core training in the CJCS SROE that the combat forces may have received prior to deployment.** Core training in the SROE, which at present is not uniform among the Services or even within the Services, has proven an exceptional tool to familiarize the “trigger-puller” with ROE and has proven effective in streamlining swift adjustments to the SROE dictated by rapidly changing circumstances. As Service doctrine develops on such core SROE training, the JTF will

lessen confusion and contribute to readiness and effective use of force by accounting for the language and training that Service components are using in core training in the ROE planning process. Figure IV-2 lists several key ROE considerations.

10. Combat Identification

a. **Combat identification measures must be established early in the JTF planning cycle.** These measures particularly are important in peace operations and certain traditional noncombat operations conducted in an uncertain or hostile operational environment.

b. **Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE.** These measures also must allow units and individuals to conduct actions appropriate for self-defense.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

- International law and domestic law.
- Operational concerns (*mission requirements*).
- Commander's intent (*both commander, joint task force and higher headquarters*).
- Threat.
- Tactical capabilities (*of proposed force*).
- Tactics and weapons systems organic to the joint task force.
- Host-nation law and requirements.
- US policy (*considering United Nations resolutions and international agreements*).

NOTE: May not interfere with right and responsibility for self-defense!!!

Figure IV-2. Rules of Engagement Considerations

c. **Force protection considerations provided in Chapter VII, “Joint Task Force Operations,” play an important role in combat identification** and must be included in planning combat identification measures.

d. Although not required in present OPLAN and OPORD formats, **a combat identification appendix to Annex C of the JTF OPORD, OPLAN, or campaign plan outlining CJTF policy and guidance for JTF combat identification would provide a basis for combat identification within the JOA.** Supporting component and subordinate task force OPORDs or OPLANs and SOP would provide the additional detail needed to ensure implementation of a robust JTF combat identification program.

11. Multinational Command and Control Considerations

“It is a basic fact of life that the command and control of a coalition must always take into account the existence of parallel lines of authority, especially when the mission of the coalition involves combat.”

**Kenneth Allard
Somalia Operations:
Lessons Learned**

interfere with US forces’ right and responsibility for self-defense. After assignment to non-US commands, US forces will report any changes to ROE and combat identification measures for review and approval.

- US forces will be assigned and remain OPCON to a multinational force only if the combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense and with the rules for individual self-defense contained in the current version of CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.”

“It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of command) to place US forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, factors such as the mission, the size of the proposed US force, the risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement will be carefully considered.”

**Presidential Decision
Directive 25**

a. **Command Authority.** The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council.

- **US forces assigned to the OPCON of a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force unless directed otherwise by the NCA. Multinational ROE and combat identification measures must not**

b. **Normal Options**

- **Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures.** Staffs are integrated and often are led by senior representatives from member nations.
- Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. **Coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: parallel command or lead-nation command.**

•• **Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces.** This is the simplest multinational C2 structure to establish and allows coalition forces to control operations through existing national chains of command. It must be stressed, however, that even though it may satisfy national requirements for command over their own forces, such an arrangement can hamper operations in that it violates the doctrinal principle of unity of command. Therefore, it should be avoided whenever possible.

•• In lead-nation command, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations.

•• **Lead-nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition.** This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the

command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition.

c. **Use of Special Operations Forces.** SOF maintain coalition support teams which can provide the CJTF with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JTF C2. Coalition support teams have played an integral role in assisting and integrating coalition units into multinational military operations. Coalition support includes assisting with communications interface to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure, establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and combat service support, and training coalition partners on tactics and techniques. This activity was first employed during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and has been critical in subsequent multinational operations.

Additional guidance concerning multinational C2 is available in JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," and JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations."

CHAPTER V

JOINT TASK FORCE MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

“People are the asset most critical to the success of any military operation. Thorough planning and comprehensive personnel management directly impact the mission readiness of our people.”

Joint Pub 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations

1. General

a. **The CJTF is responsible for personnel support to mission objectives.**

b. JTF J-1 is the principal staff assistant to the CJTF on personnel management and the focal point for personnel support actions.

c. As stated in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” the J-1 is charged with “manpower management, the formulation of personnel policies, and supervision of the administration of personnel of the command (including civilians under the supervision or control of the command), and enemy prisoners of war. Because many of the problems confronting this division are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the division should consider the established policies of the Military Departments.” Component commanders will normally receive personnel support from their Service headquarters.

For further details, see JP 1-0, “Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.”

2. J-1 Organization

a. Figure V-1 depicts a typical JTF J-1 organization. The actual composition of the J-1 will be dictated by the overall organization of the JTF and operations to be conducted.

b. **Personal and Special Staff.** The offices of the surgeon, chaplain, IG, legal advisor,

PM, comptroller, PAO, historian, and safety officer normally are established personal and special staff of the CJTF. At the discretion of the CJTF, some of these offices may be organized under the staff supervision of the JTF J-1.

3. JTF J-1 Primary Responsibilities

A myriad of responsibilities faces the JTF J-1 and J-1 staff to ensure that the CJTF receives the most beneficial support as it relates to personnel support and manpower management. The following is an overview of some of these responsibilities.

a. Manpower Management

- The combatant commander is responsible for JTF manning. The combatant command J-1 establishes manpower requirements for the JTF headquarters.
- If there are insufficient resources within the combatant command to staff the JTF HQ, individual augmentation may be required.
- Long-standing JTFs that evolve into subcomponents of the combatant command require establishment of formal manpower documents staffed through the Joint Staff J-1 and the Services in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 1600.01, “Joint Manpower Program Procedures.”




Figure V-1. Typical Joint Task Force J-1 Organization

b. Individual Augmentation

- Timely coordination for personnel augmentation is critical to JTF mission accomplishment. This is a major responsibility of both the JTF J-1 and combatant command J-1.
- Policies and procedures regarding the assignment of individuals to meet combatant command temporary duty (TDY) and temporary additional duty (TAD) augmentation requirements in support of NCA-directed operations are found in CJCSI 1301.01, “Policy and Procedures to Assign Individuals to Meet Combatant Command Mission Related Temporary Duty Requirements.”

“Advanced planning and commitment are required to ensure that augmentation puts the right people with the right experience in the right assignments at the right time.”

**Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
USACOM’s Joint After Action Report**

- Combatant commands determine the need for forces to accomplish an assigned mission and fill operational or contingency requirements through their Service component commands. If sufficient personnel are not available within a Service component command to meet operational requirements, the Service component will notify its Service

HQ with an information copy to its combatant command HQ and the Joint Staff J-1. The Service will first attempt to source the requirements from internal Service assets, and then from the assets of combatant commands and Defense agencies.

- Should a Service disagree with the supported combatant command requirements or a combatant command or Defense agency disagree with a Service's response to fill a shortfall requirement, they can voice their concern to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman will monitor, through the Joint Staff, all requests for personnel augmentation and, as necessary, help resolve issues or, after consulting with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as appropriate, refer the matter to the Secretary of Defense for decision.
- Requests for individual augmentation, whether initial or subsequent rotation, should be initiated early enough to allow adequate time for notification, training, and processing of personnel.

c. Joint Personnel Reception Center

- Consideration should be given to establishing a JPRC to facilitate the reception, accountability, training, processing, and onward movement or integration of individual replacements, augmentees, civilian employees, and units into the JTF.
- The establishment of a JPRC within the JOA will be at the direction of the CJTF.
- A JPRC should be staffed with representation from all Service components of the JTF.

- Normally, the JTF J-1 would have overall responsibility for managing the JPRC. The J-1 will coordinate with the J-4 for billeting, transportation, food service, and other required logistic support.
- The JPRC can provide such things as orientation, briefings (e.g., ROE, cultural concerns, "do's and don'ts," and familiarization with JTF HQ, dining areas, and other facilities), chaplains for counseling, initial billeting, joint training, onward movement of units or personnel, and accountability of all personnel joining the JTF.
- To be most effective, a JPRC should be established as early as feasible in an operation.

d. Personnel Accountability and Strength Reporting

- The CJTF is responsible to provide an accurate personnel strength report to the supported combatant commander.
- J-1 prepares the report by combining Service component reports into the joint personnel status and casualty report (JPERSTAT).
- A JPERSTAT normally is submitted daily through or by the supported combatant commander to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the situation report.
- JPERSTAT format is found in CJCSM 3150.13, "Joint Reporting Structures (JRS) Personnel."

e. Rotation Policy

- Rotation policy is established by the combatant commander prior to commencement of the operation.

- A rotation policy may be based on the JTF's mission, length of operation, operational environment, and requirement for "skilled" personnel.

- A standard tour length for all personnel may seem more equitable and impact more favorably on morale, but may not be supportable from an operational aspect.

- Tour length is normally governed by the JTF's mission.

- Other factors that may influence tour length.

- RC units and personnel under the PSRC can serve for a maximum of 270 days.

- Tour length for personnel on TAD or TDY is normally limited to 179 days.

f. Pay and Entitlements

- The CJTF should determine or recommend to the supported combatant commander a policy concerning pay and allowances — the JTF J-1 must be involved in this policy decision.

- Pay and entitlements (e.g., imminent danger pay, TAD or TDY) should be addressed by the JTF J-1 during the planning process. A consistent policy should be developed to prevent inequities among personnel from the various Services.

- Pay and entitlement requests normally take time to enact, so an early determination of a policy will enhance personnel receiving proper and timely pay. For example, a request for imminent danger pay is not effective until signed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy and is not

retroactive. Thus, if not requested on a timely basis, personnel will lose some of their entitlements.

g. Postal Operations

- Movement of mail to the JOA will be coordinated by the supported combatant commander J-1, normally via a designated single-Service manager. The JTF J-1 will implement postal operations in the JOA based on guidance from the supported combatant commander J-1 and single-Service manager.

- Postal policies must be developed by the JTF J-1. Below are topics for consideration.

- JTF postal staffing requirements.

- Postal restrictions and embargo procedures.

- Establishment of postal infrastructure in the JOA.

- Start date for mail service.

- Free mail.

- Any Service member mail.

- Holiday mail programs.

- Appointment of one of the JTF component commands as executive agent to accomplish the above functions.

h. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)

- MWR programs are mission essential to combat readiness. Establishment of these programs should be predicated on the combat situation. MWR programs can be "stress relievers."

"This command emphasizes [m]orale, [w]elfare and [r]ecreation (MWR) activities...Keep a sense of balance and humor. [M]OOTW is a high stress, operational mission. Soldiers see pain and suffering every day. This is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Soldiers miss their loved ones. They are concerned for their own safety. Here in Haiti, humor is a valuable stress reduction tool for our unit."

CSM McGarry, USA
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

- These programs may include:
 - Exchange services;
 - Fitness and recreation facilities;
 - Entertainment services;
 - Food and beverage sales;
 - Newspaper issue and sales;
 - Commercial telephone access; and
 - Rest and recuperation programs.
- The JTF J-1 has the responsibility to organize component command support and identify external requirements to sustain and improve MWR operations in the JOA.
 - The CJTF should establish equitable MWR support policies and may designate lead agent(s) for execution.
 - The lead agent should be responsible for operations of MWR support and exercise C2 of all Service-provided MWR resources.

i. Casualty Reporting

- While casualty reporting is a Service responsibility, the JTF J-1 ensures casualty information is reported through the chain of command to make them aware of status-of-forces and events that may have significant NCA or media interest.
- JTF casualty reporting is accomplished via Event and/or Incident Reports (Operational Report 3) or JPERSTAT, depending upon the intensity of operations and numbers of casualties.

j. Personnel Performance Evaluations.

The JTF J-1 must ensure the timely preparation and submission of performance evaluations for assigned individuals in accordance with (IAW) the established guidelines of the individual Services.

k. Awards and Decorations

- The JTF J-1 should develop and promulgate guidance concerning awards and decorations, consistent with Department of Defense (DOD) awards policy.
- The JTF J-1 also should ensure that timely recommendations and supporting information for individual, unit, and campaign awards are forwarded to the appropriate command.

l. Civilian Personnel

- The JTF J-1 is responsible for coordinating and integrating personnel plans and procedures for civilian support of joint operations.
 - Plan or coordinate personnel, logistics, and medical support.
 - Ensure civilian training requirements have been addressed by the J-3.

- Coordinate pay and compensation requirements.
 - Establish civilian accountability procedures.
 - Report and process casualty information.
 - Coordinate awards.
 - The CJTF, in conjunction with the supported combatant commander, will coordinate the approval and admission into the JOA for all civilians deployed in support of the operation.
 - The CJTF implements combatant command policy concerning the issuance of weapons to civilians for self-defense.
- e. Processes requests from directorate and/or staff sections for nonmilitary personnel (e.g., political advisors, linguists, and interpreters).
 - f. Ensures that subordinate commanders are kept informed of personnel actions that will affect their commands and their Service members.
 - g. Monitors unit strengths, both current and projected, by means of daily personnel status reports, casualty reports, and critical reports of personnel shortages.

See CJCSM 3150.13, "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) Personnel," for specific personnel reporting requirements.

h. Maintains a current personnel estimate (in coordination with other staff officers).

i. Collects data from subordinate elements and for reporting EPWs and detainee numbers through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center.

j. Coordinates and is responsible to the CJTF for liaison and repatriation planning for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). The CJTF will assign staff personnel for planning and administration as required. Submits total numbers of evacuees through combatant command J-1 to Joint Staff J-1.

k. Determines procedures concerning the use of local civilian labor (coordinate with the JTF J-4, JTF J-2, and legal officer).

l. Ensures that personnel-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities and support military deception initiatives.

m. Determines and enforces strict procedures for maintaining Records Management Program.

4. JTF J-1 Additional Responsibilities

The JTF J-1 is also responsible for the following.

a. Participates in the JTF decision and planning processes from the inception.

b. Develops Annex E (Personnel) to the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

c. Informs the CJTF and other staff sections of personnel issues that may impact on the operation. The requirement for the possible early deployment of postal personnel, linguists and interpreters, and other personnel support specialists to the JOA should not be overlooked. Input to the TPFDD is necessary to ensure timely deployment of all assets.

d. Maintains a dialogue not only with the other staff sections, but with the components and outside military and civilian agencies, as well.

n. Ensures equal opportunity and equal employment opportunity support is provided to all personnel in the JOA.

“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup.”

o. Coordinates early identification of personnel requirements under a Reserve Component Callup, when appropriate.

p. **Determines the joint and multinational publication requirements for the JTF.**

Additional information on specific procedures and requirements concerning Reserve Component Callup can be found in JP 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,” and JP 4-05.1,

5. Checklist

The following checklist may assist the JTF J-1.

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-1

- Does a personnel information management system exist that allows summation of separate Service personnel status reports, including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical personnel shortages; casualty accounting; and personnel requisitions?
- Do plans include a current summary of JTF manpower requirements?
 - Are minimum grade, security clearances, and occupational skill requirements specified?
 - Are critical positions (billets) identified?
 - Are special experience requirements consistent with pay grade level and military occupational designations?
 - Have procedures been established to identify JTF augmentation requirements? Have shortfalls been identified to the appropriate authority?
- Have procedures been established to capture personnel information on all in-bound JTF personnel immediately upon their arrival?
- Have reporting instructions been issued addressing, as a minimum: reporting date, passports, visas, immunizations, uniform and equipment requirements, and travel restrictions? If appropriate, billeting arrangements also should be addressed in reporting instructions.
- Have procedures been established by component commanders, to accomplish Service-specific preparation for movement actions prior to deployment?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-1 (cont'd)

- Giving deploying members the opportunity to update wills and powers of attorney.
- Allowing deploying members the opportunity to adjust pay allotments and establish direct deposit.
- Making provisions to pay members while deployed.
- Providing passports and visas if required.
- Have other personnel actions been accomplished, such as medical screening, (e.g., immunizations, human immunodeficiency virus screening), identification cards and tags, Service record updates, including records of emergency data?
- Consideration must be given as to how personnel will be deployed (temporary duty, field conditions) to ensure that adequate compensation is provided and to prevent unnecessary loss of pay and allowances.
- Have the following support programs been established, if applicable?
 - Special leave.
 - Hostile fire or imminent danger pay.
 - Federal income tax combat-zone exclusion.
 - Free mail.
 - Sole surviving son or daughter.
 - Absentee voting.
- Have morale, welfare, and recreation activities for JTF personnel been coordinated?
- Is military postal support adequately and equitably addressed in JTF and component commands' plans?
- Is there adequate J-1 staff to support operations (e.g., 24 hour operations)?
- Are all JTF's personnel proficient with the command's software standards?
- Has liaison been established with the International Red Cross regarding the internment of enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, retained personnel, and other detainees?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-1 (cont'd)

- Have procedures been developed to process personnel returning to duty from medical channels?
- Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified materials?
- Consistent with operational requirements, is maximum practical use being made of local national civilian labor?
- Have JTF J-1 supporting plans been developed for the evacuation of noncombatant personnel?
- Have internal standing operating procedures been developed and coordinated to streamline the execution of recurring activities and reports?
- Have all JTF components been provided reporting formats and requirements?
- Have requirements for Service, joint, and multinational publications been identified?
- Has a rating scheme been developed for JTF headquarters personnel?
- Has a point of contact list been developed and published?
- Has a rotation policy been established and published?

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CHAPTER VI

JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE

“Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.”

Sun Tzu

1. General

a. As stated in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” the Intelligence Directorate’s (J-2) primary function “. . . is to support the commander and staff by ensuring the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warning on the characteristics of the area . . . actively participates in joint staff planning and in planning, coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling a concentration of intelligence efforts on the proper enemy items of intelligence interest at the appropriate

time. The J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose enemy capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible.”

b. **J-2 Organization.** Figure VI-1 depicts a typical JTF J-2 organization. The actual composition of the J-2 will be dictated by the overall organization of the JTF and operations to be conducted. (A number of the J-2 functions may be placed under the joint intelligence support element [JISE], as shown in Figure VI-4, based on the J-2’s preference.)




Figure VI-1. Typical Joint Task Force J-2 Organization

c. **JTF JISE.** The JISE, if formed, is the hub of intelligence activity in the JOA and is responsible for providing CJTF, JTF staff, and JTF components and subordinate task forces with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation by integrating and adding to the adversary situations developed by the combatant commander's intelligence organization. Paragraph 8 of this chapter provides additional information on the JISE.

d. The objective of joint intelligence support to the JTF is to provide clear, relevant, and timely knowledge of the enemy and operational environment.

e. **Joint intelligence should be provided at all command levels** once the objectives, nature, and scope of military operations have been determined by the JTF.

f. **At the JTF level, production focuses on the fusion of all-source intelligence (to include strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence)** from components, the supported combatant commander's Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), Service organizations (such as the Office of Naval Intelligence, the National Air Intelligence Center, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, and National Ground Intelligence Center), and national sources to support the JTF mission and operations.

g. The JIC is the primary intelligence organization providing support to joint warfighting at all levels. **The JISE, if formed, is a tailored subset of the theater JIC. JIC is at the combatant commander level, while the JTF uses the JISE.**

h. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) is a transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a JIC to the JTF. JDISS is the principal means by which intelligence flows throughout the JTF. Local area networks or Service-specific systems are merely supporting assets.

i. **A JTF receives its principal intelligence support from the supported combatant commander's JIC**, which receives information from all echelons and performs all-source analysis and production.

j. Joint intelligence is rapidly evolving from exclusively a "push" system (from the national-level down) to a "pull" system, where the lower echelons request tailored intelligence support. Using the "pull" concept, the JTF can acquire timely, relevant intelligence to thoroughly evaluate the situation based on mission and specific phase of operations. A "push" system still is required for some information, such as indications of imminent or actual threats, significant military or political events, and force movement, when the JTF requires near-real-time information.

k. Figure VI-2 highlights a few of the critical intelligence responsibilities of the CJTF.

A more complete list can be found in JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations."

l. **The JTF intelligence staff must understand the intelligence requirements of superior, subordinate, and component commands;** be able to identify organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls; and access theater and national systems to ensure appropriate intelligence is provided or available to the JTF.

m. **All peacetime, crisis, and wartime intelligence requirements must be identified, documented, and prioritized.** The prioritized requirements will be passed to the supported combatant commander's JIC.

n. The intelligence effort must be integrated. The integration of intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each organizational level will result in complete

COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- Ensure required intelligence support is provided to forces within the assigned joint operations area.
- Prioritize component intelligence requirements to manage flow of information.
- Provide a clear assessment of mission, CJTF objectives, and prioritize joint task force intelligence requirements.
- Emphasize to all personnel the importance of always being information security conscious.

Figure VI-2. Commander, Joint Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities

access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities.

Support to Operations,” provides detailed CI information.

o. Biographic information and leadership analysis, while not a JTF responsibility to compile, are integral to understanding the nature and proclivities of adversaries or potential adversaries, their method of operation, and how they interact with their environment.

r. All phases of the intelligence cycle are dependent upon the proper implementation and enforcement of security procedures to prevent violations and compromises, and to provide valuable time-sensitive information to commanders expediently and efficiently.

p. Intelligence must be provided in a form that is readily understood and directly usable by the recipient in a timely manner without overloading the user and, at the same time, minimizing the load on communications facilities.

A more detailed discussion of the intelligence cycle is found in JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”

2. Intelligence Sources

q. CI activities will provide key support to both the CJTF force protection mission and compartmented contingency planning. The joint force J-2 CI/human intelligence (HUMINT) staff element (J-2X) should be included in all force protection planning, including information operations and command and control warfare.

a. Intelligence sources are the means or systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. There are five primary source types: imagery intelligence, HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and open-source intelligence.

JP 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence

b. This document focuses on intelligence support for a JTF.

A more detailed discussion of intelligence doctrine can be found in the JP 2-0 series, which also provides detailed implementing methodology for joint intelligence support and operations.

3. Collection Disciplines

a. Intelligence is developed from data collected through human and/or technical means, which together make up the intelligence collection “system.”

b. The JTF J-2 may establish elements to:

- Coordinate and deconflict source operational interests between intelligence disciplines, i.e., CI and HUMINT;
- Minimize duplication of efforts between intelligence disciplines;
- Coordinate the transfer of assets between intelligence disciplines;
- Ensure proper resource application; and
- Provide coordination and integration of intelligence and reporting efforts for the JTF.

4. JTF J-2 Responsibilities

Each JTF J-2 organizational structure is situation dependent. At a minimum, a core element of analytical and administrative capabilities is required. J-2 responsibilities may include the following.

a. Providing the intelligence staff, all watch teams, and supporting intelligence organizations with a clear understanding of friendly objectives, intent, plans, and the unfolding conduct of joint operations.

b. Prioritizing the intelligence requirements. This should include review of CJTF CCIR to ensure that intelligence

requirements identified by the CJTF are being processed.

c. Requesting additional intelligence support through established command channels.

d. Ensuring intelligence support to and representation on JPGs. The J-2 directs the overall CJTF intelligence staff, including the CJTF’s JISE, to include the following.

- Synchronizing intelligence support with CJTF operations, planning, and execution.
- Determining organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls.
- Developing a JTF collection plan.
- Providing fused, tailored, and timely all-source intelligence to the JTF.
- Keeping senior and subordinate commands, Services, and national agencies informed of the current intelligence situation, priorities, and requirements.
- Providing, as required, intelligence information and support to JTF subordinate command’s intelligence staffs.

e. **Monitoring movement, status, and activities of national, theater, and organic intelligence and intelligence-related assets.**

f. Apprising the CJTF of intelligence capabilities and limitations, as well as the potential effects on operations.

g. Assisting the CJTF to:

- Develop and refine the JTF estimate of the situation and, concurrently, develop and refine the JTF’s intelligence estimate;



Unmanned aerial vehicles add to the capability to give the commander near-real-time tactical intelligence.

- Identify relevant and attainable subordinate, lateral, superior, and national intelligence objectives;
 - Identify deception objectives; and
 - Determine the priority intelligence requirements from the JTF's mission, commander's estimate, operation phases' requirements, and objectives.
- h. Ensuring the intelligence support to targeting is performed**, i.e., analyzing the enemy and the situation and identifying and nominating to the CJTF those critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited by direct military operations to attain the commander's intent and objectives.
- i. Providing appropriate targeting intelligence support, including target intelligence packages, to the CJTF, JTCB, and components, including the JFACC.
 - j. Exchanging liaison officers as appropriate. Establishing or supervising liaison, coordination, and communications requirements with
- k. Validating intelligence information requirements of subordinate and supporting commands.
 - l. Determining security requirements for intelligence information.
 - m. Planning for CI, to include:
 - Providing multidisciplinary CI threat assessments;
 - Coordinating CI plans and operations; and
 - Ensuring tailored CI and/or counterterrorism support to JTF's antiterrorism and/or force protection programs.
 - n. **Developing JTF concept of intelligence operations**, to include the following.

- Identifying potentially useful intelligence-related systems and personnel.
- Spelling out tasking authorities and reporting responsibilities.
- Detailing procedures for:
 - Developing intelligence for subordinate commands and forces;
 - Obtaining intelligence from national organizations and other JTFs and combatant commanders through Joint Staff J-2 and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
 - Obtaining geospatial information support and services, including hardcopy maps and charts as well as digital products and services;
 - Obtaining intelligence-related communications support;
 - Identifying and maintaining continuity of minimum-essential support if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost; and
 - Identifying JTF requirements for intelligence-related boards, centers, and teams (i.e., JISE and national intelligence support team [NIST]).

o. Developing Annex B (Intelligence) to the CJTF OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

p. Developing Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services) to the CJTF OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

Additional JTF J-2 responsibilities can be found in JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” JP 2-01.1, “JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting,” JP 2-01.2, “JTTP for Counterintelligence

Support to Operations,” JP 2-03, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations,” and JP 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.”

5. Multinational Intelligence Operations

There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations.

a. Collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence in a multinational environment are major challenges, depending on an appropriate level of standardization to operate and communicate between elements. The principles in Figure VI-3 are offered as considerations for building intelligence doctrine for multinational operations.

b. Intelligence sharing procedures between multinational partners should be agreed upon early in the planning process.

The JTF J-2 should have personnel knowledgeable in foreign disclosure policy and procedures and should obtain necessary foreign disclosure authorization from the DIA (through the combatant commander) as soon as possible. Multinational commands still may operate separate national intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces.

“Collecting, disseminating, and sharing intelligence [with multinational forces] is made difficult by the fact that each nation imposes its own operational and electronic protection measures on its forces.”

Joint Pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations

c. The capability of components from various nations to communicate with each

MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRINCIPLES

- Adjust for national differences among nations.
- Assure unity of effort against common threat.
- Determine and plan requirements for intelligence special arrangements.
- Coordinate intelligence-sharing.
- Provide for complementary intelligence operations.
- Operate combined intelligence center.
- Conduct intelligence liaison exchange activities.

Figure VI-3. Multinational Intelligence Principles

other, the degree of experience in working together, and the level of standardization of equipment, supplies, and operational procedures all impact on the effectiveness of multinational operations.

d. Intelligence used in multinational operations must be written simply, formatted clearly, and be classified properly to ensure its releasability to all operational forces involved.

e. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that best fulfills the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations.

f. Concepts and considerations applicable to establishing JTF intelligence support for multinational operations include the following.

- Providing to the supported combatant commander details on JTF multinational

intelligence architecture, organization, collection, and dissemination plans.

- Adjusting for national differences. The JTF J-2 should be flexible enough to adjust to national concepts for intelligence support in order to make multinational action effective. For example, **a single director of intelligence should be designated in the JOA with intelligence and information being exchanged.**
- Striving for unity of effort to achieve a common mission. The mission should be viewed from a national as well as a multinational perspective; a threat to one element of the force by a common adversary should be considered a threat to all members.
- Determining and planning for multinational intelligence. **When possible, multinational intelligence requirements should be agreed upon,**

planned, and exercised in advance of the operation.

- Seeking full exchange of intelligence. When possible, intelligence sources and methods should be shared.
- Planning complementary intelligence operations. Strengths can be enhanced and weaknesses overcome when multinational intelligence resources and capabilities are applied against the entire operation.
- **Establishing a combined intelligence center.** This center should include representatives from all participating nations. (This does not replace the requirement for a JTF JISE.)
- Exchanging liaison personnel to eliminate potential problems between cultures, languages, doctrines, and operational intelligence requirements.
- Providing sanitized intelligence, in accordance with established guidance, to multinational forces as required.
- Forwarding requests for information from the multinational forces to the supporting JISE.
- Analyzing cultural information and considerations are of critical importance in dealing with both the multinational force and the enemy. Knowledge of cultural influences is vital in avoiding misunderstandings and improving the effectiveness of operations.
- **Prioritizing, coordinating, and disseminating collection requirements to and from subordinate and multinational commands.**

See JP 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations,” and JP

3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations,” for more details on intelligence support for multinational operations.

6. Intelligence Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War

For most MOOTW the process is the same, and a detailed list of considerations can be found in Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.” For operations such as peace operations and FHA operations, the following additional considerations apply.

a. The CJTF must be aware of cultural differences among the affected population and multinational force. In some instances, these may result in periods of increased vulnerability for the JTF or may require scheduling changes for meetings and briefings. Knowledge of factors such as history, religion, science, myths, art, and language is vital in avoiding misunderstanding the population and improving the effectiveness of operations.

b. While conducting certain peace and noncombat operations, “all-source intelligence gathering” is commonly referred to as “information gathering” because of sensitivities.

c. UN prohibits the collection of SIGINT, CI, and collection of intelligence on friendly forces. Although this may not directly affect US-only operations, it may influence the way the JTF operates.

d. HUMINT and CI are especially important in MOOTW.

- Consideration must be given to establishing HUMINT and CI collection and analysis capabilities in the operational area as early as possible.

“Our robust HUMINT capability has provided in-by-nine, out-by-five [services] on priority intelligence requirements. This accounts, in some measure, for our low casualty rate. It’s refreshing to see things in their proper order — INTELLIGENCE DRIVING OPERATIONS.”

**MajGen C. Wilhelm, USMC
COMMARFOR
Operation RESTORE HOPE**

- Linguists and interpreters are an integral part of the HUMINT and CI collection system.
 - Counterintelligence force protection source operations, low-level source operations, debrief of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are the primary information gathering techniques, within the JOA.
 - Assessing the economic needs, military capability, and political intent of those
- receiving assistance should increase the efficiency and capability of the force.
 - The best sources of information may be CA and PSYOP personnel, military patrols in local villages, military engineers, truck drivers, NGOs and PVOs working with the civilian populace, UN military observers, and others that have direct contact with the population. In addition, JTF personnel should understand that cultural information is of critical importance, and must be used in gauging the potential reactions of the local population to the ongoing operational activities. Knowledge of such factors is vital in avoiding misunderstandings and improving the effectiveness of operations. Coordination with the CMOG can assist in providing this type of information.
 - SOF, especially theater-based, area-oriented, and language-qualified US



Military patrols talking with the local populace can provide some of the best information sources.

Army SOF units, can provide indepth knowledge and information on the projected JOA.

- There are no standard templates for structuring intelligence support. Intelligence organizational resources, methodologies, and products should be established, flexible, exercised regularly, and applicable in any type of military operation.

e. Consideration should be given for requesting intelligence products that are available from PSYOP analysts — for instance, “Special PSYOP Studies and Special Assessments.” These can be tailored to address specific requirements relating to the local population and ramifications of JTF actions. These products should be requested through the supported combatant commander’s staff PSYOP officer.

f. Communications and an understanding of local infrastructure can lead to successful situation awareness.

g. Basic guidelines for all personnel to improve their information-gathering capability should be provided by the CJTF.

- Free exchange of intelligence information between military forces of different nations may not exist. This lack of free exchange may cause nations to conduct regional analysis independently, a practice that may not support the JTF’s overall plan.
- Changes in the behavior of the local populace, and the reasons the behavior has changed, may suggest that a significant change is required in operational strategy.
- Every item of operational information has potential importance.

- The media should be kept informed so that they may become more willing to exchange information.

h. A collection system and a means to evaluate information gathered “on the street” should be established.

7. Supported Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Center

a. The JIC concept fuses the main support capabilities of all national, Services, combat support agencies, and combat units into a “one-stop shopping center” for intelligence support and passes the information to the JISE.

b. While in reality, a particular JIC may not be able to completely satisfy every JTF RFI, it will coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon for those it is unable to fulfill.

c. The JIC is the focal point for intelligence support to JTF operations, and must provide a complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation by integrating all intelligence information.

d. It is the single source for RFI processing and validation, in-theater intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination.

e. The JIC has the mission of planning, training, and providing direct support to a deploying JTF.

8. JTF Joint Intelligence Support Element

a. **A tailored subset of the theater JIC, the JISE provides intelligence support to JTF operational forces and performs common intelligence functions.** Figure VI-4 shows a typical JTF J-2 JISE, wherein all major joint intelligence functional areas




Figure VI-4. Typical Joint Intelligence Support Element

and liaison relationships listed in Figure VI-1 are present. As shown, the JISE is the principal J-2 organization supporting joint operations.

b. By design, the JISE is scaleable and can expand to meet the needs of the JTF, and it is tailored to fit the operating environment based on identified CJTF requirements.

c. The JISE is composed of analytical experts and analysis teams that provide services and products required by the CJTF, JTF staff, and components. These all-discipline and all-warfare specialty analysis teams should be focused on substantive operational intelligence problems. Analysis teams should take into account pertinent information from all sources; **a JISE’s capability for joint and all-source analysis is the key to operational intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete.**

d. JISE should support “upward” to the supported combatant commander’s JIC, CJTF, and the JTF staff and should support “downward” to components, units, and elements assigned and attached to, or in support of, the JTF.

e. **Analytical efforts of the JISE should have an operational focus**, with responsibility for helping the CJTF to better understand how the adversary thinks, e.g., how an adversary will conceptualize the situation, what options an adversary will consider, and how an adversary will react to the JTF actions.

- When the CJTF is engaged in planning operations, the JISE assists by:
 - Identifying and nominating attainable military objectives;
 - Orientation of planners to the situation (mission analysis);

- Providing updates during planning;
 - Identifying enemy COAs (COA development);
 - Identifying intelligence capabilities and shortfalls that affect the development of COAs (COA development);
 - Participating in COA analysis wargaming by representing enemy COAs;
 - Conducting J-2 COA comparison;
 - Identifying intelligence requirements;
 - Identifying time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) requirements;
 - Identifying and nominating deception objectives that will help attain military objectives; and
 - Performing the intelligence function of targeting, i.e., analyzing the enemy and the situation, and identifying and nominating to the CJTF those critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited by direct military operations to attain the commander's intent and objectives.
- When the CJTF and subordinate commanders are engaged in conducting operations, the JISE assists by:
 - In conjunction with J-3 watch teams and collection managers, orchestrating all forms of reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy which are necessary for understanding the situation, identifying objectives and opportune targets, providing warning to forces, and assessing the effects of operations;
 - Preparing estimates of enemy C2, logistics, ground, air, space, air defense, maritime force capabilities, and intentions; and
 - Assessing the effects of operations (to delay, disrupt, debilitate, destroy, dissuade, or coerce) on enemy capabilities and intentions.
- f. In addition, the **JISE also may be used to manage intelligence resources and efforts and to coordinate application of senior, subordinate, and supporting commands' intelligence activities.**

9. Intelligence Offices, Centers, and Teams

- a. While not all of the offices, centers, or teams listed below may be required, each should be evaluated based on projected operations.
- b. The following may be established or requested by the CJTF in addition to the JISE.

• Joint CI/HUMINT Support Element

- During joint operations, CI and HUMINT complement each other, and work in partnership to provide intelligence and force protection to a JTF. To accomplish this unity of effort, the JTF commander or J-2 may establish a joint force J-2 CI/HUMINT support element (J-2X). The J-2X will manage, coordinate and deconflict HUMINT and CI collection activities of attached elements and Service components. The J-2X reports directly to the JTF J-2.
- Designates a task force counterintelligence coordinating authority (TFCICA) to coordinate counterintelligence force protection source operations, maintain tactical source registry, maintain liaison coordination, and conduct CI collection management support functions.

- Designates a HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) Chief to coordinate operations, source administration, and requirements with the Country Team; establish liaison with the joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC), joint document exploitation center (JDEC), joint interrogation and debriefing center (JIDC), and JISE Technical Intelligence elements and task HUMINT collection elements against identified priority EPW, document, and foreign material acquisition requirements; and guide HUMINT operations toward elimination of intelligence gaps.
- Deconflicts source operational interest to minimize duplication of effort.
- Ensures proper resource application to provide a coordinated, deconflicted and integrated CI, HUMINT, and SOF collection and reporting effort for the JTF.
- **Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center**
 - JCMEC is formed from elements of the DIA Foreign Material Program and the Services' technical intelligence organizations and explosive ordnance disposal personnel.
 - It is activated during periods of hostilities and assists in management of recovery, exploitation, and disposal of captured enemy equipment. This type of equipment can provide critical information on enemy strengths and weaknesses that may favorably influence operational planning.
 - The CJTF should notify the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) through command channels that it requires JCMEC support.
- **Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF)**
 - Conducts initial screening and interrogation of EPWs, translation and exploitation of captured adversary documents, and debriefing of captured or detained US personnel released or escaped from adversary control.
 - Coordinates exploitation of captured equipment with the JCMEC, documents with the JDEC, and human sources with the JIDC. Forwards key reports to the JIDC.
 - More than one JIF may be established in the AOR depending upon the anticipated number of EPWs. JIF personnel are provided by the land force.
 - Normally subordinate to the JFLCC, if designated.
- **Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center**
 - JIDC conducts follow-on exploitation of EPWs. EPWs are screened by the JIFs and those of further intelligence potential are identified and forwarded to the JIDC for follow-on interrogation and debriefing in support of JTF and higher requirements. Besides EPWs, the JIDC may also interrogate civilian detainees, refugees, and other non-prisoner sources.
 - **Subordinate to the JTF J-2.** JIDC activities are managed by the J-2X HOC. The HOC will coordinate with the TFCICA for CI augmentation for exploitation of those personnel of CI interest, such as civil and/or military leaders, intelligence and political officers, and terrorists. The HUMINT appendix of Annex B (Intelligence) to the OPLAN, CONPLAN, or campaign

plan contains JIDC planning considerations.

- JTFs requiring JIDC should request support from the DIA through the supported combatant commanders.

- **Joint Document Exploitation Center**

- JDEC uses exploitation of captured enemy documents to obtain intelligence. Document exploitation can obtain information on a great range of topics, such as information on adversary intentions and planning (including deception), locations, dispositions, tactics, communications, logistics, and morale as well as a wealth of information for long-term exploitation.

- Coupled with other intelligence sources, document exploitation provides the CJTF (through the J-2) with a more complete picture of an unfolding operation and enemy capabilities.

- The JDEC is activated during periods of hostilities, deployed to the combatant command, and normally assigned to, and under the OPCON of, the JTF J-2 to manage the recovery, exploitation, automated processing, and disposal of captured adversary documents.

- The CJTF should notify the NMJIC (through command channels) that it requires JDEC support.

NOTE: The JCMEC, JDEC, and JIF all conduct exploitation in the JOA, but their functions are not limited solely to combat operations. Both peace operations and refugee relief, for example, could require confiscating weapons and contraband; refugee relief could also require screening refugees for critical information. Cosmetic name changes of these centers in such scenarios may be required.

- **National Intelligence Support Team**

- NIST provides a mission-tailored national intelligence ‘reach-back’ capability to fulfill the stated intelligence requirements of the supported JTF. Normally, it is composed of DIA, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and other intelligence resources as required.

- At a minimum, the personnel deployed in a NIST provide access to agency-unique information and supporting analysis.

- NIST deployment is requested for the supported JTF by the combatant commander, and is tailored to meet operational requirements based on arrangements between the theater’s J-2 and the Joint Staff J-2.

c. The following national assets, while not a complete list, are available to support the CJTF. The CJTF should review the complete list of national assets and request the appropriate national intelligence support through command channels. **The NIST, if established, may coordinate and obtain the support from national intelligence organizations.**

JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” describes national intelligence support to joint military operations and provides guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.

- **National Imagery and Mapping Agency**

- NIMA is a combat support agency under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

- The NIMA mission is to provide timely, relevant, and accurate imagery and imagery intelligence and geospatial information in

support of the US national security objectives.

- NIMA provides responsive imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial products, support, services, and information, to include the coordination of imagery collection, national tasking, processing, exploitation, and primary and secondary distribution.

- **DIA Directorate for Intelligence Operations**

- Provides centralized direction for the management of DOD intelligence collection requirements and all-source intelligence collection.

- Responsible for centralized direction and management of the DOD HUMINT System, including operation of the Defense Attaché System.

- Serves as the Director of Central Intelligence's Executive Agent for MASINT, and the DOD MASINT collection manager.

- **DIA Defense Collection Group**

- Validates and prioritizes requests from the CJTF for national or other external intelligence support. Standing requirements are addressed by the Standing Requirements Division; time-sensitive requirements are handled by the Defense Collection Coordination Center.

- Since competing priorities, physical status of assets, and desired response time of CJTF requests are considered in processing the collection requirements, DIA Defense Collection Group will determine if they can be provided.

- **National Military Joint Intelligence Center**

- At the national level, the NMJIC is the focal point for all defense intelligence activities in support of joint operations and allows for efficient access to the entire DOD intelligence infrastructure in support of joint operations.

- The NMJIC is the channel through which CJTF intelligence and CI needs are tasked to the appropriate national agencies.

- **DIA Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI)**

- DI produces and manages the production of military intelligence in support of the NCA, Joint Staff, unified commands, and warfighting components. DI's analytic expertise includes military capabilities, estimative intelligence, medical intelligence, missile intelligence, military production and geography, intelligence data bases, and operational support and facilities intelligence.

- In addition to the analytical elements at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center in Washington, DC, DI directs the production efforts of the Missile and Space Intelligence Center and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center.

- DI's Operational Intelligence Coordination Center serves as the focal point for the NMJIC for managing DI support crisis operations and contingency planning.

10. Checklist

The following checklist may assist the JTF J-2.

Additional checklists for the JTF J-2 can be found in JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations."

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-2

General

- With inputs from the JTF J-3, have the JTF J-2's missions, tasks, and requirements been clarified, prioritized, and confirmed with the commander, joint task force (CJTF)?
- Has a complete intelligence assessment of the situation been developed?
 - Have the current intelligence and indications and warning situations in the joint operations area been identified?
 - Have current regional and threat assessments been accomplished?
 - Are situation assessments periodically updated?
 - Has an intelligence situation assessment been completed and submitted to the CJTF and up the chain of command?
- Are the CJTF intelligence tasking and guidance completely understood, and have they been analyzed and applied to regional and/or theater assessments?
- Have intelligence priorities been regularly updated and passed throughout the entire chain of command, including components and supported commands?
- Has the status (such as number, type, and readiness condition) of JTF's and combatant commander's organic intelligence collection and production assets been determined?
- Has the JTF J-2 designated a J-2X to coordinate and deconflict CI and HUMINT collection activities?
- Has National Intelligence Support Team support been requested?
- Have the JTF J-2 requirements for personnel augmentation, to include regional or functional experts, linguists, and/or reservists, been identified?
- Have the deployable elements to support the JTF's efforts in collection management, Service expertise, communications, and tactical indepth analysis been identified?
- Have the JTF Joint Operation Planning and Execution System managers been kept up-to-date on intelligence personnel, equipment, and related movement requirements?
- Have the requirements for a joint intelligence support element (JISE) to support the JTF been determined? (Establishment of a JISE will be situation-dependent.)

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-2 (cont'd)

- Has the JTF J-2, in coordination with the JTF Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate (J-6), developed a JTF intelligence communications architecture that achieves interoperability laterally, vertically, and with multinational forces? (JTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and local area network to carry intelligence information.)
- Has the intelligence architecture for flow of responsibilities for priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and request for information been determined?
- Have intelligence responsibilities been clearly delineated between JTF, supported combatant commander, and national levels?
- Have any JTF subordinate units, such as special operations forces, been receiving intelligence support from the supported combatant commander or national levels?
- Has the JTF coordinated with the supported combatant commander's joint intelligence center (JIC) to determine whether PIR have already been established for the current situation? (PIR should be built around the CCIRs.)
- In concert with the JTF J-3 and the supported combatant commander's JIC, have PIR been tailored for the current situation?
- Have PIR been kept current, and are they updated periodically?
- Have the CJTF and component commanders been fully apprised of all relevant current events?
- Do any current events require closer examination or reporting to higher authority?
- Have the JTF J-2's automated data processing equipment requirements been identified, and are they compatible with the supported combatant commander's and subordinate's systems (to include compatibility for multinational JTF operations when required)?
- In concert with the supported combatant commander's J-2 and the JTF J-3, have all the JTF intelligence collection requirements been identified, developed, and published?
- Have JTF intelligence shortfalls in collection capabilities been identified?
- Have collection requirements to cover shortfalls been developed and forwarded to the supported combatant commander's JIC for collection by theater resources or to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center for subsequent national tasking?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-2 (cont'd)

- Have requirements for all geospatial information and services support been identified?
- Have JTF geospatial information and services shortfalls been identified?
- Has information to support the joint intelligence estimate for planning been passed to Defense Intelligence Agency?
- Has the Annex B (Intelligence) been prepared for the CJTF's operation plan, operation order, or campaign plan?
- Can the JTF J-2 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?
- Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

- Have the JTF's requirements for HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT collection been identified?
- Have the requirements for a HUMINT operations cell and supporting HUMINT collection forces, to include facility locations and personnel requirements, been established?
- Has the requirement for establishment of a joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC) or joint document exploitation center (JDEC) and supporting technical intelligence collection forces been analyzed?
 - Have elements been requested for a JCMEC or JDEC if and/or when determined to be necessary?
 - If the full center capability is not necessary, have adequate smaller elements (teams or cells) been requested?
 - Have the requirements for interrogation and debriefing capabilities (JIF and JIDC) been identified?
- Have HUMINT management, liaison, and exchange program requirements been identified?
- Has emergency disclosure authority for imagery and imagery products been obtained?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-2 (cont'd)

- Has tailored imagery been requested (once target has been identified)? Has all imagery been forwarded to requesting command?
- Has the requirement for SIGINT operational tasking authority been identified? If not, work with cryptologic support group and command National Cryptologic Representative to obtain.
- Have MASINT management liaison and exchange programs been identified?
- Has a SCIF been established and accredited?

Counterintelligence (CI)

- Have JTF counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and force protection related intelligence requirements been identified?
- Has the J-2X appointed a Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA)?
- Has CI been incorporated into the planning as a force protection measure?
- Has CI been included in collection management planning?
- Have the J-2X and/or TFCICA initiated coordination with the theater CI support officer (CISO) and DIA's Joint Counterintelligence Support Branch (JCISB) for theater- and national-level CI assistance?
- Have component CI organizations been advised of possible TFCICA staff augmentation requirements?
- Have intelligence security guidelines been developed and disseminated?

Multinational Interaction

- Has liaison been established between joint and combined force intelligence structures?
- Have procedures been established and reviewed to expedite sharing US-generated intelligence products with multinational forces (for example, sanitize products)?
- Have friendly objectives, intentions, and plans been fully communicated to appropriate intelligence organizations?

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CHAPTER VII

JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

*“Maximum effort to accomplish the mission, to win decisively, demands **joint action** on the battlefield.”*

GEN C. L. Powell, USA
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



The individual “rifleman” still plays a significant role in joint task force operations.

SECTION A. OPERATIONS DIVISION

1. General

As stated in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” the Operations Directorate “assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity the division plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. When the joint staff includes a J-5, it also performs the long-range or future planning responsibilities. The J-3 is responsible for the

operation of the Joint Operations Center for the joint force commander.”

2. J-3 Organization


Figure VII-1 depicts a typical JTF J-3 organization. The actual composition of the J-3 will be dictated by the overall organization of the JTF and operations to be conducted. (A number of the J-3 functions illustrated in Figure VII-1 may be placed under the JOC based on the J-3’s preference.)

3. JTF J-3 Responsibilities

The following is a list, not necessarily all-inclusive, of JTF J-3 responsibilities.

- a. Organize the operational aspects of the JTF HQ.

TYPICAL JOINT TASK FORCE J-3 ORGANIZATION



*CJTF determines staff relationship.

**May be placed under the JOC or be assigned to one of the component commands.

Figure VII-1. Typical Joint Task Force J-3 Organization

b. Assist in the development of joint plans and exercise staff supervision or cognizance over the conduct of the following operations.

- ROE
- Information Operations. (Serve as the single point of contact for the operations

aspects of IO. IO includes actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.)

- Rear area operations.
- MOOTW

- Arms control.
- Combatting terrorism.
- DOD support to counterdrug operations.
- Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations.
- Enforcing exclusion zones.
- Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.
- FHA.
- Military support to civil authorities.
- Nation assistance and support to counterinsurgency.
- NEO.
- Peace operations.
- Protection of shipping.
- Recovery operations.
- Show of force operations.
- Strikes and raids.
- Support to insurgency.
- PSYOP
- CA
- Search and rescue and combat search and rescue.
- Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
- Mine warfare operations.
- Training of joint forces.
- Weather service.
- Land, sea, air, and space control operations.
- Mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations.
- c. Recommend a joint force organization.
- d. Establish Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reporting guidance and requirements for the joint force.
- e. Monitor current operational status of friendly forces and conduct current operations planning.
- f. Develop tasks for components.
- g. Identify the requirement for additional combat forces.
- h. Initiate, in coordination with the J-2, requests for Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program support, multispectral imagery support and other assets outside JTF control. Establish mechanisms that will assure continued access to requested support once initiated.
- i. Establish interface with USG and multinational agencies.
- j. Formulate requests for the use of nuclear weapons and riot control agents.
- k. Disseminate general targeting guidance.
- l. When directed by the CJTF, establish a JTCB and serve as the member responsible for the following tasks.
 - Development of the role, functions, and agenda of the JTCB for CJTF approval.

- Review of targeting information as it pertains to CJTF targeting guidance, objectives, and priorities.
- Executive assistant for administrative and logistic support.
- m. Initiate requests for operations to be conducted outside the assigned JOA.
- n. Request modification of the assigned JOA (including establishment of exclusion and/or inclusion zones).
- o. Include special operations in plans.
- p. In cases where a JFACC is not designated, plan, coordinate, monitor, and direct execution of joint air operations as directed by the CJTF.

See JP 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations."

- q. In cases where a JFACC is not designated, coordinate and integrate the use of airspace in the JOA when directed by the CJTF.

See JP 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations," and JP 3-52, "Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone."

- r. In cases where a JFACC is not designated, coordinate and integrate joint air defense operations within the JOA when directed by the CJTF.

See JP 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations" and the JP 3-01 series.

- s. Prepare the operations estimate.
- t. Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations (branches) during the execution phase.

- u. Prepare Annex C (Operations) and other selected portions of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

- v. **Assist in the preparation of combat identification measures.**

- w. When directed by the CJTF, establish an ROE planning cell to develop, monitor, modify and disseminate supplemental ROE.

4. Centers, Boards, and Cells

a. Joint Operations Center

- The CJTF may organize a JOC to serve as a focal point for all operational matters and, in the absence of a JISE, intelligence matters.
- The JOC should be staffed and equipped to manage friendly and enemy information; maintain the tactical situation and status-of-forces; make recommendations; and promulgate CJTF orders in the execution of current operations.
- **Consideration should be given to establishing a JOC or portions thereof during the CAP process.** Early establishment of a JOC may assist in the flow of information, since it provides a centralized point for the handling, tracking, and recording of information.
- The functions of the JOC may include the following.
 - Force and Resource Monitoring and Management. Monitors the current status of assigned forces and resources and provides information to aid in allocating and moving forces and materiel.
 - Planning. Assists in the preparation of plans relating to current operations.

- Direction. Facilitates CJTF direction to JTF component commanders and takes other necessary actions within the authority delegated to the JOC by the CJTF.
- Execution Supervision. Monitors the implementation of OPORDs or campaign plans to ensure that CJTF objectives are being met.
- Situation Monitoring. Monitors the ongoing situation of JTF forces and continuously reviews their progress.
- Reporting and Recording. Prepares operational reports as required; also maintains a staff journal, displays, and files necessary to record operational activities of the JTF.

CJCSM 6120.05, "Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations - Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats," contains message interface and message text formats (MTF) and employment procedures for JOC use. Interim Military Standard 6040, "USMTF Electronic Documentation System" and the Joint User Handbook—MTF contain examples of the MTF approved for joint use.

- Operations Evaluation. Evaluate actions to identify operational deficiencies and develop methods to improve joint effectiveness.

b. Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC)

- The CJTF should establish a JSRC or its functional equivalent in the earliest stages of forming a JTF. A JSRC may be established by the CJTF under the cognizance of the JTF staff (normally the J-3), or the CJTF may assign the responsibility to one of the component commanders.

- If assigned to a component commander, the component commander will ensure the JSRC is augmented with appropriate representatives from the other JTF components.

- Specific JTF guidance for evasion and recovery operations will be in Appendix 5 (Evasion and Recovery Operations) to Annex C (Operations) of the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

For further details, see JP 3-50.2, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)."

c. Joint Targeting Coordination Board

- A CJTF may establish a JTCB. The JTCB may be either an integrating center to accomplish the broad targeting oversight functions, or a CJTF review mechanism.

- A CJTF defines the role of the JTCB.

- A JTCB should be a joint activity composed of representatives from the staff, components (Service and/or functional), and others as required. **Directorship of the JTCB will be determined by the CJTF.**

- The CJTF defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, JTCB reviews targeting information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists (JTLs). (1) In addition, the JTCB should maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where SOF are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations. (2) This board maintains a macro-level view of the JOA and ensures targeting nominations are consistent with the CJTF's concept of operations. (3) Through coordination with the PA, PSYOP, and CA representatives, the

JTCB also may ensure that favorable IO support is developed. Early preparation and planning for civilian influence or interference on the battlefield also can be coordinated.

- Normally, JTCB meetings are conducted daily to disseminate CJTF targeting guidance and objectives, monitor the effectiveness of targeting efforts, and validate NFAs.
 - JTCB meeting results should be provided to JTF components and supporting forces.
 - These results include suggestions and recommendations to NFAs and the JTL, modifications to JTF targeting strategy, and summaries of the daily battle damage assessment reports received from component and supporting forces.

d. Formation of Joint Fires Elements. The CJTF may approve the formation within the JTF J-3 of a joint fires element (JFE). The JFE is an optional staff element that provides recommendations to the JTF J-3 to accomplish fires planning and coordination. The JFE assists the JTF J-3 to accomplish responsibilities and tasks as a staff advisor to the JFC. Specific duties of the JFE are assigned by the JTF J-3 and will be approved by the CJTF. When established, this element would be composed of a variety of experts from the CJTF's staff (including the J-3), the components, the combatant command, and elsewhere as needed. The JFE provides the capability to accomplish fires planning and coordination functions.

e. Rules of Engagement Planning Cell. The JTF J-3 is responsible for the development of ROE in CAP. The ROE cell provides a formal planning structure through which the J-3 can effectively perform this responsibility. The ROE planning process requires timely and extensive intra-staff

coordination and planning (usually between the J-2, J-3, J-5, and SJA). The starting point for mission-specific ROE is the SROE, which may be modified with approved supplemental ROE. (See Paragraph 9 of Chapter IV, "Joint Task Force Command and Control," for details on ROE.) ROE are not static, however. They are tailored to the individual mission and threat environment and must remain responsive to changes in either. The ROE planning process does not end when the OPLAN or OPORD is approved. The ROE cell should track and review the ROE and respond according to threat or mission changes. It also is the responsibility of the ROE cell to ensure that core SROE training concepts from the Service and functional component forces are integrated into the ROE development process and that subsequent training on the approved mission-specific ROE build upon that core training base.

ROE development must begin early in the planning process (before or during COA development). The ROE cell ensures early and knowledgeable ROE development. **Key points regarding the ROE cell are as follows.**

- The initial focus of effort by the ROE planning cell is in support of the overall planning effort by the J-5 and/or JPG.
- J-2, J-3, J-5, and SJA representatives at a minimum (participation may vary according to the mission).
- Consideration of ROE issues is critical to the COA analysis process. Prepare for wargaming of COAs in the same manner as an opposition force cell by predicting probable ROE impact on operation planning and by discussing political and military aspects of the mission statement and forecasting probable ROE restrictions and allowances for use of force. Proposed ROE must be modified as necessary to

support the accomplishment of mission objectives.

- Gather threat indicators and decision points during COA development that will become the basis for drafting and requesting supplemental ROE.
- Draft ROE and supplemental ROE (OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan Appendix 8 to Annex C, “Operations”).
- Develop or review for uniformity and compliance with the ROE the tools for training, tracking, and/or interpreting ROE.
 - Threat matrix is a tool that identifies theater-specific threats and hostile indicators.
 - ROE pocket cards may be used at the unit level for training in ROE.
 - Tracking boards for current ROE in force have proven effective.
 - ROE situation vignettes for use in training.
- Oversee dissemination and training of ROE.
- React to requests for supplemental ROE from components.
- Generate supplemental ROE requests based on changing threat or mission.
- Assist the SJA in interpreting SROE and existing ROE for CJTF, JTF staff, and component commands.

f. **Weather Cell.** The JTF J-3 will determine if there is a requirement for a weather cell or that the functions of this cell

simply will fall within the J-3 organization (e.g., JOC).

- Meteorological support for JTF operations requires a weather organization compatible with the JTF command structure.
- Early identification of specific weather support requirements for all JTF elements is required to ensure availability of necessary meteorological information.
- Basic products used in support of JTF operations are facsimile weather charts, weather teletype observation data, and meteorological satellite imagery from national collection and analysis facilities.
 - The basic information is supplemented by weather data collected from indigenous sources and observation data furnished by elements of the JTF.
 - JTF staff weather officer normally is assigned to the J-3.

For further details, see JP 3-59, “Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.”

g. **Information Operations Cell**

- The CJTF may establish an IO cell to coordinate operations focused on affecting adversary information and information systems, while defending the JTF’s information and information systems.
- The overall composition of each IO cell will vary, but it is important to have an officer in the grade of O-6 (e.g., JTF J-3 Operations Officer) as the key individual. This officer will ensure deconfliction and unity of effort for information activities within the JOA. Other members of this

cell may include: electronic warfare planner, military deception planner, OPSEC planner, J-2 planner, J-6 planner, PSYOP planner, and others as required.

For further details, see CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy,” (classified secret) and JP 3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).”

5. Checklist

The following checklist may assist the JTF J-3. A number of the checklist items refer to the planning process and may closer resemble J-5 responsibilities, but this will depend on how the JTF is organized and who has been directed to do the planning.

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-3

- Have current plans been evaluated?
- Have regional options been developed, prioritized, and passed to the superior commander?
- Have regional military objectives been developed and forwarded to the superior commander?
- Have component and supporting commanders been tasked to analyze the situation and begin tentative planning to support proposed courses of action (COAs)?
- Have the disposition and location of assigned and attached forces been reviewed, and, if needed, has an increased force posture and force readiness been directed within established authority? (Respond as necessary within existing rules of engagement [ROE], requesting modification if necessary.)
- Have COAs been evaluated and prioritized? (“Wargaming” is one method.)
- Has the commander’s estimate, containing an appropriate risk assessment, been developed and submitted to the superior commander?
- Has the status of noncombatants in the joint operations area (JOA) been evaluated to determine the requirement for a noncombatant evacuation operation plan?
- Has the process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights been initiated?
- Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?
- What is the deployment status of Reserve units?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-3 (cont'd)

- Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the superior commander for resolution?
- Has the superior commander's tasking and guidance been analyzed?
- Has guidance been developed for components?
- Have completed COAs, including validated forces and sustainment, been developed?
- Have pre-hostility special operations (e.g., special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, counterterrorism) been considered during COA development?
- Has the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) been notified that the selected COA is ready for evaluation?
- Has the JTF legal officer been consulted concerning applicable international agreements or special requirements of the law of armed conflict?
- Has a Global Command and Control System teleconference been established, or does one need to be established to support planning?
- What is the effect of identified shortfalls on the COA?
- Can the shortfalls be resolved using organic resources, or do they require elevation to the superior commander?
- How will the COA likely be perceived by the indigenous, US, and allied publics?
- Have supported command execution planning instructions been developed?
- Has the COA been adjusted based on the superior commander's guidance?
- Has the time-phased force and deployment data been validated with USTRANSCOM?
- Have appropriate JPEC organizations been tasked to develop information for support annexes?
- Have all support annexes been incorporated in the operation plan (OPLAN), operation order (OPORD), or campaign plan?
- Is the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan complete and in the proper format?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-3 (cont'd)

- Has the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan been submitted to the superior commander for approval?
- Has an EXECUTE ORDER been received?
- Has the OPORD or campaign plan been adjusted for the superior commander's EXECUTE ORDER before issuing the commander's EXECUTE ORDER?
- Are plan objectives being met?
- Is a reassessment of objectives required?
- Are situations developing that require additional force and sustainment resources, or redirection of allocated force and sustainment resources?
- Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?
- Has replanning guidance been issued to the JPEC (if necessary)?
- Does the situation call for termination of operations?
- Does the situation call for redeployment planning?
- Can the JTF J-3 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?
- Have US and friendly government agencies and in-country relief organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component civil affairs (CA) operations?
- Has the superior commander's political adviser provided guidance on CA priorities?
- Have CA priorities been coordinated with the JTF component staffs?
- In the absence of a joint planning group, the JTF J-3 normally will establish an operations planning and execution cell, composed of J-3, J-4, and J-5 planners (as a minimum), to complete the timed-phased force and deployment data planning tasks, monitor the flow of forces and nonunit supplies into the JOA, and track forces to their destination. The following questions are for use by this team.
 - Have plan identification numbers been established in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for each COA?
 - Have movement requirements for each COA been created and tested?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-3 (cont'd)

- Has plan information been entered in JOPES?
- Have in-place or in-theater forces been identified in JOPES?
- Have noncombatant evacuation operation, medical evacuation, and retrograde cargo movement requirements been developed?
- Have units that are moving by organic lift been identified?
- Has United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) been requested to provide COA transportation evaluation?
- Have deployment estimates been developed for each COA?
- Does the closure profile meet COA requirements?
- Can identified transportation shortfalls be resolved organically, or do they need to be elevated to the superior commander?
- Have deployment requirements been verified?
- Has transportation lift allocation been verified?
- Has each daily deployment increment been validated?
- Have intratheater movement plans been developed?
 - Is the first increment deployment flow being monitored?
 - Has the next deployment increment been confirmed once the first increment is under way?
 - Is organic lift being monitored to ensure that arrival times meet OPORD requirements?
 - Have reception and onward movement capabilities been evaluated?
 - Are use rates, requirements, and all transportation modes being monitored?
 - Is the reprioritization of lift requirements (if required) being coordinated with the supported combatant commander and USTRANSCOM?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-3 (cont'd)

- Is actual arrival data, if different than scheduled, being entered into the JOPES? (Continue to update deployment information on the JOPES deployment data base.)
- Is unit status being reported after arrival?
- Has a joint operations center (JOC) been established and properly staffed?
 - Is there a necessity to establish a JOC or portions thereof during the crisis action planning (CAP) process?
 - If established during the CAP process, what role does the JOC play?
- If directed by the CJTF (based on J-3 recommendation):
 - Has a joint search and rescue center been established?
 - Has a joint targeting coordination board been established?
 - Has the commander considered creation of a JFE?
 - Has an ROE planning cell been formed?
 - Has a weather cell been formed?
 - Has an information operations cell been formed?
 - Has the commander, joint task force (CJTF) (or designee) provided initial guidance concerning the functions and responsibilities of the above organizations?
 - Have these organizations been properly staffed?
 - Have these organizations analyzed all phases of the operation (deployment through redeployment)?
- If directed by the CJTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to plan, monitor, and direct execution of joint air operations?
- If directed by the CJTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate the use of airspace in the JOA?
- If directed by the CJTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate joint air defense operations within the JOA?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-3 (cont'd)

- Have combat identification measures been established?
- Has a Joint Space Support Team been requested from United States Space Command?
- Have the effects of weapons of mass destruction been evaluated and the appropriate technical operations components been notified?

SECTION B. OPERATIONS

“... joint operations work and they work more efficiently than single-Service operations. There is unmatched power in the synergistic capabilities of joint operations.”

**GEN G. R. Sullivan, USA
Chief of Staff**

6. General

a. A CJTF may employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces across the range of military operations.

b. JTF operations are often operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational-level objectives; however, depending on national and/or coalition objectives, they may also be conducted at the strategic or tactical levels and may be very limited in scope or require a major military commitment.

c. To achieve these objectives, the CJTF must synchronize the actions of all the forces. In some operations, the CJTF will have to coordinate military actions with those of nonmilitary organizations (e.g., NGOs and PVOs).

d. Although there are a multitude of functions associated with JTF operations, this section only will discuss three of them — multinational operations, forcible entry

operations, and joint rear area (JRA) operations.

7. Multinational Operations

a. Multinational operations can be some of the most difficult to conduct.

- As discussed in other sections of this publication, there are many factors that have a bearing on the smooth, efficient, and effective use of multinational forces (e.g., C2, release of classified material, sharing intelligence, incompatible equipment).
- Success in multinational operations can be attributed to sound and effectual command relationships.
 - Much like the United States, most nations are not willing to relinquish command of their forces to other countries.
 - The challenge for the CJTF will be to arrange the best possible working relationship with multinational forces without demanding more from them than they are willing or able to provide.
- The CJTF needs to understand the many differences between US forces and those of other nations and must strive to build a team which includes multinational forces. Unity of effort must be achieved.

“Future operations — multinational in scope — in which all have a part to play, will require lean and clean military command and control structures functioning with harmonized doctrine.”

GEN H. Hansen
Commander in Chief
Allied Forces Central Europe

For further details, see JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” and JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

8. Forcible Entry

The nature, purpose, and uncertain environment in which JTF operations may be conducted may necessitate prior planning for possible forcible entry operations.

b. In assigning missions to multinational forces, it is important to assign them missions based on their ability to accomplish them (“mission-oriented orders”).

- The key to assigning missions to multinational forces is for the CJTF to have a clear understanding of each **nation’s capabilities, political will, and national interests in the operation.**
- The CJTF does not want to embarrass a multinational force by giving it a mission it cannot perform because of capability or political will.
- It also is important to ensure that what is stated to multinational forces is understood. Affirmative responses do not necessarily mean a total understanding of the CJTF’s direction, guidance, or intent to comply.

c. There will be more operational pauses when working with multinational forces. Most of these pauses will be based on the ability of multinational forces to work together smoothly and the requirement for some forces to obtain their nation’s “consent” before accepting a mission.

d. The liberal use of JTF liaison personnel with multinational forces will assist in improving the operational capability of these forces. US SOF with cross-cultural and language skills working with these forces can be a valuable asset.

a. Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition.

b. Normally, forcible entry operations are joint operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations or any combination thereof.

c. During planning the CJTF must spend considerable time determining if forcible entry operations are necessary, because they are complex and risky.

- In many situations, forcible entry operations are the only method for gaining surface access into the operational area.
- These operations often provide the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the onset of combat operations.
- Forcible entry operations may strike directly at enemy centers of gravity and may open new avenues for military operations.
- In addition, these operations may horizontally escalate the operation, exceeding the enemy’s capability to respond.

d. Figure VII-2 highlights some of the characteristics of forcible entry operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

- Require detailed intelligence and unity of effort.
- Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment.
- Forcible entry forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements.
- Operations security and deception are critical.
- Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with special operations.
- Special operations forces may precede forcible entry forces.
- Sustainment requirements are challenging.
- Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.

Figure VII-2. Characteristics of Forcible Entry Operations

For further details, see JP 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.”

9. Joint Rear Area Operations

The expeditionary nature of most JTF operations, coupled with the probable paucity of HN facilities and resources, will require JTF rear area operations.

a. The rear area of a JTF may be vulnerable to attacks by enemy forces with sophisticated surveillance devices, accurate weapon systems, and transportation assets capable of inserting forces behind friendly combat formations.

- Rear area installations also may be the targets for indigenous elements capable

of unconventional warfare ranging from crime, sabotage, and terrorism to large-scale raids.

- **The JRA contains units and facilities from all components that are critical to the JOA.**
- These units and facilities are organized into bases to enhance their effectiveness and security.
- Operations in sea areas normally are not considered to be in a JRA.
 - When a naval AO and a JRA meet along a coastline, the high water mark normally will designate the boundary between the two.

KEY TERMS

Joint Rear Area (JRA)

- Specific land area within a joint force commander's operational area.
- Facilitates protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint task force (JTF).

Joint Rear Area Coordinator

- Officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the JRA.
- Coordinates intelligence support.
- Ensures area management is practiced.

Joint Rear Area Operations

- Operations that facilitate protection or support of the JTF.

•• Ports and harbors, but not the built-up areas around them, usually are included in the naval AO.

b. Concurrent with the designation of a JRA, the CJTF normally designates a JRAC.

- The CJTF may designate a component commander or a member of the JTF HQ as the JRAC. Mission, force capabilities, nature of the JRA, and threat are criteria used by the CJTF in selecting a JRAC.
- JRAC is responsible for coordinating and maintaining the overall security of the JRA as directed by the CJTF. Figure VII-3 highlights specific JRAC responsibilities. These responsibilities include coordinating with appropriate commanders and staff.

c. **JRA Operations.** Operations occurring within the JRA either protect the JRA or support the JTF.

- **Security.** This function addresses operations that contribute to the security of the JTF as well as provide protection against hostile threats that could degrade the opportunity for mission success.
- **C4.** A system must be established to ensure secure, reliable, interoperable and/or compatible, and redundant communications. Installations within the JRA that possess C4 capabilities may be the most critical to protect.
- **Intelligence.** The overall intelligence effort provides a dual function — enhances protection within the JRA and ensures continued support to the JTF.

JOINT REAR AREA COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITIES

- The security posture in the joint rear area (JRA) supports the commander, joint task force's (CJTF's) concept of operations and is adaptable to support future operations.
- The overall JRA security plan is developed and coordinated with appropriate US, multinational, and host nation (HN) commands in accordance with CJTF directives and guidelines.
- The chain of command established by the CJTF and degree of authority granted to the JRAC are adequate for the mutual protection and security of all US assets and personnel in the JRA.
- Sufficient response forces are identified to respond to anticipated threats in the JRA.
- The intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement networks are responsive to the needs of commanders operating in the JRA.
- Objective criteria are developed and disseminated for assessing the criticality and vulnerability of bases in the JRA in order to prioritize security improvements and position reaction forces or area damage control.
- Coordination with the area air defense commander has been completed to ensure air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into US, multinational, and/or HN air defense plans in accordance with CJTF priorities and concept of operations.
- Positioning and stationing of units and facilities in the JRA are made with due consideration for security.
- Defense plans incorporate adequate provisions and procedures for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, to include NBC warning and reporting procedures.
- Appropriate liaison is established with multinational and HN commands for coordination of security issues.
- All relevant international and domestic (United States and HN) legal guidelines impacting on security within the JRA (such as host-nation support agreements, Law of War guidance, and rules of engagement) are disseminated to appropriate command levels.
- Civil affairs and Judge Advocate support is available to assist in resolution of security issues.
- Development and positioning of infrastructure are made with due consideration of security requirements.

Figure VII-3. Joint Rear Area Coordinator Responsibilities

JOINT REAR AREA COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITIES (cont'd)

- Component commanders in the JRA coordinate security at the boundaries of their area of operations (if the JRA is divided) to ensure coordinated JRA security efforts.
- Threat estimates to the JRA are developed and disseminated to appropriate commands in a timely manner.
- A tactical combat force, if established by the CJTF, is positioned and given the appropriate mission in accordance with CJTF directives.
- Any additional security forces (United States, multinational, and/or HN) are properly integrated into an overall JRA defense plan.
- Key lines of communication through the JRA are protected to support current and future operations.
- Key movements and sustainment operations have priority for security, mine detection and clearing, and area damage control assets.
- Liaison is established with the naval coastal warfare commander to coordinate security operations. (NOTE: If it is necessary to plan and/or execute an amphibious operation in the JRA, the JRAC also establishes liaison with the commander, amphibious task force, and the commander, landing force, as required.)

Figure VII-3. Joint Rear Area Coordinator Responsibilities (cont'd)

- **Sustainment.** The ability to provide sustainment to the entire JTF often is accomplished by units and personnel within the JRA. Operations within the JRA can lead to improved and continued sustainment to the JTF.
- **Movements.** Normally, the JRA contains the facilities and forces required to move most of the JTF's sustainment. Movement control must be protected to continue support to the JTF.
- **Infrastructure Development and Area Management.** Mission support and security should be considered when positioning US assets throughout the JRA. All assets supporting the JTF must be protected.
- **HN Support.** US forces may operate with HN forces to provide security in the JRA. In addition, US forces may have to provide security for HN facilities.
- d. **Levels of Response.** Threats to bases in the JRA are categorized by the levels of defense required to counter them.
 - **Level I threats** (agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorists) can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures.
 - **Level II threats** (small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces, guerrillas) are beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities. These threats can be defeated by response forces,

normally military police units assigned to area commands with supporting fires.

- **Level III threats** (large tactical force operation, major air operations or theater missiles armed with conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction) necessitate a command decision to commit a tactical combat force.

For further details, see JP 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations,” and JP 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.”

10. Other Operational Considerations

a. JTF Training

“I felt good and comfortable going to war because I knew we had reached a peak of training. I didn’t fear anything because I knew we were ready.”

**CSM M. Alston, USA
Operation DESERT STORM**

- **Training needs to be a continuing process for personnel, units, and the joint force.** Service forces are responsible for individual and unit training. However, the CJTF should ensure that components are given the opportunity to conduct this training. In addition, training should be accomplished with as many of the multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations associated with the operation as possible.
- The CJTF is responsible to the establishing authority for the conduct of joint training of assigned forces.
- A predeployment joint training program should be established by the CJTF to include all elements of the JTF.

- Predeployment joint training can be accomplished, even in a time-sensitive operation, as long as it is based on anticipated operations to be conducted. The following are potential individual unit and joint training areas: (1) Individual military skills; (2) Unit training (rehearsals should be mandatory) based on projected operations; (3) Staff training to include training with multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations (when applicable); (4) Customs, culture, religious practices, political situation, and historical background of the situation and population of the projected JOA; (5) Enemy capabilities; (6) Effective communication to the public through the news media; (7) Negotiation and mediation; (8) Language training, especially key phrases; (9) Situational awareness; (10) ROE (to include CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces”); (11) Law of war (law of armed conflict); and (12) JOPES CAP.

- Embarked forces aboard Navy ships can accomplish some training (e.g., individual skills, classes on ROE, working with the media, and cultural aspects of the JOA). An attempt should be made to bring these forces ashore for appropriate training.

- Training may be accomplished once the JTF arrives in the JOA, but it probably will depend on the situation and be based on specific requirements and functions.

- Exercises may be conducted to rehearse the OPORD or new missions.

- Some exercises and training will require HN approval and are situationally dependent.



Training conducted aboard a Navy ship.

- Success of the operation, in part, will depend on the training the JTF receives prior to and during the operation.

*“As the lead battalion crossed the line of departure, three thoughts occurred to me — what was going to happen 150 kms away in the fight, what could go wrong, and that I was just one guy in 20,533. If I hadn’t **trained and prepared** those men and women for war, all the meetings and radio calls during the fight would not make a difference. The fight was in their hands now.”*

MG P. E. Funk, USA
Cdr 3rd Armored Division
Operation DESERT STORM

b. JTF Force Protection

• General

- Force protection must be a top priority during the “life” of a JTF. It is the responsibility of the CJTF and all other commanders within the JTF. The intent should be to accomplish the mission with the least loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

- Conducting the mission analysis process should assist in determining forces and equipment required to provide force protection.

- In some MOOTW, banditry and terrorism may play a major role in disrupting the JTF’s security efforts. A plan must be developed to counter this threat — US forces often are targets of violent acts.

“Force protection is the first thing that I want to see at the top of the list when it comes to anything we do for any operation. The number one priority is protecting the force.”

LTG J. Rutherford, USA
CG, V Corps

• Force Protection Considerations

- **Protection from the Enemy’s Firepower and Maneuver.** CJTFs counter the enemy’s firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and firepower,

KEY TERM

Force Protection

- Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations.
- Accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.

including the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Air and maritime superiority operations, air defense, and protection of airports and seaports, lines of communication, and friendly force lodgment all contribute to force protection. **OPSEC** and **military deception** are key elements of protection.

•• **Health, Welfare and Morale.** CJTFs are responsible for health promotion and disease nonbattle injury prevention which will help maintain the fighting spirit. CJTFs ensure systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine.

JP 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations," discusses health support for joint operations.

•• **Safety.** CJTFs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. **Command interest, discipline, and training** lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat

operations and the preservation of combat power.

•• **Prevention of Fratricide.** CJTFs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide—the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The **destructive power and range of modern weapons**, coupled with the **high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat**, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and **institute appropriate preventative measures**. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are **command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced situational awareness**. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat. (1) CJTFs should establish anti-fratricide measures in their SOPs and other directives. (2) In multinational operations, it also is essential that JTFs coordinate these measures with



Demonstration of nonlethal capability available to joint task forces.

multinational forces to ensure their understanding and concurrence.

•• **Technology.** Every means of force protection must be examined. Technology can assist in providing lethal and nonlethal capability (e.g., sensors, secure communications network, and unmanned aerial vehicles) to the JTF.

•• **ROE.** ROE also provide a means for the CJTF to influence force protection.

•• **Individual Awareness.** All JTF commanders, “from top to bottom,” must stress to the “troops” and others (e.g., media personnel, other government agencies’ personnel, and civilian organizations) **the significance of security and the importance of individual awareness** (be aware of what is going on around them).

c. Consequence Management

- Consequence management response includes measures to protect public health and safety and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and

individuals. Technical operations will be activated to address aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical material that are not encountered in standard crisis and consequence operations. Technical operations involve measures to identify the hazardous material, to assess the threat posed by the hazardous material, to provide consultation to decision makers concerning the implications of the hazardous material, and to decontaminate response personnel and the affected population and environment. Technical operations may be triggered pre-release in support of the crisis management response and continue post-release in support of the consequence management response.

See Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.15, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” and DODD 3150.08, “Department of Defense Response to Radiological Accidents.”

d. Risk Management

- Uncertainty and risk are a fundamental part of all military operations. A time-

tested tenet of success of the joint operations of the United States is taking bold, decisive action and a willingness to accept the associated risk. Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to various hazards. Carefully determining the risks, analyzing and controlling as many hazards as possible, and executing a supervised plan that accounts for these hazards contributes to the success of the application of military force. Risk management (RM) is a process which assists decision makers in reducing or offsetting risk. The RM process provides leaders with a systematic mechanism to aid in identifying and choosing the optimum COA based upon risk for any given situation. RM should be an element of planning and executing an operation. The RM process is applicable to all levels of military operations — strategic, operational, and tactical. Commanders are responsible for the routine application of RM in the planning and execution of military operations.

- **Risk Management Process**

- **Identify Hazards.** Consider all aspects of current and future situations, environment, and known historical problem areas.

- **Assess Hazards.** Assess hazards to determine risks. Assess the impact of each hazard in terms of potential loss and cost, based on probability and severity.

- **Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions.** Develop control measures that eliminate the hazard or reduce its risk. As control measures are developed, risks are reevaluated until all risks are reduced to an acceptable level.

- **Implement Controls.** Put controls in place that eliminate the hazards or reduce their risks.

- **Supervise and Evaluate.** Enforce standards and controls. Evaluate the effectiveness of controls and adjust and/or update as necessary.

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CHAPTER VIII

JOINT TASK FORCE LOGISTICS

“Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.”

**Jomini,
Précis de l' Art de la Guerre, 1838**

1. General

a. As stated in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” the Logistics Directorate “. . . **is charged with the formulation of logistic plans** and with the **coordination and supervision** of supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, communications system support, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistic activities. . . . This division **is responsible for advising the commander of the logistic support** that can be provided for proposed courses of action. In general, this division **formulates policies to ensure effective logistic support for all forces in the command and coordinates execution of the commander’s policies and guidance.**”

b. The **principles of logistics complement the principles of war.**

c. Logistics should be based on requirements and established priorities.

d. **Logistics provides the foundation of combat power.** Logistics is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in execution of military strategy and operations.

e. **Joint logistics should use existing individual Service policies and procedures whenever possible.** If this is not possible, the differences should be identified to the

supported combatant commander as early as possible for resolution.

f. **Mission termination planning must begin early,** and include the following.

- Planning for what logistics infrastructure, materiel, and equipment will remain in-country (if any).
- Determining what is required for redeployment of forces, materiel, and equipment.
- Determining the proper legal transfer authority before turning over US assets to HN or coalition forces.

g. Mortuary affairs include the responsibilities for search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within the theater. The responsibility extends not only to US forces, but also to multinational, civilian, third country, and enemy dead.

JP 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,” and JP 4-06, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations,” outlines mortuary affairs and contain additional information concerning field services.

h. Sharing logistics resources among field forces should be considered when operating in a multinational environment. Political,

legal, and fiscal concerns must be identified and addressed prior to providing support.

2. Logistics Authority

a. A combatant commander exercises directive authority for logistics and may delegate **authority for a common support capability to the CJTF** within the JOA.

b. **It is critical that the JTF J-4 determine what, if any, logistics directive authority for a common support capability the combatant commander has delegated to the CJTF** and if the scope of the authority meets the JTF requirements. The joint theater logistics management concept, described in Joint Pub 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," should be used in order to optimize resources by synchronizing all materiel support efforts in-theater with the objectives to provide the assets required for joint force mission accomplishment in a timely manner.

c. The combatant commander's logistics directive authority does not negate the individual Service's responsibility for logistic support or discourage coordination by consultation and agreement, nor is it meant to disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations.

d. **Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces**, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreement with national agencies, multinational partners, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing. The supported combatant command may determine that common serving would be beneficial within the theater or designated area. In addition, the applicability of Standard NATO Agreements, Foreign Military Sales, agreements under the NATO Mutual Support Act, other bilateral and multinational agreements, and international programs vary from nation to nation, and the distinction

between programs is often unclear. Determinations must often be made on a case-by-case basis.

e. **Authority over logistics under multinational and UN operations is different and situationally dependent.** Areas which must be clarified include funding, cross-servicing, and mutual support agreements.

3. JTF Logistics Organization

a. **JTF J-4 organization should be tailored to respond to the anticipated operation.** To accomplish this, it should include specialists from the various logistics functional areas: supply systems, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, contracting, logistics automation (area of connectivity), and miscellaneous services, plus experts in logistics plans and operations and disposal.

b. Figure VIII-1 shows a typical JTF J-4 organization. The actual composition of the J-4 will be dictated by the overall organization of the JTF and operations to be conducted. A number of the J-4's functions could be placed under an optional LRC. See paragraph 13 of this chapter for an explanation of each board, office, and center.

c. Logistics responsibilities follow single-Service command channels; **therefore, it is recommended that the JTF J-4 staff have representatives or liaison personnel from each Service involved in the JTF.** Since SOF relies on conventional Service counterparts for support, it also is recommended that the special operations components or JSOTF, if activated, have representatives involved as well.

d. **It is recommended that the CJTF establish an LRC** to provide the following logistics control and coordination functions.




Figure VIII-1. Typical J-4 Organization Less Logistics Readiness Center

- Monitor current and evolving JTF logistics capabilities. as the JTF agent and advocate for logistic support.
- Coordinate logistic support and maintain total assets visibility. • Provide a central point for logistics-related boards, offices, and centers.
- Advise the CJTF on supportability of proposed operations or COA. e. HNS specialists, HN liaison representatives, an international agreements liaison, and linguists and interpreters on the JTF J-4 staff are essential when dealing with the HN, multinational forces, and the civilian populace and contractors. CA can provide invaluable assistance in obtaining these personnel.
- Determine logistics sustainment requirements for planning and execution.
- Coordinate with the supported combatant commander's LRC and act

f. The J-4 should consider assigning a minimum of two individuals for preparation of the daily logistics status report for the supported combatant commander. These individuals build confidence and become the JTF experts for logistics status and issues.

g. Figure VIII-2 illustrates an optional LRC which can serve as the JTF J-4 “Operations Center,” for all logistics functions, boards, offices, and centers, and can provide to the JTF logistics oversight, coordination, and control of logistics functions.

4. Logistics Considerations

a. **Logistics As A Factor In Determining Objectives.** Strategically, logistics capabilities may limit the deployment, concentration, and employment options available to the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or combatant commanders. Operationally, theater logistics constraints may dictate the rate of strategic buildup or theater onward movement, overall size of the combat force, the depth of any attack, or the speed of advance. Logistics almost always will affect a theater campaign and exert varying constraints on JTF operations.

b. **Coordinate Logistics Planning With Operational Planning.** Operations and logistics are inseparable. J-4 must coordinate closely with current operations, future operations, and future plans to be effective.

c. **Forward Impetus.** A system of continuous replenishment that requires either automatic “push” or requisitioning “pull” capability. JTF requirements should be reviewed periodically and refined if required. Service component commanders can help determine the best method of continuous replenishment. A system to capture cost associated with providing support to multinational forces must be established and the legal authority for the provision of support identified.

d. **Balance Between Combat Forces And Logistics Forces.** The aim of any military organization is to produce the **greatest possible combat power with the resources available**. Commanders must determine the **proper balance** based on differences between various logistics and operation concepts. The **balance at the beginning of hostilities** is especially important. Fully trained and equipped combat support elements must be available and deployed early enough and in adequate numbers to render immediate sustained support to combat troops. **A combat force without logistic support is immobile and powerless.**


e. **Logistics Command and Control.** Unity of command requires coordination not only between Services, but among government departments and agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and multinational forces.

f. **Apportionment and Allocation.** Apportionment is distribution for planning of limited resources, whereas allocation is distribution of limited resources among competing requirements. Failure to maintain a system of apportionment and allocation can cause inflation of priorities, ultimate breakdown of the priority system, and loss of control over the logistics system.

g. **Accommodation for Requirements.** JTF J-4 organization should be set up to meet all the JTF requirements. An effective J-4 organization will be able to meet the JTF logistics needs without a reorganization should a change in the JTF missions and responsibilities occur.

h. **Logistics Discipline. True economy of supply requires the careful planning and buildup of levels to provide those resources required. Excess stock or unwise use of priorities decreases flexibility and drains transportation, facilities, and logistics resources from other operational priorities.**

TYPICAL J-4 ORGANIZATION WITH LOGISTICS READINESS CENTER



Notes:

1. **LRC**, if established, is **tailored to operations and staffed primarily by the joint task force (JTF) J-4 staff.**
2. JTF J-4 should determine logistics augmentation requirements as early as possible. These requirements would be passed, along with other JTF augmentation requirements, to the supported combatant commander.
3. **Only those logistics boards, centers, offices, and functional areas required by the JTF should be established.** JTF J-4 must advise the commander, joint task force on which logistics-related boards and centers to establish. **Once established, these boards, centers, and offices must coordinate with their respective logistics functional area within the LRC.**

Figure VIII-2. Typical J-4 Organization With Logistics Readiness Center

i. **Movement Control.** Accurate, up-to-date information is vital to effective operations. A JTF needs the capability to monitor and track movement of forces, equipment, and supplies coming into and within the JOA. Radio frequency tags may be used for monitoring and tracking the movement of supplies throughout the operational area.

• **Transportation by air, land, and sea, is the “linchpin” of the JTF operation.**

The JTF J-4 must understand the roles and functions of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the JTF.

• Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations. The JTF J-4 requires the capability to monitor and track movement of forces, equipment, and supplies in the JOA.

• Success of Service logistics streamlining initiatives are heavily reliant on intratheater distribution support. The JTF J-4 must coordinate with the theater J-4 to ensure the theater

distribution network is focused to meet the JTF’s deployment and initial sustainment requirements.

• Coordination of movement and access to JOPES via Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is critical to deploying and supporting JTF forces. Allied Command Europe’s Deployment and Movement System is an updated automated data processing network linking movement and transportation agencies with NATO.

• Logistics flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and continually updated as operations progress. Materiel arriving before offload equipment is on hand or personnel deploying well in advance of their equipment can cause major problems.

• The JTF J-4 should integrate theater movement requirements with strategic movement. Inadequate control of movement reduces efficiency and could cause bottlenecks (especially seaports and airports).



Surface lift provides up to 85 percent of the total dry cargo transportation requirements (90 percent if petroleum, oils, and lubricants is included).

- **The J-4 must prioritize the JTF transportation;** if surface delivery is possible, use it. **Everything should not be shipped immediately by air. Provide transportation requirements and priorities established by the J-3 to the supported combatant commander to validate and pass to US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).** The JTF J-4 must allow the Defense Transportation System to effectively move those requirements.

j. Deployment Information Flow.

Accurate, up-to-date information flow is vital. It is almost as important to know where units and supplies are as it is to have them physically present.

k. Logistics Reserves. Logistics can be a pacing factor at the operational level of war when it determines how quickly a campaign can proceed. It is necessary to establish the requirement for logistics reserves with the supported combatant commander.

l. Industrial Base Requirements.

Planners must identify the items that must come directly from the industrial base vice existing stocks.

5. Logistics Planning

a. Logistics plans should be written to anticipate changes.

b. Early involvement of the JTF J-4 logistics staff is critical to the success of the operation and ensures sustainment requirements are balanced with capabilities. Key logistics representatives and their responsibilities are listed below.

- Logistics planners
 - Review lessons learned data bases for unique requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas.

- Determine JTF resupply requirements.
- Identify requirements and pass them to the supported combatant commander. The supported combatant commander will validate the requirements and pass them to the appropriate Service component or outside agency for sourcing. Working with the Service components, the JTF J-4 can determine whether the JTF support should be provided from the military (Services), civilian sources, HN, UN, or other nations.

- Transportation specialists, working with transportation specialists from USTRANSCOM and the transportation component commands (TCCs), evaluate airports, seaports, and inland transportation systems capabilities and requirements.
- Contracting and supply specialists evaluate any HN capabilities to provide support services, storage, and materiel.
- Engineers or facility managers determine the capabilities of existing infrastructure and develop plans and requirements to upgrade infrastructure to support the JTF.

c. A JTF logistics plan should be integrated with component commands and other organizations and agencies, as well as HN and multinational forces, to ensure success.

JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," CJCSM 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)" (which has replaced JP 5-03.2), and CJCSM 3122.04, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance) (Secret Supplement)," provide planning guidance

and areas to consider when developing the logistics plan.

6. JTF J-4 Responsibilities

The JTF J-4 responsibilities are as follows.

- a. Coordinate the overall logistics functions and requirements of the JTF.
- b. Advise the CJTF concerning logistics matters that affect the accomplishment of the JTF mission.
- c. Formulate JTF logistics policies.
- d. Develop Annex D (Logistics) to CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans. Develop appropriate sections of paragraph 4 of the Basic Plan and Commander in Chief's Strategic Concept.
- e. Coordinate common item supply support in accordance with tasking assigned in Annex D (Logistics) to the OPLAN or OPORD.
- f. Coordinate agreements for inter-Service supply and support, local procurement and controls, and allocate indigenous facilities and

logistics resources available at staging bases and in the JOA.

- g. Monitor critical classes of supply support capabilities for the purpose of mission tasking and economy of resources and apportioning critical resources.
- h. Arrange for and monitor transportation movement requirements; also assess capabilities and limitations of assigned forces, supporting commands, agencies, and in-country assets.
- i. Identify and coordinate JTF HNS requirements with the CMOC. During disaster relief and/or FHA, the J-4 can play an important supporting role to the CMOC in meeting NGO and/or PVO requests for assistance and aiding them in coordinating all aspects of providing assistance with limited resources.
- j. Arrange HNS with the appropriate agency in the JOA, including procurement and use of HN resources.
- k. Coordinate the operation of beaches, airports, and seaports within the JOA.



The longer an operation lasts, the more important maintenance becomes.

l. Exercise staff supervision or cognizance over applicable military engineering matters (e.g., construction, maintenance, and base development).

m. Coordinate maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations to ensure economy of inter-Service and HN resources, even though these are primarily a Service vice J-4 responsibility.

n. Assist the JTF surgeon in developing the logistics aspects of the JTF's HSS system.

o. Coordinate joint mortuary affairs, including return of remains.

p. With the J-1 and PM, coordinate support for returning EPW, civilian internees, displaced civilians, and other detained persons.

q. Refine logistics OPSEC planning guidance, ensure logistics-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities, and support military deception initiatives.

r. Maintain liaison with the other JTF staff agencies, subordinate task forces, and component commands.

s. **Identify requirements for contracting and request contracting officers with the appropriate warrants. Additionally, identify resources available to advise the contracting officers on such contract, acquisition, and fiscal law questions as may arise.**

t. Coordinate agreements, transactions, and implementing instructions for US and multinational mutual support logistics exchange issues with the appropriate component and multinational points of contact.

7. Multinational Logistics

a. **Logistic support and sustainment of forces is each nation's responsibility;** however, varying degrees of mutual support among nations can and should be developed. The exchange of logistic support among multinational members can result in significant economies of effort. In the absence of appropriate international agreements, no authority exists for the combatant commanders to provide for or accept logistic support from multinational partners.

b. Once multinational support is established, the JTF J-4 should ensure that it is clearly understood what assistance can be rendered to multinational forces and what reports are required by higher authorities.

c. It is to JTF advantage to attain as much control over logistics as possible through tact, diplomacy, knowledge of multinational forces' doctrine, and generally good relations with military commanders and civilian leaders.

d. It is essential that logistics be handled on a multinational basis, within the limitations of interoperability.

e. **Some nations will not relinquish directive authority over their logistics forces, assets, and systems.** Even if multinational participants insist upon maintaining a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort.

f. **Funding guidance to support multinational forces should be identified as early as possible.** Once funding guidance is determined, procedures should be developed to ensure there will be no adverse impact on operations.

g. Consensus on multinational logistics issues and requirements should be formed early. Potential problems can be avoided by early identification of differences among the nations' and Services' logistics doctrine, stockage levels, interoperability, and accountability.

h. The JTF J-4 staff should be aware of cultural differences (language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks) which may have an impact on logistic support to multinational forces.

i. In conjunction with the JTF legal officer, the JTF J-4 staff should develop a list of current agreements with other participating nations that provide for logistic support and should establish quality control and monitoring compliance for all multinational-provided services and supplies such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), water, and food.

Additional multinational logistics information, considerations, and issues can be found in JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations," JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," and JP 4-08, "Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations."

8. United Nations Logistics

a. UN logistics systems depend on member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level for a given length of time, normally 60 to 120 days. This period allows the UN to organize a logistics structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and memorandums of understanding which will provide logistic support for the forces involved.

b. UN survey and assessment team will evaluate the operation requirements and develop planning data for sustainment. When participating in a UN mission, the JTF

should, if possible, send a US logistics representative with the UN mission survey team to assist in preparing the UN assessment. JTF efforts to participate and coordinate with UN forces will improve the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts for use of facilities or resources.

c. Once established, the UN logistic support structure normally will provide a measure of continuing support through a system of a lead nation(s) (one or more nations providing the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement), civilian contractual arrangements, a UN force logistic support group, or a combination of the above.

d. The UN normally coordinates such logistics areas as bulk supplies (water, fuel, and rations of common-user items — UN clothing, domestic consumables, batteries, and some vehicle spares) and services such as waste disposal, laundry, and bath.

e. For UN operations, the JTF J-4 should determine what standards are to be followed in regard to support.

- US standards tend to exceed UN standards (e.g., consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels). US military equipment and system sophistication and the life style of US forces may be different than the quality of support the UN is providing.
- UN standards must be clearly understood in regards to the level and quality of UN support provided and funded. Logistic support that is significantly more extensive than what is outlined in the UN agreement may not be reimbursable.
- The JTF must be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support may be deficient, especially in critical areas such as medical support.

9. Contracting Support

a. **General.** Providing support to the JTF and its subordinates may require contracting interaction with foreign governments, commercial entities, NGOs, and PVOs. **Contracting can be an effective force multiplier of combat service support for deployed forces.** When properly used, contracting is another essential tool of the CJTF in support of the mission. Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic support units can deploy or before scheduled logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP), construction capabilities contract (CONCAP), Armed Forces contract augmentation program (AFCAP), ACSA, or HNS resources can provide support. It also is valuable where no HNS agreements exist, or where HNS agreements do not provide for the supplies or services required. **Close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support also is essential.**

b. **Contracting Support Plan.** The CJTF may want to develop a contracting support plan to provide the following information.

- Outline the procedures and policies for implementation of contracting support in the JOA, assuring full utilization of HNS, LOGCAP, AFCAP, ACSA, and CONCAP resources.
- Ensure that contracting solutions receive consideration during logistics planning and become part of the CJTF OPLAN.
- Identify JTF subordinate commands requirements that may be met by HNS, LOGCAP, CONCAP, AFCAP, ACSA, or contracting support.
- Develop an area data base containing all available data concerning local resources. The data base may include area studies,

locally developed logistic support data, a complete listing of existing LOGCAP, CONCAP, and HNS agreements available in the JOA, and recommendations from State Department Foreign Service personnel. Information also may come from the United States or civilian organizations (NGOs and PVOs) familiar with the area. This part of the contracting support plan must be continually updated.

- Address security and quality control aspects of contracting, to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions and fraud.

c. **JTF Contracting Office(s).** The CJTF may establish joint contracting office(s), staffed by personnel from all the Services operating in the JOA (to include linguists and interpreters when required). A JTF contracting office would be responsible for the following.

- Include some or all of the warranted contracting officers in the JOA. If more than one contracting office is required, contracting officers may have to be assigned to other smaller joint contracting offices to provide support on an area basis.
- Provide coordination and cooperation among Services that maintain parallel contracting organizations within the JOA. Preclude inter-Service competition for local supplies or services, and obtain the most advantageous prices through consolidation of requirements to more effectively utilize scarce personnel resources.
- Establish coordination and cooperation with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.

- Provide contracting representatives to the JTF J-4 organizational structure.
- d. **It is critical, upon mission termination or redeployment, that the JTF ensures all records or files are closed out and submitted to the supported combatant commander for disposition.**

10. Host-Nation Support

a. **HNS can be a significant force multiplier.** Whenever possible, available and suitable HNS should be considered as an alternative to deploying logistic support from CONUS. **HNS may increase dramatically the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce the strategic airlift and sealift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the JOA.**

b. Countries without a government infrastructure may not be able to provide logistics assistance; however, limited support may be obtained through local contractors.

c. To maximize the JTF logistics effort, HNS functions (i.e., identification of requirements and procurement) should be centralized and coordinated within the J-4.

d. CA personnel assigned to the JTF are trained to identify and coordinate HN support resources and can provide valuable assistance to the J-4 staff.

e. HN agreement should include the authority for the CJTF to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate.

f. Every effort should be made to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The most effective negotiations occur when military members show competence in local language and customs. The J-2 may assist in obtaining personnel for use in negotiations.

g. A JTF legal advisor should be involved in the development process for HN agreements.

h. It is critical to determine a lead agency (UN, Service, component, or other agency) for contracting and negotiating for support.

i. Areas of potential HNS are shown in Figure VIII-3.

j. Authority for negotiations must be obtained through the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Department of State (DOS) channels. Negotiations for HNS fall under two basic categories.

- No existing HNS agreements.
- The JTF J-4 determines potential HNS areas of logistic support required by the JTF and develops a concept of requirements for HNS.
- The JTF concept of requirements for HNS is passed to the supported combatant commander for approval and action.
- The supported combatant commander reviews and approves the JTF's HNS requirements and forwards them to the DOS via the OSD with a request that a general agreement be established between the HN and the United States. The general agreement provides the framework, procedures and the authority for the supported combatant commander to conduct military-to-military negotiations. (If possible, the agreement should provide for direct negotiations between the JTF or component commanders and the HN.)
- A JTF legal officer should be directly involved in new HNS agreements, to

HOST-NATION AREAS OF SUPPORT

Can include, but are not limited to:

- TRANSPORTATION
- SUPPLIES
- REAR AREA PROTECTION
- PETROLEUM, OILS, AND LUBRICANTS
- TELECOMMUNICATIONS
- FACILITIES
- ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT
- CIVILIAN LABOR
- HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT
- CONTRACTING
- SERVICES

Figure VIII-3. Host-Nation Areas of Support

ensure adherence to both HN and US laws.

- Once the general HNS agreement is established, the JTF J-4 provides a detailed statement of requirements to the HN and begins the negotiations for detailed JTF logistic support.
- A current HNS agreement exists.
 - The JTF J-4 reviews the current HNS agreement, identifying the logistic support items in the HNS agreement that the JTF would like the HN to “activate.” The JTF then requests, in accordance with procedures established in the general agreement, that these logistic support items be implemented.
 - The JTF J-4 identifies additional HNS logistic support which the JTF requires and begins negotiations (within the framework of the general agreement) to obtain the additional logistic support required by the JTF.
- The JTF J-4 ensures the components use existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN.
- Component commanders inform the JTF J-4 if an ACSA exists with the HN. If an ACSA does not exist, the JTF, via the supported combatant commander, and the DOS, should take steps to initiate an ACSA with the HN.

11. Logistic Supporting Agencies and Organizations

a. The supported combatant commander, through the LRC (if established), provides the link to interface with the JCS, Services, Defense Logistics Agency, USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies. The **supported combatant commander’s LRC** normally performs the following.

- **Manages the combatant commander’s directive authority over logistics** and provides the coordination required to resolve logistics issues and problems.

- **Acts as the JTF agent for requesting additional resources**, deconflicting demands on common use resources (when demand exceeds capabilities), and coordinates logistics with other multinational forces at the DOS and JCS levels.
- b. **USTRANSCOM** will be responsible for the following.
 - Providing strategic air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces.
 - Procuring commercial transportation services through component commands.
 - Activating, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Ready Reserve Force, Sealift Readiness Program, and the Voluntary Intermodal Shipping Agreement.
 - Providing representatives to the JTF assessment team to help evaluate seaports, airports, and inland transportation system requirements. Through its TCCs, USTRANSCOM performs the functions of the single port manager for both aerial and seaports of debarkation.
 - Monitoring movement data.
 - May nominate a Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR), upon request.
 - Assisting in the development and validation of the TPFDD; may also provide training to TPFDD development personnel on the JTF staff.
 - Coordinating movement and transportation movement information in JOPES. This data is critical to deploying and supporting forces.
- c. **Director of Mobility Forces**
 - The DIRMOBFOR works for the CJTF through the commander, Air Force forces.
 - The DIRMOBFOR provides direction to the air mobility division in the JAOC and to the air mobility element and will normally be a senior officer familiar with the AOR.
 - The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced by the theater Air Force component commander or nominated by the commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC).
 - The DIRMOBFOR has the specific authority and responsibility to:
 - Direct the integration of strategic air mobility support provided by assigned mobility forces;
 - Direct the tasking of AMC strategic air mobility forces (air and ground) attached (TACON) to the JTF and/or command center (CC);
 - Direct the tasking of theater air mobility forces (air and ground) attached (either OPCON or TACON) to the JTF and/or CC;
 - Coordinate with the air operations center (US Air Force) director to ensure that all air mobility missions supporting the JTF and/or CC are fully integrated with the air tasking order cycle and are deconflicted with all other air operations; and
 - Coordinate all strategic air mobility missions with the tanker airlift control center to ensure the most effective use of these resources in accomplishing the

CJTF, theater, and USTRANSCOM missions.

j. Fundamental logistic principles apply across the range of military operations.

12. Logistics Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War

a. In MOOTW, logistics elements may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles and in nonstandard tasks; planners must be aware that overextending such forces may jeopardize their ability to support combat operations.

b. Logistics elements may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed.

c. Logistics forces must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable legal, regulatory, or political restraints governing US involvement in MOOTW.

d. Logistics planners should analyze the capability of the HN economy to accommodate the logistic support required by US or multinational forces and exercise care to limit adverse effects on the HN economy.

e. Like all other units, logistics units must be capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces.

f. Early mission analysis also must consider transportation requirements.

g. Additional support forces may be required to build supporting infrastructure.

h. Procedures must be established to coordinate movement requirements and airfield “slot” times with other participants in the operations.

i. Logistic elements are especially critical during post-crisis or postconflict activity.

Refer to JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,” and JP 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,” for additional specific guidance regarding logistics.

13. Logistics Boards, Offices, and Centers

a. While not all of the below-listed joint boards, offices, or centers may be required, each should be evaluated based on the projected operations.

b. The following theater-level organizations may be established by the supported combatant commander to assist the JTF in coordinating logistics efforts.

- **Joint Transportation Board** establishes priorities and allocates common-user transportation resources within theater.
- **Joint Petroleum Office (JPO)** coordinates POL planning and execution, as well as the supply of common bulk petroleum products. Normally, the supported combatant commander’s JPO provides wholesale bulk petroleum management.
- **Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB)**, a temporary board, establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements in the JOA.
- **Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB)** evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, inter-Service support, and construction in compliance with JCMEB priorities.

- **CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB)** coordinates contracting operations with US embassies and HN for acquisition of supplies and services, eliminating duplication by arranging for single-Service contracting.
 - **Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board** modifies and recommends priorities for allocation of materiel assets for both US and multinational forces.
- c. The following may be established by the CJTF to coordinate logistics efforts.
- **The Joint Movement Center** implements the CJTF's taskings and priorities for movement. The JMC tracks strategic movements to ensure that they meet the JTF commander's expected flow of force capabilities into the operational area, maximizing the use of available in-transit visibility automation tools. Additionally, the JTF's JMC coordinates the employment of all transportation assets, including multinational and HN, within the JOA.
 - **The Subarea Petroleum Office**, when tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk POL in theater, is established by the JPO to coordinate, plan, and execute common bulk petroleum products for the JTF.
 - **The Joint Facilities Utilization Board** evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, inter-Service support, and construction at the JTF level. JFUB actions will be guided by the provisions of Joint Pub 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."
 - **The JTF Contracting Office**, working with the CLPSB, is established (with warranted contracting officers) to coordinate contracting requirements for and assisting in the acquisition of local facilities, supplies, services, and support. The contracting office coordinates contracting support requirements among Services to preclude inter-Service competition for supplies or services in order to obtain effective utilization and advantageous prices through consolidation of JTF requirements.
- A complete description of the functions and responsibilities for each of the above boards, centers, and offices can be found under Appendix B to JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations."*

14. Checklist

The following checklist may assist the JTF J-4.

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-4**General**

- Has a thorough review of the operation plan or operation order been made?
- Has the establishing authority's (CINC's) logistics guidance been reviewed?
- Are Annex D (Logistics) and the logistics estimates prepared?
 - Is initial distribution of supplies included?
 - Have logistics plans been coordinated with component commanders?
 - Are movements of personnel, equipment, and supplies included? Have adequate provisions been made for security during movements?
 - Are construction and other engineering requirements included?
- How many days can assigned forces sustain operations with organic supplies? Are sustainment supplies phased to provide uninterrupted operations? What is the supply safety level?

Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL)

- Should a Subarea Petroleum Office for resupply of POL be established?
- What is the concept of operations for petroleum support?
- What host-nation support (HNS) is available?
- What are component responsibilities for petroleum support? Have components provided estimates of POL requirements?
- Have arrangements been made with either the supported Joint Petroleum Office or the Defense Energy Support Region to contract for host nation (HN) sources?
- Has a quality control program for POL been established?
- Have POL storage methods and sites been selected? Have security arrangements for the sites been established?
- Have arrangements been made for transportation of POL within the assigned joint operations area (JOA)?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-4 (cont'd)

Munitions

- What are the critical munitions required for this operation as determined by the warfighter? Are there suitable substitutions available?
- Are sufficient stocks of these critical munitions available?
- Have munitions been properly relocated or positioned to support the operations?
- Can any critical munitions shortfalls be remedied through transfer between component commands or from foreign forces?
- Have components provided estimates of ammunition resupply requirements and common-user support?
- Have ammunition storage sites been selected and were explosive safety considerations considered?
- Have security arrangements for the ammunition sites been established?
- Have arrangements been made for transportation of ammunition within the JOA?

Joint Mortuary Affairs

- Has a Joint Mortuary Affairs Office been established to:
 - Provide oversight of Mortuary Affairs Support within the AOR of the combatant command?
 - Maintain two-way coordination with the Central Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.
- Have mortuary affairs guidelines been established in accordance with JP 4-06, "JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations":
 - Does the plan provide for establishment, manning and support of the Mortuary Affairs Collection Point?
 - Does this site plan include procedures for decontamination of remains?
 - Theater Mortuary Evacuation Point?
 - Personal effects depot?
 - Current death, concurrent return and Graves registration programs?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-4 (cont'd)**Sustainability**

- Are procedures established for maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations? Is there a requirement to provide disposal support within the theater where there is no Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO)? Is a useable DRMO located in the vicinity of the theater?
- Have HNS availability and requirements been determined?
- Has it been determined if any HNS agreements exist? Have required steps been taken to start the process for requesting authorization to begin negotiations?
- Have arrangements been made to obtain maintenance support not organic to the JTF?
- Have laundry and bath support requirements been generated in coordination with the medical authority, with consideration for environmental factors?
- Does the JTF require contracting personnel in country? Is a JTF contracting office required?
- Have procedures been established to coordinate with US embassies and host countries for acquisition of supplies and services?
- Are imprest funds required? Have imprest funds cashiers been appointed to the US disbursing officer?
- Has a joint logistics communications plan been developed to support J-4 command and control requirements?
- Are adequate security procedures established for classified logistics data transmission?
- Have the requirements for logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP) assistance been evaluated?

Transportation

- Have joint-use transportation requirements been established?
- Has a joint movement center (JMC) been established (if needed) to ensure transportation requests are validated and theater common-user transportation resources are employed with maximum effectiveness?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-4 (cont'd)

- Are common-user transportation requirements, capabilities, and performance monitored?
- Are transportation shortfalls and conflicts in priorities deconflicted?
- What HN transportation facilities and equipment are available?
- Has the JMC evaluated and disseminated information about HN transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and personnel?
- Has the JMC established the necessary communications (Global Command and Control System) to monitor and effect changes to the deployment of forces and supplies?
- Has the JTF J-4 coordinated with United States Transportation Command throughout planning, deployment, execution, and redeployment phases?
- Has the JTF J-4 coordinated with the JTF J-1 to ensure customs and duty issues do not hinder the expeditious movement of DOD cargo?

Engineer

- Has a JTF engineer been assigned or identified?
- Have engineer policy and guidance been established?
- Have a Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board and Joint Facilities Utilization Board been established? Are board procedures in place?
- Have traffic regulations, dictated by physical conditions of routes and communications been established?
- Has engineer support in the collection and processing of information for preparation and revision of maps been identified?
- Have future engineering requirements been anticipated and planned for?
- Have component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction been evaluated and prioritized? Are procedures in place for this to occur?
- Have provisions been made for battle damage repair (e.g., rapid runway repair)?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-4 (cont'd)

- Has the JTF engineer established, issued, and executed the JTF Environmental Management Support Plan?
- What HN engineer support is available?
- What Class IV (construction and protection material) is available?
- What are the component responsibilities for engineering support?
- Will contract construction (to include LOGCAP) be utilized?

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CHAPTER IX

JOINT TASK FORCE PLANS AND POLICY

“Never go anywhere unless you know what you’re going to do there...when you commit forces to combat and there is the distinct possibility of people being hurt, there must be clarity of purpose, there has to be a clear-cut objective and a clear-cut chain of command or else you shouldn’t introduce forces.”

Gen J. J. Sheehan, USMC
Commander in Chief
US ATLANTIC COMMAND

SECTION A. PLANS AND POLICY DIVISION

1. General

Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” states, “The Plans and Policy Division assists the commander in long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint operation plans, and associated estimates

of the situation. The Plans and Policy Division may contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section. When the commander does not organize a separate Plans and Policy Division, the planning functions are performed by the Operations Division.” Joint planning processes are shown in Figure IX-1.



Figure IX-1. Joint Planning Processes

2. J-5 Organization

Figure IX-2 depicts a typical JTF J-5 organization. The actual composition of the J-5 will be dictated by the overall organization of the JTF and operations to be conducted.

3. JTF J-5 Responsibilities

The JTF J-5 must provide political-military oversight for all aspects of the JTF's operations to include HNS, NEO, CA, and ROE. The following is a list, not all-inclusive, of JTF J-5 responsibilities.

a. Prepare and coordinate required OPLANs or OPORDs in support of assigned CJTF missions.

- These plans or orders may exist as a coordinated part of a combatant commander's plans or orders or as a supporting OPLAN or OPORD.
- OPLANs or OPORDs may be prepared in response to a combatant command's

planning directive or a directive by the CJTF.

- As operations are executed, the J-5 will prepare OPLANs or OPORDs as directed in support of future operations. Keys to OPLAN or OPORD development are the following requirements:

- Identify the overall objective;
- Identify the acceptable level of risk;
- Determine the necessary military conditions for success (end state); and
- Conduct mission analysis.

b. Develop COAs within the framework of the JTF-assigned objective or mission, forces available, and the commander's intent.

- Anticipate tactical and operational opportunities and risks and recommend supporting ROE.




Figure IX-2. Typical Joint Task Force J-5 Organization

- Perform combat power assessments (wargaming) and determine the corresponding required joint force closure.
- **Ensure synchronization of combat power in support of each COA.**
- Consider command relationships with higher, lower, adjacent, and HN HQ and elements.
- Identify decision criteria to support analysis of the developed COA.
- Promulgate the commander's decision in planning directives, OPLANs, or OPORDs.
- Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations (generally 72 hours and beyond) during the execution phase.
- Promote timely decision making to allow execution of OPORDs.
- Provide parameters for current operations.
- Promulgate the commander's intent.
- Plan command transitions (e.g., changes in location or structure).
- Coordinate planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational headquarters, as required.
- Determine forces required and available and coordinate deployment planning in support of the selected COA.
- Ensure that the force requirements are entered in JOPES.
- Provide planning recommendations for HNS.
- Provide assistance to the J-3 in the preparation of orders.
- Coordinate and review the TPFDD input through GCCS.
- Coordinate with the J-3 to ensure that politico-military activities such as NEOs and CA are properly addressed with the appropriate US embassy and HN governments from a strategy and policy viewpoint.
- Participate in ROE development.

4. Checklist

The following checklist may assist the J-5.

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-5

- What is the current politico-military situation?
- Have current plans been evaluated (e.g., DOS Political-Military Plan)?
- Have all appropriate warning, planning, and implementing directives been thoroughly reviewed and mission analysis completed?
- Have regional military objectives been developed and forwarded to the supported combatant commander?
- Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-5

- Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the JTF establishing authority for resolution?
- Has the JTF supported combatant commander’s tasking and guidance been analyzed?
- Has guidance been developed for components?
- Have operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN) shortfalls and limitations been identified and resolved?
- Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPORD or OPLAN?
- Is the OPORD or OPLAN complete and in the proper format?
- Has the composition of the JPG been determined?
- Has the battle rhythm of the JPG been established?
- Does the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base accurately reflect all force and sustainment requirements needed to accomplish the assigned mission? Are these requirements properly routed, phased, prioritized, and sourced?
- Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?
- Do current conditions indicate the need and suitability for planning for operations during prehostilities, such as special forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs?
- Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

SECTION B. JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING

“The greatest lesson of this war [World War II] has been the extent to which air, land, and sea operations can and must be coordinated by joint planning....”

**Gen H. H. Arnold, USAF
Chief of Staff, USAF**

5. General

The CJTF will make the decision on how planning will be accomplished for the JTF. Regardless of how it is accomplished,

planning requires the full integration and synchronization of the JTF staff.

a. **The requirement for a JTF may be identified in either the deliberate planning process or the CAP process.**

- Deliberate planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint OPLANs for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents.
- CAP is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and

resources. Crisis action planners base their plan on the actual circumstances that exists at the time planning occurs.

- This section focuses on CAP.

b. Optimally, a **JTF should be established before or during CAP Phase III (course of action development) to allow the designated CJTF and staff to participate in as much of the CAP process as possible.**

Figure IX-3 highlights a comparison between the combatant command and JTF during the CAP process.

- A JTF performs joint planning functions similar to those of combatant commands for a specified mission or designated JOA.

- In “close-hold” planning scenarios, CJTF and key JTF staff members should be included in the planning process at the earliest opportunity.

c. **CAP begins when a significant incident or event is reported to an appropriate government agency and ends when the crisis is resolved or forces are withdrawn.**




Figure IX-3. Combatant Command and Joint Task Force Comparisons

d. Once CAP is activated, effective interaction is essential to optimize information flow and coordinate planning activities among the NCA, Joint Staff, Services, Defense agencies, combatant commands, CJTF, designated forces, and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).

- The CJTF staff must maintain a close relationship with the supported combatant commander’s staff during CAP Phases III-VI to ensure that planning activities are coordinated.
- It is important that the CJTF keeps the JTF components informed of planning initiatives — **the CJTF should strive**

to have JTF components assigned for planning as early as feasible.

For further details, see JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

6. Joint Planning Group

a. **To enhance the CAP process, it is recommended that the CJTF form a planning element.** Figure IX-4 depicts a typical JPG.

- This element has been referred to by various commands as an operations planning group, operations planning team, crisis action team, or JPG. For simplicity, the term JPG will be used




Figure IX-4. Joint Planning Group

throughout this publication when referring to this planning element.

- The decision on the organization and functions of the JPG should be determined by the CJTF at the onset of JTF organization.
- Furthermore, it must be made clear how the JPG and staff sections (especially the J-3 and J-5) will interact during planning and once operations commence.

b. Suggested purposes for the JPG are to conduct CAP, be the focal point for OPORD development, perform future planning, and accomplish other tasks as directed.

c. Composition of the JPG may vary depending on the planning activities being conducted. There are no “hard and fast” rules on how to determine the precise number of personnel required to staff the JPG. A task specific organization may work best. Figure IX-5 depicts one approach to JPG organization.

- Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure.
- These representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, components, or organizations.
- Often, representatives from the supported combatant command will augment the JPG.
- The heart of the JPG is the planning cell. This cell is a core of 10-12 personnel who are familiar with the CAP process and JOPES products. A small group of core planners is recommended, since large groups tend to become less focused and unmanageable. A focused effort is critical during the initial phases of CAP.

An organization such as USACOM’s and USPACOM’s DJTFAC and USEUCOM’s core JTF cell may provide the planning expertise and continuity from the commander in chief’s planning team to jump start the JTF planning process. These organizations typically include two separate groups: an operational planning team (OPT) to assist in joint planning, and a joint training team (JTT) to assist and act as a focal point for training the JTF staff. Figure IX-6 depicts this makeup.

- Figure IX-7 depicts the relationship of the DJTFAC subgroups (OPT and JTT) to the overall JTF staff.
- The JPG should be expanded for some planning functions. Typically these representatives will be called for when specific subject matter expertise and staff or component planning input is required. These members of the JPG should only be called for under specific circumstances. Many of these representatives are liaison officers (LNOs) and JTF staff action officers with specific duties and responsibilities to the CJTF.
- Additional cells may be formed in order to support the JPG effort. The information management cell manages the flow of information to and from the JPG. The deployment cell is organized to concurrently develop the TPFDL in JOPES. The cell is typically active only through the planning and deployment phases of an operation. A similar cell may be organized for redeployment. A joint IO cell may be organized to integrate and synchronize IO activities. An orders cell may be incorporated to support the administrative effort of publishing CJTF orders (warning order, planning order, OPORD, commander’s estimate, and other related orders.)




Figure IX-5. Joint Planning Group Composition

DEPLOYABLE JOINT TASK FORCE AUGMENTATION CELL COMPOSITION




Figure IX-6. Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell Composition

- Figure IX-8 depicts one example of JPG linkages as well as additional members of the JPG.
- d. The composition of the JPG is a carefully balanced consideration between group management and appropriate representation from the JTF staff and components. JPG membership will vary based on the tasks to be accomplished, time available to accomplish the tasks, and the experience level of the JPG members.
- In the initial planning phase, the JPG is focused on mission analysis. This lends itself to a small group (10-12 personnel) of core planners, or the planning cell. Once mission analysis has been completed, the entire JPG may be assembled to brief the results of the mission analysis and to disseminate the commander's planning guidance.
- Appropriate representation from the JPG will then proceed to COA development and analysis. The JPG may be organized into COA teams that are responsible for developing, refining, and wargaming each COA.
- Once the JTF has completed initial planning and an OPORD or OPLAN has been published, the focus of the JPG turns to branch and sequel planning. Normally, this type of planning will be conducted by the planning cell. The entire JPG is assembled under specific circumstances. This is in consideration of the duties and responsibilities of LNOs and other representatives during the execution phase. The JPG can expend a significant amount of planning time in attempting to assemble ad hoc meetings.




Figure IX-7. Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell Augmentation

e. Normally, the head of the JPG is an officer in the grade of O-6. For the JPG to be effective, this officer must be experienced in joint planning and operations.

- **The head of the JPG must ensure that this group is organized from the start with a clear, concise agenda.**
 - The dynamics of CAP requires that a daily schedule be developed for the JPG that supports the tasks at hand and the CJTF's requirements.

- Timelines and milestones need to be firmly established to ensure "time spent" equates to "quality output."

- **In establishing these timelines and milestones, consideration must be given not only to the time required for the JTF to accomplish its planning, but also the time required by the JTF components to plan and produce the necessary products required by the CJTF.** (1) Some commands use the "1/3-2/3 rule" as a guide for establishing

JOINT PLANNING GROUP LINKAGES AND MEMBERSHIP




Figure IX-8. Joint Planning Group Linkages and Membership

planning timelines — 1/3 of the time available would be provided to the JTF for planning and 2/3s of the available time would be provided to the JTF components for planning. (2) This rule, if used, only should be looked at as a

starting point. (3) It also is important to consider that at times, the location of **components may be in different time zones** from the CJTF, which may hamper significantly the timely and effective initial JTF planning.

- **The CJTF must determine, based on such factors as mission execution time, direction from the supported combatant commander, and staff experience, when the components are brought “on board” for planning and the necessary time required for both the JTF and components to do their planning.** (1) In some situations, it may be best for the JTF to take the first 2-3 days for its planning and gradually phase in the components for planning. (2) The JPG may be doing much of the planning but it is the responsibility of the **CJTF to establish the planning timeline for the overall effort to include that of the components.**
- It may be necessary to conduct some training during the initial standup of the JPG. All representatives may not be “up-to-speed” with the complexities of joint planning. The head of the JPG should determine these training requirements through an evaluation process. An organization such as USACOM’s and USPACOM’s DJTFAC and USEUCOM’s core JTF cell could provide the expertise to provide training to these individuals.
- Another important function for the head of the JPG is to develop a system to ensure that representatives understand their role in this group and to provide a forum for these individuals to voice their concerns, issues, and ability to support a particular COA. Included in this system must be the **capability for proper JTF staff coordination** and how the JTF will communicate with the supported combatant command and other agencies. Below are a number of sample questions that should be of concern to the head of the JPG. (Establishing the policy for internal and external coordination is not the responsibility of the JPG, but how this policy is established will impact on the functioning of the JPG.)
 - Has the JTF established an internal system to coordinate the release of message traffic and the distribution of messages?
 - Who can coordinate with higher authority?
 - What method will be used to communicate with higher authority?
 - **Has the JTF established an internal system to monitor what action has been taken on pending issues?**
 - f. The DCJTF and the chief of staff should be involved in the JPG, providing guidance and insight into the CJTF’s critical concerns. **These individuals should not allow the JPG to get “bogged down” with trivia or headed off on a tangent that does not support the CJTF’s guidance.**
 - g. Effectiveness of the JPG will be measured, in part, by the support provided to it by the principal JTF staff officers (J-1 through J-6). **At times, the principal staff officers should be the representatives to the JPG.**
 - h. Early designation of a JTF will facilitate the forming of the JPG and the commencement of the planning process. It may be possible to form a JPG without the JTF being fully organized and staffed.
 - i. The immediate concern of the JPG is to commence the CAP process. Detailed mission analysis is critical during this process.
 - The JPG prepares initial correspondence (e.g., letters of instruction, warning orders, alert orders, planning orders) for distribution to the JTF components or others based on guidance from the CJTF.
 - Formats for various type orders are in Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be converted to

CJCSM 3122.01), “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).”

- It also is important for the CJTF to provide to JTF components and others only what is needed when preparing messages, orders, or other directives. There is no requirement to duplicate the complete contents of orders from higher authority unless required for emphasis. Much of these contents can be referenced by the JTF in its orders as long as the referenced material is readily available to all that need it — higher authority orders may be retransmitted by the JTF to the commands that require them.

j. As the JPG works through the CAP process towards development of an OPOORD, it is important that the head of the JPG devise a system which analyzes COAs. There has to be a synchronization process to ensure that “all parts” of the JTF will work in unison from planning through operations.

k. The head of the JPG normally arranges for briefings to appropriate individuals (e.g., CJTF, supported combatant commander, and others as required) as JPG milestones are reached.

l. The development of the JTF OPOORD can be a long and tedious process. JPG can be the focal point for OPOORD development. JTF’s OPOORD normally will be based on the JTF’s establishing authority’s (supported combatant commander’s) OPOORD.

- The JPG must ensure that staff sections and individuals responsible for developing various sections of the OPOORD are aware of their responsibilities.
- A sample OPOORD is provided in Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be converted to CJCSM

3122.01), “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).”

- As previously stated, information in the supported OPOORD need not be repeated (that can be referenced) in the supporting OPOORD unless directed.

- Referenced material should be readily available to all that require it.

- If there is a requirement for annexes and appendices to support the CJTF OPOORD, formats in CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)”, and CJCSM 3122.04, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance) (Secret Supplement)” should be used.

m. Upon completion of the OPOORD and/or OPLAN and based on CJTF guidance, the JPG focus turns to execution phase planning. Typically, this involves branch and sequel planning. Figure IX-9 represents one organizational strategy for conducting this type of planning.

- The planning for future operations often is accomplished under the cognizance of the J-3 (future operations cell).
- Other functions the JPG may perform are the planning for termination and the planning for transition of the JTF to another military force, UN, regional organization, or civilian organization.
- Again, the JPG Chief must be cognizant of the other responsibilities of JPG representatives. A balance between effective staff and/or component coordination and overloading LNOs with meetings must be maintained.




Figure IX-9. Execution Phase Crisis Action Planning Process

n. The value of an organization such as a JPG only can be measured by the coordination, cooperation, and communication among the staff sections. Without these factors, quality products will be difficult to produce.

o. **To reiterate a key point, the establishment, functions, and interaction (with the JTF staff) of the JPG must be**

clearly articulated by the CJTF to prevent misunderstandings and “intramural disputes.”

7. Crisis Action Planning Process

Figure IX-10 is a graphical depiction of the CAP process.




Figure IX-10. Crisis Action Planning Process

a. CAP involves a structured process and provides for the transition from planning of military operations to their execution.

b. This planning is accomplished within a framework of six phases which allows for flexibility and time-sensitive decisions. These

phases may be omitted or compressed in the interest of time criticality. Figure IX-11 summarizes and highlights various aspects of these phases. In Figure IX-11, the term “supported commander” equates to the JTF establishing authority (e.g., supported combatant commander).

PHASES OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

Phase I — SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

- Potential problem detected, reported, and assessed.
- Focus of CAP is on the combatant commander in whose area the event occurs.
- Combatant commander prepares an assessment of the event and submits it to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).
- Course of action (COA) also may be submitted depending on the time sensitivity of the situation.
- If established, the joint task force (JTF) would monitor the situation and make preparatory plans to commence CAP — may involve more interaction depending on the supported commander’s guidance.

Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE I




Phase II — CRISIS ASSESSMENT

- NCA, CJCS, and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared.
- NCA makes a decision concerning progressing to the next phase, remaining in current phase, or returning to the pre-crisis situation.
- Specific guidance on COA development may be provided by the NCA.
- Supported commander would continue to monitor situation and conduct planning as required, including providing necessary information to JTF.

Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning (cont'd)

- The JTF, if established, would continue to monitor the situation and review any existing documentation (plans and area studies) pertaining to the area in question.
- The JTF may conduct informal discussions with potential components and retransmit message traffic or other pertinent information.

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE II



Phase III — COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

- Implements NCA decision or CJCS planning directive to develop military options.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff probably would transmit a warning order to the supported commander to commence preparation of COAs. Other type directives could be issued by the Chairman depending on the time sensitivity of the situation.
- **The directive establishes command relationships, identifies the mission, and provides any planning constraints.** In addition, this directive will either identify forces and strategic mobility resources and establish tentative timing for execution, or request the supported commander to develop these factors.
- In the event the NCA directs development of a specific COA, the directive will describe the COA and request the supported commander's assessment.

Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning (cont'd)

- Upon receipt of the CJCS directive (warning order), the supported commander develops and analyzes COAs.
- Based on the CJCS directive, the supported commander would transmit a directive, perhaps a warning order, to the JTF and other commands as appropriate to provide necessary guidance and information.
- Force requirements established and timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) development commences for each COA (time permitting).
- The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) reviews the proposed COAs and prepares deployment estimates. When possible, **USTRANSCOM or its representative should participate in the development of COAs.**
- Services monitor development of COAs and begin planning for support forces, sustainment, and mobilization.
- **If not previously established, the JTF would be established and commence the CAP process.**
- Guidance from the supported commander should prescribe the extent of the JTF involvement in CAP (e.g., JTF components have been identified and activated for planning, mission analysis, COA development, and TPFDD development).
- **The commander, joint task force (CJTF) prepares and issues a directive to JTF components concerning current situation.** This directive may be in the form of a warning order. It does not have to reiterate (unless directed) the complete contents of the directives from higher authority or include every section of a warning order, but should **provide to the JTF components what is needed.**
- **The CJTF should be evaluating requirements (forces and equipment) for the JTF and discussing these issues with the supported commander.**
- The supported commander analyzes the COAs and submits recommendations to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the supported commander's estimate. The COA development phase of CAP ends with the submission of the supported commander's estimate.

Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning (cont'd)

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE III

Course of Action (COA) Development

Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Warning Order

- Joint task force establishment
- COAs developed and evaluated
- Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base established

Commander's
Estimate

Phase IV — COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

- Selection of a COA by the NCA and initiation of execution planning.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other members of the JCS review and evaluate the COAs and prepare recommendations and advice for consideration by the NCA.
- **Upon receipt of the NCA decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an alert order.** This order is approved by the Secretary of Defense and issued to the supported commander and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community to announce the COA selected by the NCA and to initiate execution planning.

Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning (cont'd)

- A CJCS alert order provides sufficient detail to allow the supported combatant commander to conduct detailed planning required to deploy forces. Additionally, this order contains direction to amplify or change earlier guidance provided in the CJCS warning order.
- A CJCS planning order (vice alert order) may be issued to initiate execution planning prior to selection of a COA by the NCA. The planning order normally is not used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the planning order will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
- The supported commander issues a directive (e.g., alert or planning order) to the CJTF to commence detailed execution planning. Additional information would be provided, as appropriate.
- The CJTF commences more detailed execution planning. Determination of JTF force requirements continues as well as overall JTF organization.
- The CJTF issues a directive (e.g., alert or planning order) to the JTF components to commence execution planning. As previously stated, the CJTF does not need to repeat all that is stated in the directives from higher authority; again, provide what is needed to the JTF components. It also would be prudent for the CJTF to retransmit appropriate directives from higher authority to the JTF components.

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE IV

Course of Action (COA) Selection

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presents refined and/or prioritized COAs to the National Command Authorities (NCA)
- NCA select COA

Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff Alert or
Planning Order

Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning (cont'd)

Phase V — EXECUTION PLANNING

- **Execution planning commences when the alert or planning order is issued.**
- The NCA-approved COA is transformed into an operation order (OPORD) by the supported commander.
- Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format.
- **The CJTF develops an OPORD based on the supported commander's OPORD** — Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) procedures are used to develop the OPORD and TPFDD.
- **The CJTF develops unsourced force requirements**, enters them into the appropriate TPFDD, and validates the requirements to the supported combatant commander. As directed by the supported combatant commander, supporting commanders, component commanders, and providing organizations source the force requirements and validate the sourcing and accurate cargo and personnel detail to the supported combatant commander. The CJTF monitors the sourcing process and validates to the supported combatant commander that the sourced requirements satisfy JTF operational needs. **JTF components must be familiar with TPFDD preparation.** Provision should be made for CJTF input to the Global Command and Control System and the JOPES data base.
- **The supported combatant commander validates the TPFDD to the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) — all changes to the validated TPFDD by the CJTF and/or sourcing commanders and organizations must be coordinated through the supported combatant commander, who revalidates the TPFDD prior to any action by USCINCTRANS.**
- USTRANSCOM develops transportation schedules.
- **The CJTF issues OPORD to JTF components.**
- **Execution planning phase ends with the NCA decision to implement the OPORD.**

Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning (cont'd)

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE V

Execution Planning

- **Combatant commander and/or commander, joint task force operation order developed**
- **Time-phased force and deployment data refined**
- **Force preparation**

Phase VI — EXECUTION

- **Execution phase commences when the NCA determines to execute a military option in response to the crisis.**
- **When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS issues an execute order. This order is issued to the supported commander and directs the deployment and employment of forces, defines the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveys guidance not provided in earlier orders and directives.**
- The supported commander issues an execute order to the CJTF that directs the execution of the JTF OPORD.
- **The CJTF issues an execute order to the JTF components and other commands as necessary.** As with other directives, the CJTF should provide in the execute order only that information required by the JTF components. Retransmission of higher authority directives to the JTF components would be appropriate.
- **This phase continues until the crisis is terminated or the mission is terminated and force redeployment has been completed.**

Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning (cont'd)




Figure IX-11. Phases of Crisis Action Planning (cont'd)

c. CJCSM 3122.01, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures),” which will replace Joint Pub 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance),” CJCSM 3122.04, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance) (Secret Supplement),” and Joint Pub 1-03, “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions,” (to be converted to CJCSM 3150.01) provide sample formats for various directives, OPLANs, OPORDs,

CONPLANs, functional plans, and operational reporting formats.

d. CAP documents are shown in Figure IX-12. A sample OPORD format is shown in Figure IX-13.

e. During CAP, the CJTF would be involved with many other functions in addition to those listed in Figure IX-3. **One of the most important CJTF functions is to provide planning guidance (this should include the friendly centers of gravity) to the JTF staff to allow it to develop staff estimates, properly analyze each COA, and create the concept of operations.**




Figure IX-12. Crisis Action Planning Documents

SAMPLE OPERATION ORDER FORMAT

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJTF XXX

TO: USACOM NORFOLK, VA // // (LIST REMAINING ACTION ADDRESSEES)

INFO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC (LIST REMAINING INFO ADDRESSEES)

DISTR:

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/NAME OF OPERATION//

MSGID/ORDER/CJTF XXX//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

REF/A/ORDER/USACOM /211742ZNOV__//

REF/B/ORDER/USACOM/270300ZNOV__//

NARR/WARNING ORDER, ALERT ORDER//

ORDTYP/OPORD/CJTF XXX//

MAP/1015/BLUELAND//

MAP/1020/ORANGELAND//

NARR/SCALE 1:100,000//

TIMEZONE/Z//

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT

/UNITDES	/UNITLOC	/CMNTS
USACOM	NORFOLK, VA	SUPPORTED COMMANDER
CG II MEF	CAMP LEJEUNE, NC	CJTF XXX
II MEF (FWD)	CAMP LEJEUNE, NC	MARFOR
101ST ABN DIV (AASLT)	FORT CAMPBELL, KY	ARFOR
9 AF	SHAW AFB, SC	AFFOR
COMCARGRU EIGHT	NORFOLK, VA	NAVFOR
SOCLANT	NORFOLK, VA	JSOTF

Figure IX-13. Sample Operation Order Format

- () GENTEXT/**SITUATION**/
 - 1. () GENERAL SITUATION. SEE REFS A AND B.
 - A. () ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT INTSUMS.
 - B. () FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE ANNEX A, TASK ORGANIZATION.

- () GENTEXT/**MISSION**/
 - 2. () WHEN DIRECTED, CJTF XXX CONDUCTS NEO WITHIN COUNTRY X TO PROTECT AND EVAC AMCITS AND DESIGNATED OTHERS.

- () GENTEXT/**EXECUTION**/
 - 3. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. (PROVIDE OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATION).
 - 4. () FIRST TASKING ASSIGNMENT ARFOR. CONDUCT NEO OF AMCITS AND DESIGNATED OTHERS AT SITE A AND BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO MARFOR IN ZONE B.
 - 5. () SECOND TASKING ASSIGNMENT MARFOR.
 - 6. () THIRD TASKING ASSIGNMENT. (PROVIDE TASKING TO REMAINING COMPONENTS/OTHERS AS REQUIRED).
 - 7. () **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**
 - A. () THE NAME OF THE OPERATION IS _____.
 - B. () THIS OPOD IS EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER.
 - C. () ROE WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY OUTLINED IN USACOM DIRECTIVE _____. REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ROE TO THIS HQ.
 - D. () ANTICIPATED TIME OF EXECUTION (D-DAY) IS _____.
 - E. () DIRLAUTH FOR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS. KEEP THIS HQ INFORMED.
 - F. () SUBMIT REPORTS AS DIRECTED IN CJTF DIRECTIVE _____.
 - G. () FORCE PROTECTION/COMBATTING TERRORISM: THE THREAT LEVEL IN COUNTRY X IS (SPECIFY CINC'S THREAT LEVEL). SUPPORTING CINC/SERVICE ENSURE DEPLOYING FORCES ARE AWARE OF THREAT LEVELS SET BY (SUPPORTED CINC) THROUGHOUT (SUPPORTED CINC'S) AOR. SUPPORTED CINCS/SERVICES ENSURE FORCES COMPLETE (SUPPORTED CINC'S) REQUIRED PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING, TO INCLUDE ANTITERRORISM AWARENESS TRAINING. (SUPPORTED CINC) ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TERRORIST AWARENESS TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND AS REQUIRED THROUGHOUT PERIOD OF DEPLOYMENT IN AOR.

- () GENTEXT/**ADMIN AND LOG**/
 - 8. () IDENTIFY SHORTFALLS TO THIS HQ FOR RESOLUTION.
 - 9. () SERVICE COMPONENTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN LOGISTICS. SERVICE COMPONENTS DEPLOY WITH SERVICE DIRECTED LOGISTIC SUPPORT. DEPLOY WITH AT LEAST ____ DAYS OF SUPPLY AND ____ DAYS OF AMMUNITION.
 - 10. () THIS HQ WILL COORDINATE ALL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE JOA.
 - 11. () ALL REQUESTS FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO OTHER US GOVT AGENCIES, FOREIGN GOVTS, OR FOREIGN NATIONALS MUST BE APPROVED BY THIS HQ.
 - 12. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS. ALL PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELEASES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH USACOM DIRECTIVE.

Figure IX-13. Sample Operation Order Format (cont'd)

() GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
 13. () USACOM IS THE SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDER.
 14. () CG II MEF IS CJTF XXX.
 15. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AS OUTLINED IN ANNEX J AND USACOM (OR CJTF) DIRECTIVE _____.
 16. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE PER ANNEX K AND USACOM (OR CJTF) DIRECTIVE _____.

AKNLDG/Y//
 DECL/OADR//

Figure IX-13. Sample Operation Order Format (cont'd)

- It is imperative in this process that the CJTF provides “commander’s intent” to the staff. The intent should:
 - Define the desired end state;
 - This statement should focus subordinate commanders on the purpose of the operation and describe how it relates to future operations.
 - The CJTF’s order should contain the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command.
 - The intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process.
 - It may include the CJTF’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent.
 - The CJTF’s intent also may contain an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation.
- **The commander’s intent is refined as the situation evolves.**

KEY TERM

End State

What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude — both military operations as well as those in which the military is in support of other instruments of national power.

- Help subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned;
- Provide focus for all subordinate elements; and
- Express in concise terms the purpose of the operation (not a summary of the concept of operations.)
- The intent statement usually is written, but could be verbal when time is short. **It should be clear and concise** — one page if possible.

8. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

a. General

- The automated data processing portion of JOPEs provides the capability to construct an automated deployment data base designed to interface with management systems of the NCA, Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINTRANS), and Defense agencies.

- The CJTF and component commanders use JOPES for CAP, involving COA development, detailed deployment planning, execution, and redeployment operations.
- Beginning with CAP Phase I, JOPES is used to assist in COA development by coordinating and providing force and deployment data, deployment estimates, and transportation feasibility studies.
- During deployment execution, JOPES provides the NCA, the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, CJTF, and supporting commanders with the information required to monitor the progress of the deployment and to exercise positive control of C2 of the force deployment battlespace.
- Explicit provision should be made for the CJTF to make inputs via GCCS. **Equipment and trained JOPES operators will be made available to the CJTF when the mission requires JOPES capability.**
- If physical constraints or other factors preclude JOPES equipment and operators from being assigned to the JTF HQ, the establishing authority must make provisions for the CJTF to input to the JOPES data base.

b. Deployment Considerations

- JTF HQ may be structured for incremental deployment.
 - Each deployment increment should include a capability for C2 of forces assigned to or supporting the CJTF and should come complete with logistics, communications, and security support. (1) **Liaison Increment.** When directed by the CJTF, a liaison increment may deploy in advance of the JTF HQ. This

increment is not designed for (nor is it capable of) C2 of combat operations. It acts as an advance party for the JTF and assists in receiving the forces. In addition, it acts as an interface between local US and foreign agencies, often serving as a forerunner to a military coordinating committee. (2) **Initial JTF HQ Increment-Advanced Echelon (ADVON).** This increment should provide a minimum capability for C2 during the buildup of the JTF. It must be designed for the planned method of insertion (e.g., airborne, amphibious).

- The design of each increment should consider the mission and whether forcible entry into the JOA is required. It also should be noted that an afloat JTF organization normally will not deploy incrementally.

- The JTF will enter JTF HQ deployment requirements in the JOPES data base.

- **COA Development.** During TPFDD development in support of COA development, the supported combatant commander and CJTF (if designated) are responsible for developing the concept of operations. The supported combatant command and the JTF, in conjunction with their Service components, update the JOPES TPFDD with force deployment requirements to support the employment concept.

- TPFDD can be initiated by loading from existing OPLAN in the JOPES data base, or by creating a new TPFDD when no OPLAN exists.

- JPEC uses the TPFDD to analyze various COAs.

- Analysis includes transportation feasibility, shortfall identification and

resolution, constraints analysis, and deployment estimates.

- Results of TPFDD analysis are reflected in the commander's estimate.
- **Execution Planning.** The execution planning phase represents refinement of gross planning conducted during COA development.
 - During this phase, the supported combatant commander is the focal point for the JPEC.
 - The supported combatant commander directs refinement of the TPFDD in the JOPES data base.
 - The combatant commanders, Service components, supporting commanders, Services, and providing organizations source requirements and validate the TPFDD to the supported combatant commander.
 - The supported combatant commander validates TPFDD requirements to USCINCTRANS for movement scheduling.
 - USTRANSCOM components, AMC, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military Sealift Command **provide movement schedules for the requirements in the sequence requested by the CJTF and validated by the supported combatant commander.**
 - Initially, USTRANSCOM will focus scheduling efforts on the first 3 to 7 days of air movement (including surface movements to aerial ports of embarkation) and 30 days of sea movements.
 - Throughout the execution planning phase, USTRANSCOM will provide

required updates to movement schedules in the JOPES data base.

- **Deployment Execution**

- Deployment begins as specified in the CJCS execute or deployment order.

- USTRANSCOM updates schedules for validated movement requirements and provides actual departure and arrival reports in the JOPES data base.

- All changes to validated TPFDD requirements must be approved and revalidated by the supported combatant commander. Changes to validated TPFDD need to be identified to the supported combatant commander as soon as possible via GCCS teleconference supporting the operation.

- **Execution (CAP Phase VI) may be ordered without the benefit of the planning accomplished in CAP Phases I through V.**

- In this case, execution and planning occur simultaneously. Upon receipt of the CJCS execute order, USTRANSCOM's actions are focused on deployment.

- If the CJCS execute order is received before completion of execution planning, USTRANSCOM will provide all available deployment information.

- Procedures for coordinating and monitoring deployment of non-unit-related personnel and resupply are also provided.

- c. **Employment Responsibilities.** CJTF responsibilities during employment include the following.

- **Force and Resource Monitoring and Management.** Monitoring the current

status of assigned forces and their resources and providing information to assist in the allocation and movement of forces and materiel.

- **Planning.** Preparing plans relative to current and future operations.
- **Execution.** Directing the implementation of OPORDs and monitoring the current air, land, sea, space and special operations situation; ensuring support for combat operations; and reviewing the enemy threat and issuing follow-on orders, as appropriate.
- **Reporting.** Submitting reports to the supported commander and heads of other agencies as prescribed in Joint Pub 1-03 (to be converted to CJCSM 3150.01), “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions,” and other directives.

d. Redeployment Considerations

- **Redeployment may be directed when operations have terminated or movement of the JTF is directed by higher authority.** Based on guidance from the CJTF, the JPG could be used to accomplish redeployment planning.
- Commanders should make the same considerations for redeployment as for deployment in regard to phasing of command, combat, combat support, and combat service support elements out of the JOA.
- JOPES will be used to provide redeployment status and to schedule common-user lift assets.
 - e. **Checklist.** The following checklist contains a list of questions, arranged by JOPES CAP phase, that the CJTF and staff should consider during a crisis situation. **It should be noted that all items in this checklist do not apply directly to the CJTF, but are provided to illustrate the overarching CAP process.**

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS

CAP PHASE I — SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

- What are the national and military strategies and US national security policy for the region or CAP PHASE country?
- What is the nature of the conflict or crisis that might require military resources to resolve it? Can other elements of National Power (economic, diplomatic, informational) be used to influence the outcome? If so, what type of military support will they need? What type of support can they provide to the JTF?
- What are or might be the potential missions or tasks from the National Command Authorities (NCA)?
- Will action be unilateral or multinational?
- What is the current situation (who, what, when, where, and why)?**

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- How will the adversary conceptualize the situation? What are the goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss?
- What steps can be taken to collect additional information?
- What is the status of communications with key US and foreign government agencies and personnel? **Has a list of key phone numbers been established?**
- Has the supported combatant commander developed an intelligence collection plan?
- Has the supported combatant commander deployed sufficient organic reconnaissance resources? Should national assets be tasked or repositioned?
- Has the supported combatant commander established a joint communications control center?
- Are any US or multinational forces conducting operations within the joint task force (JTF) joint operations area (JOA)? What type? Duration? Who commands those forces?
- What is the status of communications to and/or from and within the JOA?**
- Has the supported combatant commander established an information operations cell?**

CAP PHASE II — CRISIS ASSESSMENT

- Is noncombatant evacuation needed?**
 - Are there any US or other DOD civilian noncombatants in the JOA? How many? Where are they located? Are they in any danger?
 - Is there a noncombatant evacuation plan for this JOA? Has the Department of State (DOS) authorized a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO)? Has the DOS asked for DOD assistance?
 - Should psychological operations (PSYOP) assets be used during the NEO?
- Have agencies or commands (e.g., National Imagery and Mapping Agency or environmental support facilities) that provide specialized or long-lead support been notified of the ongoing analysis and the potential for future support? What dedicated communications should be established with these agencies or commands for use by operations, intelligence, and logistics personnel?

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- What requests, if any, have been made by the foreign government(s)? What is the DOS position?
- What security assistance may be provided to the foreign government(s) concerned?
- What humanitarian assistance may be provided to the foreign government(s)?
- What sources have been identified to fund assistance efforts?
- Does the United States have any treaty or legal obligations?
- Are there status-of-forces agreements with the foreign government(s)?**
- Is a military coordinating committee required?
- Is the civil-military operations center (CMOC) established to coordinate and facilitate US and multinational force operations with other government agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and foreign nation agencies and authorities? Is the CMOC established to provide access for non-military agencies desiring assistance and coordination from the military?
- What coordination and assistance will be required for other government agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and foreign national agencies and authorities?
- Is there a current plan for the area or situation?**
- What type and level of PSYOP is most advantageous for the current situation?
- What are the key friendly, enemy, and neutral target groups and their PSYOP vulnerabilities?
- Has a teleconference been established to support the operation?
- What is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) plan identification number applicable to the operation?
- Is a data base maintained by the supported combatant commander that is current or applicable to the situation?**
- Are there adequate provisions to maintain secrecy, achieve surprise, and preserve the security of US forces against attack?

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- What operations security and military deception measures are required? Is a cover story required or available? Are diversionary actions needed to support the preparation, deployment, and employment of forces?
- What national-level actions are necessary to protect secrecy and execute deceptions?
- What are foreign governments' (including hostile) attitudes toward US intentions and military capabilities? How could these be shaped to US advantage?
- What are the reactions of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly foreign governments?
- What level of opposition can be expected from hostile governments?**
- What support can be expected from friendly and allied and coalition governments?**
- What access and overflight assurances do friendly forces have for deployment or employment operations?**
- What are the public affairs implications and responsibilities for the area?**
- Is there a joint information bureau? (See Annex F, "Public Affairs," in subject operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order [OPORD])
- Has a DOD media pool been activated? (See DOD Directive 5105.35)

CAP PHASE III — COURSE OF ACTION (COA) DEVELOPMENT

- What precisely must be accomplished in the crisis to strengthen or support the objectives established by the NCA?
- What are the general operations, intelligence, and logistics requirements to support the actions so as to bring about the NCA objectives?**
- Do the military objectives identified take into account exploitable enemy vulnerabilities that are critical to the commander, joint task force's (CJTF) responsibilities and intent or are critical to the enemy's intent?
- From the CJTF's perspective, are the military objectives attainable?**
 - What is the commitment of the adversary to own COA?
- What are the current rules of engagement (ROE) in the area?**

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- Do they need to be changed because of the current situation?**
- Who should recommend changes?
- Is the authorization to use riot control agents required as an alternative to the use of deadly force to save lives?
 - Has NCA approval been requested or received?
 - Are riot control agents and protective equipment available to friendly forces?
- What forces are readily available and when could they arrive on the scene?**
- What reception and operations support facilities are needed and available?**
- What types and amounts of logistic support are available from friendly and allied nations?**
- Are joint or multinational interoperability considerations involved?
- Is medical support adequate to support planned operations?**
- Has direct liaison authorized been established, as applicable, within the operational, intelligence, and logistics nets, with the committed forces, supported and supporting commands (as applicable), and national agencies?
- What medical support is available in the objective area or provided for in the OPLAN or OPORD?
- Are special operations forces (SOF) required** (e.g., United States Special Operations Command, theater special operations command, or host nation SOF)?
- What is the unit readiness of the available or allocated forces?
- What are the major constraints before forces can be committed?**
- What is the status of geospatial information and services support within the area?**
- What are the environmental (meteorological, oceanographic) support capabilities and constraints within the area? Who is coordinating environmental support?
- Will special CJCS-controlled communications assets, such as the joint communications support element, be required?**

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- Are Army or Air Force PSYOP units, or Navy supporting units, required?**
- What is the command relationship of civil affairs (CA) and PSYOP forces?
- Will the use of deception operations enhance mission success for each COA being considered?**
- Have subordinate and supporting commands or agencies been tasked to enter JOPES data base requirements for development of deployment estimates by United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)?
- Has Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program support from the supported combatant commander been requested?
- Have plans for the use of space systems (e.g., for reconnaissance, surveillance, warning, navigation, communications, targeting, weather) been integrated into JTF plans?
- What is the status of strategic mobility resources and supporting elements?** Are facilities, airports, seaports, and lines of communications capable of supporting the operation?
- What are the logistics factors that affect actions under consideration?
- Is aerial refueling required during deployment and/or employment?
- Will intermediate staging bases be required?**
- What is the backup COA?
- What all-source intelligence resources are available?** Has the full range of intelligence capabilities been employed to ensure maximum intelligence support to planning efforts by the supported combatant commander? By the NCA? Has CJTF declared emergency reconnaissance and implemented signals intelligence operational tasking authority?
- Has coordination been conducted with United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) to determine whether repositioning or launch of space systems is required for JTF operations?
- Will electronic warfare units, such as radar jammers or communications jammers, be required?
- Which airports and seaports are available to friendly forces?**

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- Are runway lengths and weight-bearing capacities adequate for the planned forces?**
- Are pier capabilities and depth of water sufficient to accommodate sealift?**
- Will use agreements need to be coordinated with other nations?**
- Have sufficient contracting officers with adequate contracting authority been assigned?**
- Has a sufficient amount of local currency been obtained to support the exercise or operation?**
- Has local civilian labor support been acquired?**
- Have adequate funds been identified to support the COA?**
- Have procedures been established to ratify irregular purchases?**
- What procedures must be established to protect information exchange between the United States and foreign forces and governments?**
- Have standard JTF Special Technical Operations billets been activated and indoctrination conducted on special access programs?**

CAP PHASE IV — COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

- What COA has been selected? Have the pros and cons of each alternative, with regard to enemy options, been fully and objectively assessed (wargamed)?**
- What decisions have yet to be made? What changes to ROE are required?**

CAP PHASE V — EXECUTION PLANNING

- Is the mission clear? Is CJTF's intent clear?**
- Are the ROE adequate for the JTF mission?**
- Will the selected COA accomplish the objectives?**
 - If it will not, has this been clearly outlined to the supported combatant commander?**
 - Is the COA consistent with the law of armed conflict?**

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- Are command relationships clear, unambiguous, and understood by all parties?**
 - Between supporting and supported commanders?
 - For command and control (C2) for SOF?
 - For C2 of CA and PSYOP forces?
- Before operations commence, has the theater J-2 established a joint intelligence center (JIC)? Has the JTF J-2 established a joint intelligence support element (JISE)?**
- Has a joint search and rescue center been designated or established?**
- Has the CJTF elected to designate functional component commanders (e.g., joint force air component commander [JFACC], joint force land component commander, joint force maritime component commander, joint force special operations component commander)?**
 - Have the authority and responsibilities for functional component commanders been established by CJTF?
 - Have the functional component commands' staffs been organized so that component representation reflects the composition of the joint force?
 - Are commanders of the other JTF components aware of the functional component commanders' assigned authority and responsibilities?
 - Have liaison officers from the other JTF components been assigned to the functional component commanders to facilitate coordinated joint force operations?
- Has an airspace control authority been assigned?** (Normally assigned as a JFACC responsibility, if designated.) Is required liaison provided?
- Has an area air defense commander been assigned?** (Normally assigned as a JFACC responsibility, if designated.) Is required liaison provided?
- What is the status of communications?**
 - Have multiple means of communications been provided for?
 - Is there frequency deconfliction?

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- Are the joint communications-electronics operation instructions adequate?
- Is there a requirement for joint airborne communications assets?
- Have common communications security materials (authenticators, operations codes, and keylists) been identified for all circuits, networks, and users?
- Are there any other special command, control, communications, and computers requirements to include Global Command and Control System capability for JTF components?
- What country clearances are required for overflight, landing, or staging?** What are the existing (or needed) agreements for overflight; staging; transit and refueling for combat, cargo, and evacuation aircraft; and basing rights?
- What forces and concept of operations are available if the adversary escalates abruptly?
- Has sufficient coordination with allies been conducted?
- What constraints have been placed on USTRANSCOM's components** (e.g., allocation of lift assets)?
- What is the status of space system support coordination?
 - If a theater missile threat exists, has a special request for tactical warning support been made to USSPACECOM's J-3 (in accordance with the Joint Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems Manual)? Additionally, has USSPACECOM been requested to provide support from the Tactical Event Reporting System (TERS), to include equipment required to receive TERS downlink data (e.g., constant source and joint tactical terminal) ?
 - Has military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) support been coordinated with the Defense Information System Agency MILSATCOM Systems Office?
 - Has Defense Satellite Communications System Ground Mobile Facility support been coordinated with the appropriate regional space support center?
 - Has USSPACECOM been requested to provide a Joint Space Support Team to support the JTF and to serve as a focal point for the coordination of space systems support?
- Has the enemy situation changed appreciably; if so, what are the effects on the selected COAs?**

CHECKLIST FOR CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) PROCESS (cont'd)

- Have all necessary actions been taken to provide for self-defense of JTF forces?**
- Will the predicted environmental conditions adversely affect the operation? Who will provide environmental updates to decision makers?
- Is logistics and administrative planning adequate?**
- Has the OPORD been published?**
- Do the component commanders' plans adequately address the coordinated employment, direction, and control of their forces in conformity with the JTF concept of operation?

CAP PHASE VI — EXECUTION

- Has intelligence identified front line enemy movements or changes in the disposition of rear echelon, strategic, or other critical units, particularly special forces?
- What is the status of the deployment as planned? Are any phasing or prioritization changes required based on changes in the situation, mission, or strategic lift availability? Are additional forces required?
- Are any other changes necessary to ensure that military action will accomplish the objectives intended?**
- Are there sufficient civil-military planners to coordinate escalation in military assistance to civilian governments and infrastructure?

9. Joint Task Force Specific Planning Process

a. This section combines material that appears in other areas of the publication into a section dealing with the specific steps a JTF would accomplish in CAP and serves to single out and underscore the importance of the JTF-level planning process. The JTF planning process described herein is one method which can be modified as necessary based upon mission, circumstances and time available. Ultimately, the CJTF is responsible for the plan and the planning process and may modify the process to accomplish all objectives.

- The JTF can enter the CAP process during any phase (usually upon receipt of the supported combatant commander's warning order or planning directive); however, once entered, the JTF goes through specific procedures for developing its own OPORD based upon guidance from the supported combatant commander. This section deals with the JTF-specific planning process — steps taken during CAP.
- The CJTF and staff develop an OPORD as a result of an iterative planning process that is dynamic and in a constant state

of refinement and change. The process is never done in a vacuum; instead, concurrent planning with the combatant commander's and components' staffs is a must whenever feasible. The CJTF sets the tone for the staff.

JP 5-03.1 [to be converted to CJCSM 3122.01], "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: [Planning Policies and Procedures]," and CJCSM 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: [Planning Formats and Guidance]," provides overall joint guidance and formats for OPORD preparation.)

- Figure IX-14 depicts the major steps in the JTF operational planning process.

- **Mission Analysis**

- Mission analysis is the first step in the process, consisting of command and staff actions leading to the development of the commander's guidance.

- This step consists of gathering facts and staff estimates about the current status or condition, making assumptions where appropriate to substitute for facts that are not known, analyzing the supported combatant commander's warning order or planning directive and commander's estimate (if already produced), and issuing CJTF guidance to focus subsequent JTF and component planning. Figure IX-15 highlights one example of how the staff may conduct mission analysis.

- Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) (CJCSM 3500.04A, "Universal Joint Task List"). The UJTL contains a comprehensive hierarchical listing of the tasks that can be performed by a joint military force. The UJTL also contains

a common language of conditions that is used to describe the operational context in which tasks are performed. Finally, the UJTL contains a menu of measures of performance for each UJTL task. These measures are used to develop standards of performance consistent with mission requirements. The UJTL does not address how a task is performed (found in joint doctrine), or "who performs the task" (found in the concept of operations). The UJTL helps identify "what" is to be performed in terms common to multiple combatant commands and joint force components.

- **Planning Guidance**

- CJTFs must provide sufficient planning guidance for their staffs to develop refined staff estimates and feasible COAs.

- The CJTF must add focus to staff planning by stating what options to consider (and conversely not consider). This saves the JTF staff time and effort, and allows it to concentrate on developing COAs which are more appropriate. The commander's guidance must focus on the essential tasks that support mission accomplishment. This guidance can be broad or specific, based upon the time available and the proficiency of the staff. Whether the guidance is broad or specific, it should always contain at least the following information: (1) Situation; (2) The restated mission; (3) The CJTF's intent; (4) The concept of operations; (5) A deception objective (if used); (6) The CCIR; (7) The amount of risk the CJTF is willing to accept; (8) CJTF priorities; and (9) The time plan. Figure IX-16 highlights steps in issuing the commander's guidance.




Figure IX-14. Joint Task Force Operational Planning Process

- Once the CJTF approves the restated mission and issues guidance and initial intent, a warning order may be issued to the JTF components.
- **Time.** The element of time is not clearly identified for analysis in any of

the staff estimates; however, time is critical to planning and executing successful joint operations. The amount of time available must always be considered as an integral part in mission analysis as well as the entire CAP process. The proper use of time sets the




Figure IX-15. Mission Analysis

JTF’s “daily operations cycle,” and the constant reevaluation and assessment of available time is closely linked to the CJTF’s struggle between detailed planning and the need for speed.

•• **Staff Estimates.** The development of staff estimates, particularly the intelligence estimate, is an iterative process in a constant state of refinement. Staff estimates should not be developed in seclusion. Instead, close coordination with other staffs (and the staff section’s representatives to the JPG) ensures that

estimates stay current and focuses efforts on the key elements of information necessary to develop COAs for acceptance or rejection.

•• A JPG should concentrate efforts on key elements of a COA which will cause accomplishment or failure. By advertising these key elements, and through coordination with the staff’s members on the JPG, the staff can concentrate on what is most essential in their staff estimates and provide further details later.




Figure IX-16. Commander's Guidance

• **COA Development**

• To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key information necessary to make decisions and assimilate the data in mission analysis. **Usually, no more than three COAs are developed to focus staff efforts and concentrate valuable resources on the most likely scenarios.** A complete COA consists of the following information: **what** type of action; **when** the action begins; **where** the action takes place; **why** (commander's intent); and **how** (method of employment of forces). Figure IX-17

is a graphical depiction of the COA development process.

• A valid COA should be: (1) **Suitable** — must accomplish mission and comply with supported combatant commander's guidance. A COA also must be consistent with doctrine and comply with the CJTF's guidance; (2) **Feasible** — must accomplish the mission within established time, space, and resource constraints; (3) **Acceptable** — must balance cost with advantage gained by executing a particular COA; (4) **Distinguishable** — each COA must be




Figure IX-17. Course of Action Development

significantly different from others; and (5) **Complete** — must incorporate major operations and tasks to be accomplished, to include forces required,

logistics concept, deployment concept, employment concept, time estimates for reaching termination objectives, reserve force concept, and desired end state.

• COA development should be synchronized by all staff sections and components. This ensures unity of effort and direction.

• **COA Analysis**

• Analysis of the proposed COAs provides the staff with: (1) Key decision points; (2) Task organization adjustment; (3) Data for use in a

synchronization matrix or other decision making tool; (4) Identification of plan branches and sequels; (5) Identification of high value targets; and (6) Recommended CCIR. Figure IX-18 provides an overview of COA analysis.

• Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of a battle, given JTF strengths and dispositions, enemy assets and possible COAs, and the JOA. It




Figure IX-18. Course of Action Analysis

attempts to foresee the action, reaction, and counteraction dynamics of an operation.

- Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the staff will obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred. This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with operational level possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve.

- Wargaming rules: (1) remain unbiased; (2) accurately record advantages and disadvantages as they become evident; (3) continually assess feasibility; (4) avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts to support such conclusions; (5) avoid comparing one COA with another during the wargame; (6) stay at the operational level; and (7) identify, but do not pursue branches and sequels.

- Wargaming can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort which describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used. A more detailed version is the “Sketch-Note” technique, which adds operational sketches and notes to the narrative process in order to gain a clearer picture. The most detailed form of wargaming is modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation.

- Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, counteraction method of friendly and/ or opposition force interaction.

- The most important element of wargaming is not the tool used, but the people who participate. A robust cell that can aggressively pursue the enemy’s

point of view in the counteraction phase is essential. Personnel attending the wargaming should be the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of COAs, both in the JPG and the rest of the staff.

- Throughout analyses (wargaming) it is critical that the JPG has a “devil’s advocate” who is not afraid to challenge authority to ensure that what the CJTF wants to do can be accomplished.

- Figure IX-19 provides an example of a wargaming checklist.

- A synchronization matrix is a decision making tool and a method of recording the results of wargaming. Using a synchronization matrix allows the staff to visually synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the enemy’s most likely COA. The wargame and synchronization matrix efforts will be particularly useful in identifying cross component support resource requirements.

- Figure IX-20 provides an example of a typical synchronization matrix of a functional component’s organized JTF.

- **COA Comparison.** COAs are not compared to each other in this process. The COAs are individually evaluated against the criteria established by the staff section.

- A detailed analysis with the entire staff (and, if possible, components) must be conducted to determine the recommended COA.

- During the analysis, each staff section and component ranks the COAs and briefs their reasons for ranking.

- One technique to use is a points based decision matrix with criteria developed

WARGAMING CHECKLIST

1. Gather tools, material, and data:
 - a. Location away from distractions
 - b. Maps
 - c. Overlays
 - d. Butcher paper
 - e. Friendly courses of action
 - f. Enemy courses of action
 - g. Task organization
 - h. Enemy order of battle

2. List:
 - a. Assumptions
 - b. Known critical events
 - c. Decision points

3. Select method of wargame:
 - a. Manual/Computer assisted
 - b. Time line/operational phasing/critical events

4. Select technique to record and display wargame results:
 - a. Narrative/sketch-note technique/wargame worksheet/synch. matrix
 - b. Adapt technique to fit the needs of analysis

5. Conduct the wargame:
 - a. Identify role players
 - b. Identify recorder and wargame facilitator
 - c. Review assumptions
 - d. Review the restated mission
 - e. Review phases
 - f. Red cell - enemy lay down
 - g. Joint planning group leader - general blue action
 - h. Command and control (C2) - lay down of C2 structure
 - i. Forces:
 - (1) Army Forces - actions
 - (2) Navy Forces - actions
 - (3) Air Force Forces - actions
 - (4) Marine Corps Forces - actions
 - (5) Joint special operations task force - actions
 - (6) Space Forces - actions
 - (7) Others (as required) - actions
 - j. Firepower - priority targets
 - k. Blue intel-actions
 - l. Support:
 - (1) Personnel - actions
 - (2) Logistics - actions
 - (3) Communications - actions
 - (4) Engineer -actions
 - (5) Medical - actions
 - m. Interagency - actions
 - n. Enemy Reaction to Blue Actions
 - o. As the move is made record:
 - (1) Decision points
 - (2) Critical information requirements
 - (3) Branches
 - (4) Sequels
 - (5) Risks
 - (6) Issues
 - p. Blue Counteraction to Opposition Force Reaction

6. Conduct risk assessment
 - a. Assess
 - b. Mitigate

7. Assign responsibilities by name for:
 - a. Branches
 - b. Sequels
 - c. Issues

Figure IX-19. Wargaming Checklist

EXAMPLE OF A SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

	STEP 1 Red Cell Response leads to Step 2	STEP 2 (8-10 hour window)	STEP 3
JFLCC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Forces closing on JOA ● ARFOR AVN in S FL ● ARC Posn W/IN 4 Hours ● Fwd Deploy AVN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ATF moving to JOA ● ARG in 4 HR POS (.25 mi) ● ARFOR at SPOE ● ARFOR AVN in 5 FL ● Force Recon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ATF closed in JOA ● ARFOR AVN in GI ● ARFOR (-) at SPOE ● Continue AM 10 Spt
JFMCC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Est Maritime Superiority ● Support JFACC ● BPT Conduct TLAM Strikes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CVBG move in closer ● MCM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Maritime Superiority ● Support JFACC ● Cont. TLAM strikes
JFACC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Position CVG for Air Super. ● Est. Local Air Super. VIC LPF ● Conduct Strike Ops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Maintain local air superiority (sorties depend on ramp up) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Maritime Superiority
JSOTF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prepare for SR missions ● Coordinate/deconflict planned deep operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Est. Lilly Pad (Inchon) ● SEAL Plt. support for insertion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prepared for SOF missions
JPOTF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Increase PSYOPS with Print Media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Products ready for air dissemination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Continue missions
JTF Staff		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Refuel for Army Avn 	
C2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● JFLCC C2 ARG/ATF ● Deception Plan Initiated ● LPF Forces OPCON to JFLCC 		
Decsn Pts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Deterrence Fails ● Launch TLAM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Insert SOF ● Conduct ADV force ops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● When commit land forces ● Evacuate - when casualties too high
Branch	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Weather prevents Air ● ARG disabled (Mine/Torpedo) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mass casualty at sea ● No basing right for AVN 	
Sequel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Resupply of ground forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● OPLAND aggression ceases 	
RISK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Weather dependent ● Degredation to SLOCS ● ARG Deploy before MS ● AVN FSB 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Approx. 2 days for local maritime superiority ● Force protection - LPF and JFMCC ● Temporary loss of air superiority 	
CCIR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ground-based mines ● Movement of enemy forces/ position 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Status change that influences JFLCC ability to protect forces over the horizon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Notification of force ● closure of JTF reserve
INTEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Monitoring enemy exercise ● Targeting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Increasing collection ● Targeting increasing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Continue Step 2 tasks
OPPOSITION FORCE CELL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Resupply plane shot at ● Deter fails (17 JUL) ● OPLAND Forces move <p style="margin-left: 20px;">ENEMY REACTION - Ground assault, artillery assault on airfield, attack C2W/SPEC OPS, lay mines in harbor, disperse ADA</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Request UN intervention ● MIG 23/29S targeting shipping ● 2 Foxtrots with torpedos 	

DEFENSE: COA 3

UNCLAS

SYNCH MATRIX

Figure IX-20. Example of a Synchronization Matrix

EXAMPLE OF A SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX (ACRONYM LIST)

ADA	air defense artillery	JTF	joint task force
ADV	advanced	JUL	July
AM	ante meridiem	LPF	leased port facility
Approx	approximately	MCM	mine countermeasures
ARFOR	Army forces	mi	miles
ARG/ATF	amphibious ready group/ amphibious task force	MS	maritime superiority
AVN	aviation	OPCON	operational control
BPT	be prepared to...	OPLAND	fictitious country
C2	command and control	Ops	operations
C2W	command and control warfare	Plt	platoon
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements	POS	posture
COA	course of action	Posn	position
Cont.	continue	PSYOP	psychological operations
CSAR	combat search and rescue	Recon	reconnaissance
CVBG	carrier battle group	Repos	reposition
Decsn Pts	decision points	SEAL	sea-air-land team
Est	estimate	S FL	South Florida
FSB	forward staging base	SLOC	sea lines of communications
FWD	forward	SOF	special operations forces
GI	Great Inagua	SPEC	special
HR	hour	SPOE	sea port of embarkation
Intel	intelligence	Spt	September
JFACC	joint force air component commander	SR	special reconnaissance
JFLCC	joint force land component commander	Super.	superiority
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander	SYNCH	synchronization
JOA	joint operations area	TLAM	Tomahawk land-attack missile
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force	UN	United Nations
JSOTF	joint special operations task force	UNCLAS	unclassified
		VIC LPF	vicinity leased port facility
		WIN	within

Figure IX-20. Example of a Synchronization Matrix (Acronym List) (cont'd)

from the commander's guidance, critical events, and other significant factors pertaining to the mission.

- Quantify each COA by ranking them according to each criterion and add the scores.
- An alternative to the points-based decision matrix is a simple advantages and disadvantages matrix.
- If modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation is used, compare the outcomes of each scenario to the desired outcomes.
- Figure IX-21 highlights the COA comparison process.
- **COA Selection.** Using a decision support template, points-based decision matrix, or other types of decision making tools, a selection is made of the best COA to be recommended to the CJTF.
 - All COA results from wargaming, synchronization matrixes, and other decision support tools used are briefed to the CJTF.
 - Modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation can provide a possible choice for the best COA.
 - Regardless of the decision tool used, the CJTF makes a decision based upon experience and the staff's recommendations.




Figure IX-21. Course of Action Comparison

- The formal commander’s estimate is prepared in accordance with CJCSM 3122.03 “Joint Operations Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)” for transmittal to the supported combatant commander.
- Figure IX-22 summarizes the COA selection process.
- **Order Preparation.** Preparation of the order is not a sequential process; instead, whenever possible, it is done concurrently with the components. The

same is true for development of the TPFDD.

- The staff section tasked with overall responsibility for publishing the OPORD is responsible for coordinating TPFDD development. However, the JTF J-3 must be responsible for TPFDD **implementation** to ensure the forces flow in the correct order.
- The Service components play an important role in TPFDD development. Generally, the CJTF gets OPCON of




Figure IX-22. Course of Action Selection

forces once they arrive in theater. Involving the components as early as possible increases the chances of producing a timely, synchronized, coordinated, prioritized, Service combined, deconflicted, and **validated** TPFDD — essential to mission success.

•• A JPG should conduct a crosswalk of component orders compared to the JTF order. This crosswalk should consist of

simple, main event synchronization and deconfliction. Once again, a synchronization matrix could be used. Any problem areas should be identified and coordinated and deconflicted.

•• Figure IX-23 summarizes the OPOD preparation phase.

b. The entire JTF-specific process for joint planning fits within the overall planning

process from NCA to JCS to the combatant commander, on down to the JTF. This process is especially close-knitted between the combatant commander and the JTF. Steps in the JTF process may be combined or eliminated based upon the combatant commander's planning process and the time available. This collaborative planning relationship between combatant command and JTF levels is illustrated in Figure IX-24.

10. Campaign Planning

a. The JTF can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military

operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation.

b. **Campaign plans developed by a JTF should be consistent with the strategy, theater guidance, and direction provided by the supported combatant commander and should contribute to achieving combatant command objectives.**

JP 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations," provides information on campaign planning and campaign plans.




Figure IX-23. Operation Order Preparation

COLLABORATIVE PLANNING AT COMBATANT COMMAND AND JOINT TASK FORCE LEVELS




Figure IX-24. Collaborative Planning at Combatant Command and Joint Task Force Levels

KEY TERMS

Campaign Planning

- Process of translating national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans.
- Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning but normally is not completed until the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning.
- Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation.

Campaign Plan

- A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time or space.

11. Termination Planning

a. Planning for termination of operations must be ongoing during all phases of COA development, deployment of forces, and execution of operations.

b. In most cases, operations will be terminated in their own right when stated objectives have been met.

- The CJTF must establish indicators of success to determine the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end.

• In some operations (e.g., peace operations), the CJTF may have to recognize that the mission is not achievable without restructuring and/or commitment of additional assets. In these situations, the CJTF may have to recommend to the supported combatant commander that further action will not achieve the desired end state and that the mission should be terminated.

c. **Checklist.** The following checklist may assist in termination planning.

d. The following section on transition planning may provide additional information

CHECKLIST FOR TERMINATION PLANNING

- Has the end state been achieved?
- Have stated operations objectives been accomplished?
- Has the underlying causes of the conflict been considered and how do they influence termination planning?

CHECKLIST FOR TERMINATION PLANNING (cont'd)

- Has the commander, joint task force identified postconflict requirements?
- Can forces be safely withdrawn from the joint operations area?** What are the force security requirements?
 - What additional support will be required for redeployment?
 - What is the policy for redeployment? What is the relationship between postconflict requirements and the redeployment of joint task force (JTF) forces?
 - What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by JTF forces?
- Has coordination for redeployment of the JTF been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?
- Has consideration been given as to when Reserve Component forces will be released?
- Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, United Nations, or civilian organization?
 - What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the postconflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?
- Will the JTF be expected to support these types of activities?

that will assist in planning for termination operations.

12. Transition Planning

a. As with planning for conflict termination, planning for transition must extend throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment.

- Transferring control of an operation to another organization requires detailed planning and execution.
 - The process of transferring control of an operation to another military force or organization is situationally dependent and each transfer will have

its own characteristics and requirements. Often, high-level interagency approval is required with long-lead times.

- Transition planning should be continuous and requires CJTF guidance.
- JTF operations may be transferred to another military force, regional organization, the UN, or civilian organizations.
- Regeneration of force capabilities after a conflict will be a primary consideration in the transition plan.

b. Transition planning can be accomplished by a number of organizations

within the JTF, such as the JPG, future operations cell, CMOG, J-3 Plans, or J-5. This will depend on how the CJTF organizes the JTF.

c. Mission analysis should provide the initial information to commence transition planning. An end state, time frame for operations, guidance from higher authority, and political policy can be determined through the analysis process, which should provide the impetus for commencing transition planning.

d. A **“transition plan”** should be developed as an initial step in the transition process. When possible, this plan should be “unclassified.”

- To commence plan development, identification of the following factors is important.
 - Issues and key JTF events (past, present, and future).

- Work required to accomplish the transition.

- Military force or other organization taking over control of the operation.

- All staff sections should be involved in the transition process and provide input for inclusion in the plan.

- Staff sections should highlight in the plan how they are organized and how they function. No staff work is too routine that it should be excluded.

- Additionally, the staff sections should recommend how the incoming staff should be organized.

e. **Checklist.** There are many factors that influence the transition process. The following checklist may assist in transition planning.

CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION PLANNING

- Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
- Has the joint task force’s (JTF’s) end state been accomplished?
- Who will fund for the transition?
- What is the new mission?
- What US forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?
- What will be the command relationship for US forces that remain behind?
- What will be the communications requirements for US forces that remain behind?
- Who will support US forces that remain behind?
- Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?

CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION PLANNING (cont'd)

- Will new rules of engagement be established?
- Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?
- Will the United States be expected to provide communications capability to the incoming force or organization?
- Will the incoming force or organization use the same headquarters facility as the JTF?
- What is the policy for redeployment of the JTF?
- Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who provides it?
- How will the turnover be accomplished?
- Who will handle public affairs for the transition?
- Have redeployment air and sealift arrangements been approved and passed to the United States Transportation Command?



US and multinational forces are briefed by the commander, joint task force.

13. Planning Considerations with Multinational Forces

a. Political and military intentions of multinational partners will impact on planning and operations.

- As previously discussed, each nation will have its own agenda and strive to accomplish it.
- In many instances, multinational forces will not be able to influence the planning effort without prior approval of their home country and its commitment to concept of operations and mission.

b. All factors must be considered when planning with multinational forces. Figure IX-25 highlights some of these factors.

c. To effectively and efficiently plan with multinational forces, the CJTF must recognize and accept the differences between US and multinational forces and work to develop a harmonizing approach to the planning effort.

- The CJTF must make multinational forces feel as if they are part of a team.
- Where possible, the CJTF should develop standardization procedures to reduce uncertainty among multinational forces (e.g., mutually agreeable terminology and platform to ensure input from multinational forces).

For further details, see JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

PLANNING FACTORS FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES

- Force capabilities.
- Command, control, and communications--will there be problems with transfer of authority?
- Logistics--will the United States have to provide support and to what extent?
- Level of training.
- Deployment capability--will US transportation assets be required?
- Procedures for collecting, dissemination, sharing intelligence (information).
- Status of existing agreements--have there already been agreements established that the joint task force will be expected to support?
- "Degree of risk"--what is acceptable to multinational forces (may be politically driven)?
- Cultural and historical background.

Figure IX-25. Planning Factors for Multinational Forces

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CHAPTER X

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS

“Communications dominate war; broadly considered, they are the most important single element in strategy, political or military.”

RADM Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN
The Problem of Asia, 1900

1. General

a. As stated in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” the Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate of a joint staff (J-6) “. . . **assists the commander in all responsibilities for communications, electronics, and automated information systems.** This includes development and integration of C4 architecture and plans which

support the command’s operational and strategic requirements as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable C4 systems to exercise command in the execution of the mission.”

b. J-6 Organization

Figure X-1 depicts a typical JTF J-6 organization. The actual composition of the J-6 will be dictated by the overall organization




Figure X-1. Typical Joint Task Force J-6 Organization with Joint Communications Control Center

of the JTF and operations to be conducted. Several of the J-6's functions may be placed under the joint communications control center (JCCC).

c. The C2 support (C2S) system, which includes supporting C4 systems, is the CJTF's principal tool used to collect, transport, process, disseminate, and protect data and information. C4 systems are the information exchange and decision support subsystems within the total force C2S system.

d. The C2S system gives the CJTF the means to exercise authority and direct assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The CJTF uses information to support decision making and coordinate actions that will influence friendly and enemy forces to the CJTF's advantage.

e. Component tactical C4 systems must be under the technical control of and be responsive to the CJTF. Because of their inherent capabilities, all communications are considered for joint use.

f. Complexity of joint operations and the finite amount of C4 resources may require the CJTF to adjudicate or assign subordinate commands responsibilities for providing C4 systems support. This normally is done in Annex K (Command, Control, and Communications Systems) to the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

g. C4 systems are based on the continuous need for quality information to support JTF operations. Figure X-2 provides quality criteria to be used by the JTF staff. The CJTF controls the C4 system to ensure data and information get to the right place on time and

INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA

- **ACCURACY** - information that conveys the true situation.
- **RELEVANCE** - information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand.
- **TIMELINESS** - information that is available in time to make decisions.
- **USABILITY** - information that is in common, easily understood format and displays.
- **COMPLETENESS** - all necessary information required by the Decision maker.
- **BREVITY** - information that has only the level of detail required.
- **SECURITY** - information that has been afforded adequate protection where required.

Figure X-2. Information Quality Criteria

in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients.

h. The JTF establishing authority ensures C4 systems requirements are supported; coordinates C4 activities; prepares C4 policy and guidance; and ensures the compatibility of JTF C4 systems.

i. C4 systems must be interoperable, flexible, responsive, mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable.

“We are talking about moving information at speeds and in forms that permit winning at minimum cost.”

GEN F. M. Franks, Jr., USA

j. The value of information increases with the number of users.

k. C4 systems normally focus on JTF operations; however, they also must support intelligence, logistics, and special operations.

Detailed C4 techniques and procedures necessary to deploy and sustain a JTF are contained in the CJCSM 6231 series, “Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications,” architecture; and Annex K (Command, Control and Communications Systems) of the CJTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

2. Responsibilities of the JTF Establishing Authority

The JTF establishing authority is responsible for the following.

a. Ensure that C4 systems personnel, communications security (COMSEC), and equipment requirements of the CJTF are supported.

b. Coordinate C4 activities with the CJCS, Defense Information Systems

Agency (DISA), Services, combatant commands, component forces, and others, as appropriate.

c. Prepare C4 policy and guidance to enable subordinate forces to operate within the unified command structure.

d. Ensure compatibility of JTF C4 systems.

3. CJTF C4 Responsibilities

The CJTF is responsible for the following.

a. Provide overall management of all C4 systems supporting the JTF.

b. Ensure adequate and effective C4 systems are available to support JTF C2 infrastructure.

c. Publish C4 plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission.

d. Review and coordinate C4 plans prepared by subordinate commands.

e. Request CJCS-controlled transportable communications assets, including Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) assets, in accordance with CJCSI 6110.01, “CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets” and other established procedures.

f. Ensure both passive and active information protection operations are conducted continuously to preserve the integrity and security of networks and nodal C4 systems from hostile attack.

g. Ensure compatibility of JTF C4 systems.

4. JTF J-6 Responsibilities

The JTF J-6 is responsible as follows.

a. Respond to the CJTF for all C4 and automated information systems matters.

b. Exercise staff supervision of all assets (including CJCS-controlled transportable assets) and procedures employed in joint communications systems and networks as required to accomplish the overall JTF mission.

c. Establish and supervise the operations of the JCCC to support top level network control, management of tactical communications systems within the JOA, and strategic communications connectivity within the JOA.

- A JCCC may consist of current operations, computer systems support, networks, headquarters support, future operations and plans elements, with supporting administrative, DISA, and JCSE elements.

CJCSM 6231 series, “Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications,” provides a detailed description of each element and its responsibilities.

- The DISA liaison officer serves as the interface between the JTF J-6 and DISA.
- The current operations element serves as the JCCC liaison with the JOC.
- The computer systems support element manages automated data processing support to the JTF.
- Network elements manage and control joint communications circuits and systems.
- The HQ support branch provides all communications support for the HQ.
- The future operations and plans element supports JCCC operations elements.

- The J-6 liaison to the IO cell coordinates all information assurance aspects of defensive IO to support JTF operations.

Draft CJCSI 6510.01B, “Defensive Information Operations Implementation,” provides more details on defensive IO and information assurance policy.

- JTF J-6 ensures that subordinate headquarters (Service and/or functional components) establish network management and control centers and have clearly defined missions and areas of responsibility within the network. The JTF J-6 adjudicates conflicts, establishes clear lines of communications and reporting obligations between control centers, and facilitates the execution of all C4 actions to maximize support to the JTF commander. Normally the JTF JCCC provides overall systems management, whereas subordinate elements focus on those portions of the network under their cognizance.
- A DISA representative and frequency management detachment normally will deploy with the JTF and may work in the JCCC or current operations, as directed.
- A regional space support center (RSSC) representative will deploy, on request from the CJTF, to support ground mobile forces tactical satellite planning.

Detailed reporting requirements are contained in CJCSM 6231 series, “Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications.”

d. Plan for and oversee the establishment of connectivity for JTF HQ radio circuits, to include internal message drafting, distribution, and tracking.

"With regard to communications, hope is not a plan."

**COL J. E. Downey, USA
J-6, USACOM**

Exercise UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 96-1

e. Manage JTF frequency allocation and assignments, coordinate with the area supported combatant commander's J-6 and HN communications authorities, and deconflict internal frequency requirements and allocations of component forces.

f. Plan, coordinate, and monitor the use of COMSEC procedures and assets throughout the JTF JOA.

g. Refine OPSEC planning guidance and ensure communications-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerability and support military deception.

h. Develop Annex K (Command, Control, and Communications Systems) to the CJTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

5. Associated Communications Responsibilities

a. Joint Communications Support Element

- The JCSE is a rapidly deployable, joint tactical communications unit under the operational control of the Joint Staff. JCSE provides secure and nonsecure voice, data, message, and video communications for up to two JTFs and two JSOTFs simultaneously throughout the world. The unit responds to major theater wars, plus contingencies of all types, including humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
- **JCSE is requested under provision of CJCSI 6110.01, "CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets,"** which provides the procedures and format for requesting JCSE. Supported combatant commander consolidates and submits requests to JCS, and funds JCSE support.



Tactical ground mobile forces satellite communications extend the JTF's ability to exchange information across vast distances.

- **This element supports time-sensitive operations, with missions normally not exceeding 45 days.** However, CJTF can request an additional 45 days support through the supported combatant commander.
- When directed by the Joint Staff, the JCSE installs, operates, and maintains C4 facilities in support of a JTF and/or a JSOTF, including internal HQ communications.
- An active duty element and the two Air National Guard Joint Communications Support Squadrons comprise the JCSE. Tailored to the mission, units are staffed with personnel from all the Services and are equipped with a wide array of tactical and commercial communications equipment.
- JCSE personnel are allocated to support C4 requirements during predeployment, ADVON deployment, main-force deployment, and employment phases.
- JCSE has a variety of transmission equipment available for employment to meet the requirements of a JTF and/or JSOTF HQ. Included are: military (ultra high frequency [UHF], super-high frequency [SHF]) and commercial satellite systems (C, Ku, international maritime satellite), tropospheric scatter, and line of sight microwave.
- JCSE has a variety of terminal and special communications equipment available for employment to meet the requirements of a JTF and/or JSOTF HQ. Included are: circuit switches, telephones, message switches, record traffic terminals, deployable red switches, video teleconferencing, CNN terminals, deployable GCCS terminals, e-mail, access to Defense Switched Network, access to Defense Data Network

(including SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network and/or Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network), multiplexing capabilities, and local area network for staff use.

- JCSE can provide communications packages to subordinate and component HQs that include: SHF satellite terminals, multiplexing equipment, and UHF single channel satellite systems. These packages are tailored to the requirement. Subordinate HQs include JSOTF HQ, special forces operations bases, and naval special warfare task groups.

b. **Defense Information System Agency Liaison Officer.** Serves as the principal interface between the JTF J-6 and DISA HQ. Assists the JTF in coordinating, planning, executing, and evaluating the defense information infrastructure (DII) support to the JTF.

c. **Regional Space Support Center Liaison Officer.** The RSSC serves as the primary point of contact in coordinating all ground mobile forces satellite requirements in support of the JTF.

6. Communications Requirements

a. JTF HQ and each assigned component will provide its own C4 systems and supporting communications. Communications support of a JTF HQ may be provided through the JCSE or other CJCS-controlled assets when requested by the supported combatant commander and approved by the CJCS. However, if the JCSE is already committed, the supported combatant commander may direct that this support be provided by a Service component or a consolidation of assets from the combatant commander's components. In either case, communications support to the JTF HQ and connectivity to

the components normally will be coordinated by the JTF J-6.

b. Extension of the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) services into the assigned JOA is initially accomplished through standard tactical entry points, Defense Satellite Communications System entry points, and high frequency entry stations. As forces build in the JOA, requirements will surge past the capability of standard tactical entry point (STEP) sites to support. Other means to connect the JTF with the DISN will be introduced into the JOA to include commercial satellite and leased communications services. These systems were not previously introduced simply because they were unable to respond to the deployment timeline. These systems will assume the primary support role from the STEP sites due to their greater bandwidth and ability to put the tactical entry point within the JOA. DISA will direct the employment of communications resources at designated gateways to extend DISN services to tactical networks. DISA contingency and support plans provide guidance on the requesting and termination of DISN services in the tactical environment. The appropriate DISA Regional Operational and Security Center will closely supervise the allocation, routing, and restoration of channels and circuits of the DII to provide DISN services for positive communications support of deployed forces.

c. Component commanders may be tasked with providing personnel and equipment required to install, operate, and maintain communications for their HQ support and for communications circuits from the component HQ to subordinate commanders. Additionally, component commanders may be tasked to provide communications from their component HQ to the CJTF.

d. When two or more commanders are collocated, C4 requirements will be coordinated and consolidated to the

maximum degree possible. The JTF J-6 will initiate and coordinate any cross-Service agreement with the JCCC (if formed) and the component planners.

“During [Operation] PROVIDE COMFORT, we probably brought in 1300 short tons of communications equipment over and above the TO&E equipment to gain the necessary interoperability between all national forces”

**MajGen A. C. Zinni, USMC
DCG, MCCDC**

7. Multinational C4 Systems Standardization and Procedures

a. Standardization among allied nations and the United States is achieved through international forums IAW policy and procedures in CJCSI 2700.01, “International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations.”

b. With respect to C4 systems, the policy in CJCSI 2700.01, “International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations,” focuses on enhancing multinational combat capabilities for US military forces to communicate and share data and information.

c. The United States participates in many forums of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability negotiations around the world, including:

- NATO;
- Other multinational organizations (e.g., American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies, Air Standardization Coordinating Committee, Multinational Communications-Electronics Board); and

- Bilateral contracts.
- d. Frequency managers and communications personnel must be given the authority to maintain control over communications frequency allocations, use, and communications discipline in operations involving multinational forces.
- e. For C4 systems multinational doctrine, the J-6 is the Joint Staff office of primary responsibility.

8. Global Command and Control System

a. GCCS provides the commander with a complete picture of the battlefield and the ability to order, respond, and coordinate C4 information. Along with many other capabilities, GCCS will integrate the following.

- Deliberate planning and CAP.

- Force deployment and employment.
- Fire support.
- Air operations and planning.
- Intelligence.
- Force status as provided in the SORTS.
- b. GCCS provides the means for strategic and operational direction and technical administrative and decision support for the C2 of US military forces.

c. GCCS provides the means for operational direction and administrative support involved in the C2 of US military forces. Figure X-3 shows the basic GCCS elements which can support JTF operations.

d. GCCS does not include the operating forces, but it links with designated communications that:

GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM ELEMENTS

- Tactical warning systems that notify command centers of threatening events.
- Automated fused picture of friendly and enemy forces.
- Defense Information Systems Network is used to convey and exchange information between users or commanders, hold conferences, and issue orders.
- Data collection and processing systems.
- Executive decision aids, such as documents, procedures, reporting structures, and an interactive capability allowing the user to connect with the system, enter data, and receive output reports, fused tactical pictures, and displays.

Figure X-3. Global Command and Control System Elements

- Extend from GCCS subsystem C4 facilities to subordinate commanders or operating forces; and agencies and the Service HQ of the Military Departments.
- Extend one echelon below the C4-related facilities of the Defense

9. Checklist

The following checklist may assist the J-6.

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-6

General

- Is the command, control, communications, and computers (C4) planner brought into the planning process early?
- Is a joint C4 planning meeting scheduled? Is a C4 planner from each organization attending the C4 planning meeting?
- Are the command and control relationship decisions made in sufficient time to allow supporting communications to be adequately planned and C4 decisions to be promulgated in a timely manner?
- Are the C4 planners familiar with the command and control relationships for this operation and are these relationships adequately covered in C4 planning documents?
- Are the operational impacts of potential communications problems brought to the attention of the operational planners and superior commanders?
- Is there a network diagram or description showing connectivity to all commands and organizations included in the operation plan or implementing instructions?
- Can C4 systems support each course of action being addressed?
- Are close-hold and limited access procedures understood by all planners?
- Is planning adequate to ensure that all communications nets have interoperable communications security (COMSEC) devices and keying material? Is secure equipment availability and installation adequate for this operation (e.g., encrypted ultra high frequency [UHF] satellite communications [SATCOM] Narrowband Secure Voice terminals)?
- Is the use of the Intertheater C3 COMSEC Package (ICP) being considered to ensure interoperable keying material? Do all forces hold all necessary components of the ICP? Has North Atlantic Treaty Organization COMSEC been considered?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-6 (cont'd)

- Are provisions being made to ensure that all participating organizations are notified as to which frequencies, call signs, and COMSEC procedures are to be used for the operation?
- Is there adequate planning to ensure joint communications-electronics operation instructions (JCEOI) are prepared in a timely manner? Are frequency management decisions made in a timely manner to enable JCEOI dissemination to participating units when needed? Is the Joint Revised Battlefield Electronic JCEOI System being employed for generating JCEOI and/or signal operating instructions?
- Are operations codes available at all commands?
- Is planning for special operations forces and conventional forces interoperability adequate for this operation?
- Are procedures in place to adequately plan C4 for special operations under both special operations and mission-imposed close-hold restrictions?
- Are theater and tactical C4 system interfaces (Defense Information System Network [DISN] entry points) adequate to provide timely and accurate situation reporting for crisis management reporting to superior commanders, the Joint Staff, and the National Command Authorities?
- Does C4 planning for deployment include command relationships, force operational control procedures, force communications for underway sea or airlift and for Air Mobility Command C4?
- Are deployable Global Command and Control System (GCCS) terminals needed and planned for?
- Does the JTF have qualified GCCS operators?**
- Is planning adequate to have communications into the objective area in the proper sequence and in sufficient amount and type to support the tactical operation?
- Have the functions of the joint communications control center (JCCC) been developed and published?
- Has a policy been developed concerning use of commercial telephones, i.e., units for JTF personnel to “call home”?
- Has the J-6 determined what communications assets are already in the joint operations area (JOA) (military, commercial, other civilian) and can they be used?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-6 (cont'd)

- Is planning adequate to have the buildup of communications into the objective area early enough to prevent overload of the initially deployed single-channel communications systems?
- Are CJCS-controlled assets requested to support the plan?
 - Is there a request for assets in accordance with CJCSI 6110.01, “CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets”?
 - Have transportation requirements for CJCS-controlled assets been coordinated?
- Are communications units, equipment and personnel, including CJCS-controlled assets, included in the timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD)?
- Has the operational impact of communications equipment arrival times been brought to the attention of tactical commanders?
- Is there enough detail in the TPFDD about communications assets to assist in communications planning?
- Are there any special communications needs for geospatial information and services (e.g., digital data bases, dedicated servers and/or bandwidth)?
- Is the impact of information operations (IO) (to include command and control warfare [C2W] and electronic warfare [EW]) considered in planning? Are IO (including C2W and EW) operations and communications frequency deconfliction addressed by the IO cell JCCC liaison officer?
- Are emission control procedures, requirements for operations security, military deception, and avoiding mutual interference addressed in planning?
- Have identification, friend or foe procedures and exchange of aircrew data (rendezvous procedures) been adequately coordinated?
- Are C4 relationships with the Coast Guard understood?
 - Are C4 needs of the Coast Guard adequately addressed in planning?
 - Does the Coast Guard have sufficient interoperable C4 equipment and COMSEC for this operation?
- Are communications planners included early in planning for communications support for intelligence systems?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-6 (cont'd)

- Have the J-2, J-3, and J-6 prioritized the intelligence requirements within the overall communications requirements?
- Are all intelligence systems requirements identified? Which intelligence systems have organic communications and which ones require communications provided by the J-6?
- Are the intelligence systems communications integrated into the overall communications planning? Are there provisions for frequency deconfliction to protect friendly use of the spectrum?
- Are adequate C4 systems available to get near-real-time imagery, signals data, and an accurate picture of the local situation to the tactical commanders?
- Is the CJTF aware of various Global Positioning System (GPS) user equipment employed in theater to include commercial sets?
- Are the GPS frequencies L1 (1575.42 megahertz [MHz]) and L2 (1227.60 MHz) incorporated into unit and headquarters frequency plans to preclude inadvertent GPS interference from tactical communications equipment?
- Has a GPS concept of operations been disseminated?
- Has the JTF standard datum been disseminated for GPS user equipment?
- Have search and rescue (SAR) and medical personnel and C4 personnel coordinated SAR and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) communications early?
 - Are SAR and MEDEVAC communications adequately covered in planning?
 - Are plans for SAR and MEDEVAC communications adequately promulgated to the operating forces?
- Are dedicated and secure communications for public affairs and the media pool adequately covered in planning?
- Is there a heavy dependence on any one means of communications during the operation (e.g., UHF SATCOM)?
- Have SATCOM requirements been evaluated to ensure proper use of limited assets? Have user requirements and use patterns been evaluated to determine the feasibility of time sharing and/or combining SATCOM nets to reduce total nets required and loading of satellite networks?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-6 (cont'd)

- Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?
- Have provisions been made to plan for replacement of tactical communications (tactical satellite and Ground Mobile Facility terminals) at the earliest opportunity (if applicable) with commercial or other appropriate longer term communications?

Predeployment

- Do the JTF headquarters (HQ) and identified component HQ have systems to provide secure voice, record, and data communications (including GCCS) for:
 - Issuing command instructions?
 - Updating the force data base?
 - Coordinating course of actions?
 - Managing force status and generation?
 - Multinational partners?
- Do marshalling and loading sites possess a capability for compatible communications and cryptographic keys?
- Have authenticating memorandums been written and signed by the commander, joint task force within 24 hours of JTF activation, authorizing JTF directors or their designated representatives to pick up message traffic up to and including special category?**
- Have the threats to the C4 systems been clearly defined and actions taken to eliminate or minimize the impact to these systems?

Advance Echelon (ADVON) Deployment

- If ADVON deploys aboard a ship, are communications capabilities adequate? Can transmission security be maintained?
- If ADVON deploys by air, are secure communications available to communicate with JTF HQ, the supported and supporting combatant commanders, and the appropriate US Embassy?
- Once in the assigned JOA, does the ADVON have secure voice, common-user telephone circuits, and secure record and facsimile capabilities for effective exchange of current intelligence, graphics, planning, and adjustments to operational assessments and orders?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-6 (cont'd)

Main Force Deployment

- Are arrangements required for airborne or maritime C4 capabilities (e.g., joint airborne communications center and/or command post, airborne battlefield command and control center, Airborne Warning and Control System, Joint Strategic Targeting and Reconnaissance System, or amphibious command ship)?
- Have radio nets for en route communications been developed and coordinated with supported combatant commander's and components?
- If an intermediate staging base (ISB) is used:
- Have ISB communications requirements been developed and coordinated?
- Has a responsible element been identified to make installation?

JTF Requirements

- As forces deploy into the area and the JTF HQ joins the ADVON (if used), has a ground- or sea-based communications package (capable of providing secure voice, record, and automated data processing data transmission capabilities) been made available to satisfy requirements for communications links with:
 - Supported combatant commander?
 - National Command Authorities?
 - Component HQ?
 - Multinational HQ?
 - United Nations?
 - US embassies?
 - DISN?
 - Civilian organizations (private voluntary organizations and nongovernmental organizations)?
 - Commercial access — single channel?
 - Commercial access — multi-channel?

CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) J-6 (cont'd)

- If requirements exist, are there adequate capabilities to:
 - Link deployed forces with the DISN, the Defense Special Security Communications System, and GCCS?
 - Duplicate communications capabilities at the alternate JTF HQ?
- Have procedures been established for reporting meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion to the joint command and control warfare center?
- Are there sufficient frequencies to support the course of action?
- If the deployment is to foreign soil, has the host nation approved frequencies for the operation?
- Are the J-2, J-3, and J-6 working together to develop a joint restricted frequency list to protect friendly operations and exploit enemy operations? Did the J-3 approve the list?
- Has a system been developed to standardize computer terminal workstations throughout the JTF HQ and subordinate commands?
- Has interoperability of command, control, communications, and computers systems been ensured?

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APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

The development of Joint Pub 5-00.2 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions

- a. CJCSI 1301.01, "Policy and Procedures to Assign Individuals to Meet Combatant Command Mission Related Temporary Duty Requirements."
- b. CJCSI 2700.01, "International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations."
- c. CJCSI 3121.01 W/CH1, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces."
- d. CJCSI 3210.01, "Joint Information Warfare Policy." (SECRET)
- e. CJCSI 3210.03, "Joint Electronic Warfare Policy." (SECRET)
- f. CJCSI 6110.01, "CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets."
- g. CJCSI 6510.01B, "Defensive Information Operations Implementation."
- h. CJCSI 6510.03, "CJCS-Controlled Intertheater COMSEC Support."

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals and MOPs

- a. CJCSM 1600.01, "Joint Manpower Program Procedures."
- b. CJCSM 3122.02, "Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution."
- c. CJCSM 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)."
- d. CJCSM 3122.04, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance) (Secret Supplement)."
- e. CJCSM 3150.13, "Joint Reporting Structures (JRS) Personnel."
- f. CJCSM 3500.04A, "Universal Joint Task List."
- g. CJCSM 3500.05, "Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide."

- h. CJCSM 6120.05, “Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations-Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats.”
- i. CJCSM 6231 Series, “Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications.”

3. Joint Publications

- a. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
- b. Joint Pub 1-0, “Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.”
- c. Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”
- d. Joint Pub 1-03, (will be replaced by CJCSM 3150.01) “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions.”
- e. Joint Pub 1-05, “Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.”
- f. Joint Pub 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”
- g. Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”
- h. Joint Pub 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting.”
- i. Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations.”
- j. Joint Pub 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”
- k. Joint Pub 2-03, “JTTP for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations.”
- l. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
- m. Joint Pub 3-01, “Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.”
- n. Joint Pub 3-01.5, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.”
- o. Joint Pub 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.”
- p. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”
- q. Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.”
- r. Joint Pub 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.”

- s. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”
- t. Joint Pub 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).”
- u. Joint Pub 3-07.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.”
- v. Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.”
- w. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”
- x. Joint Pub 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.”
- y. Joint Pub 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.”
- z. Joint Pub 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”
- aa. Joint Pub 3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).”
- bb. Joint Pub 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”
- cc. Joint Pub 3-17, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations.”
- dd. Joint Pub 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.”
- ee. Joint Pub 3-33, “Joint Force Capabilities.”
- ff. Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).”
- gg. Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”
- hh. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
- ii. Joint Pub 3-56, “Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
- jj. Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.”
- kk. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”
- ll. Joint Pub 3-59, “Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.”
- mm. Joint Pub 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”
- nn. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

- oo. Joint Pub 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations.”
- pp. Joint Pub 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations.”
- qq. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.”
- rr. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”
- ss. Joint Pub 4-03, “Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine.”
- tt. Joint Pub 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”
- uu. Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”
- vv. Joint Pub 4-05.1, “JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup.”
- ww. Joint Pub 4-06, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.”
- xx. Joint Pub 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.”
- yy. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”
- zz. Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning.”
- aaa. Joint Pub 5-03.1 (will be replaced by CJCSM 3122.01), “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).”
- bbb. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.”
- ccc. Joint Pub 6-02, “Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.”

4. Department of Defense Directives

- a. DODD 2000.12, “DoD Combating Terrorism Program.”
- b. DODD 2000.12-H, “Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence.”
- c. DODD 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities.”
- d. DODD 3025.15, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.”

- e. DODD 3150.08, “Department of Defense Response to Radiological Accidents.”
- f. DODD 5400.13, “Joint Public Affairs Operations.”
- g. DODI 5400.14, “Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations.”

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APPENDIX B

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 5-00.2, 3 September 1991, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures."

4. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

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- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

- c. Record of Changes:

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC	area air defense commander
AC	Active component
ACA	airspace control authority
ACSA	acquisition cross-Service agreement
ADVON	advanced echelon
AFCAP	Armed Forces contract augmentation program
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
C2	command and control
C2S	command and control support
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	civil affairs
CAP	crisis action planning
CC	command center
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CI	counterintelligence
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CLPSB	CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COMSEC	communications security
CONCAP	construction capabilities contract
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	continental United States
DCJTF	deputy commander, joint task force
DI	DIA Directorate for Intelligence Production
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DII	defense information infrastructure
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DIRMOBFOR	Director of Mobility Forces
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DISN	Defense Information Systems Network
DJTFAC	deployable joint task force augmentation cell
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DOS	Department of State

Glossary

EPW	enemy prisoner of war
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FSCL	fire support coordination line
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HOC	HUMINT Operations Cell
HQ	headquarters
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAW	in accordance with
IG	inspector general
IO	information operations
J-1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staff
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff
J-2X	joint force J-2 CI/HUMINT support element
J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a joint staff
J-5	Plans Directorate of a joint staff
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate of a joint staff
JAOC	joint air operations center
JBPO	Joint Blood Program Office
JCCC	joint communications control center
JCMEB	Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board
JCMEC	joint captured materiel exploitation center
JCMOTF	Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JDEC	joint document exploitation center
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFE	joint fires element
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JFUB	Joint Facilities Utilization Board
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JIDC	joint interrogation and debriefing center
JIF	Joint Interrogation Facility
JISE	joint intelligence support element

JMC	joint movement center
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOPEX	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPERSTAT	joint personnel status and casualty report
JPG	joint planning group
JPMRC	Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JPRC	joint personnel reception center
JRA	joint rear area
JRAC	joint rear area coordinator
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOACC	joint special operations air component commander
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSRC	joint search and rescue center
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	joint task force
JTL	joint target list
JTT	joint training team
JVB	Joint Visitors Bureau
LNO	liaison officer
LOGCAP	logistics civilian augmentation program
LRC	logistics readiness center
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MTF	message text formats
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NFA	no-fire area
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIST	national intelligence support team
NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
OGA	other government agencies
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OPT	operational planning team
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

Glossary

PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PM	provost marshal
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization
RC	Reserve Components
RFI	request for information
RM	risk management
ROE	rules of engagement
RSSC	regional space support center
SHF	super-high frequency
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOLE	special operations liaison element
SOP	standing operating procedures
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SROE	standing rules of engagement
STEP	standard tactical entry point
TACON	tactical control
TAD	temporary additional duty (non-unit-related personnel)
TCC	transportation component command
TDY	temporary duty
TFCICA	task force counterintelligence coordinating authority
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TPMRC	Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center
UHF	ultra high frequency
UJTL	universal joint task list
UN	United Nations
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USG	United States Government
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called ACA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

alert order. 1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

analysis. In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander's headquarters. Also called AADC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area assessment. The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national

or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and

Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

combat support troops. Those units or organizations whose primary mission is to furnish operational assistance for the combat elements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander’s critical information requirements. A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect

successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

common item. 1. Any item of materiel which is required for use by more than one activity. 2. Sometimes loosely used to denote any consumable item except repair parts or other technical items. 3. Any item of materiel which is procured for, owned by (Service stock), or used by any Military Department of the Department of Defense and is also required to be furnished to a recipient country under the grant-aid Military Assistance Program. 4. Readily available commercial items. 5. Items used by two or more Military Services of similar manufacture or fabrication that may vary between the Services as to color or shape (as vehicles or clothing). 6. Any part or component which is required in the assembly of two or more complete end-items. (Joint Pub 1-02)

completeness. Operation plan review criterion. The determination that each course of action must be complete and answer the questions: who, what, when, where, and how. (This term is no longer used as a criterion for reviewing joint operations plans and its deletion from the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 has been approved).

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action development. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander's estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis action planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles and in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment data base. The JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System) data base containing the necessary information on forces, materiel, and filler and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The data base reflects information contained in the refined time-phased force and deployment data from the deliberate planning process or developed during the various phases of the crisis action planning process, and the movement schedules or tables developed by the transportation component commands to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment planning. Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

employment planning. Planning that prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by combatant commanders through their component commanders. (Joint Pub 1-02)

end state. What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

execute order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

execution planning. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination line. A fire support coordination measure that is established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close air support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets

beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. Also called FSCL. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

hazard. A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness or death of personnel; damage to, or loss of, equipment or property; or mission degradation. (This

term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

human resources intelligence. The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

information assurance. Information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing

for the restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint fires. Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint fires element. The joint fires element is an optional staff element that provides recommendations to the J-3 to accomplish fires planning and synchronization. Also called JFE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment

of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFLCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the

requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFMCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operation planning. Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the single integrated operation plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance, strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operation

planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution

System. A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint patient movement requirements

center. A joint force health service support center under the control of the subordinate joint force surgeon, established to coordinate and control, in terms of identifying bed space requirements, the movement of patients within and out of the joint operations area. The joint patient

movement requirements center also generates subordinate joint force commander (JFC) plans and schedules to evacuate the subordinate JFC's patients to medical treatment facilities in accordance with the supported combatant commander's Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center theater plans and schedules for movement of the patient to the Medical Treatment Facility. Also called JPMRC. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint planning and execution community.

Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint planning group.

A joint force planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander (JFC). Joint planning group membership should be a long-term assignment and members should be designated spokespersons for their respective sections or organizations. Responsibilities and authority of the joint planning group are

assigned by the JFC. Normally headed by the joint force chief planner, joint planning group responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, crisis action planning (to include course of action development and refinement), coordination of joint force operation order development, and planning for future operations (e.g., transition, termination, follow-on). Also called JPG. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint rear area. A specific land area within a joint force commander's operational area designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. Also called JRA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area coordinator. The officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities in order to assist in providing a secure environment to facilitate sustainment, host nation support, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The joint rear area coordinator also coordinates intelligence support and ensures that area management is practiced with due consideration for security requirements. Also called JRAC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area operations. Those operations in the joint rear area that facilitate protection or support of the joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for

mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistic assessment. An evaluation of: a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area. b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,

maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

meaconing. A system of receiving radio beacon signals and rebroadcasting them on the same frequency to confuse navigation. The meaconing stations cause inaccurate bearings to be obtained by aircraft or ground stations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

measurement and signature intelligence. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. Also called MASINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations.

Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline,

internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

planning order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander's estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. See also execution planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

semi-permanent joint task force. A joint task force which has been assigned an expanded or follow-on mission and will continue to conduct these operations in a specified area for an undetermined period of time. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

private voluntary organizations. Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. "Private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organization." Also called PVO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

redeployment. The transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

risk. 1. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 2. See degree of risk. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

strategy determination. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function in which analysis of changing events in the international environment and the development of national strategy to respond to those events is conducted. In joint operation planning, the responsibility for

risk management. A process by which decision makers reduce or offset risk. (This term and its definition are approved for

recommending military strategy to the National Command Authorities lies with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in concert with supported commanders. In the deliberate planning process, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is produced as a result of this process. In the Crisis Assessment Phase of the crisis action planning process, Crisis Action Planning procedures are used to formulate decisions for direct development of possible military courses of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting forces. Forces stationed in, or to be deployed to, an area of operations to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant Command (command authority) of supporting forces

is not passed to the supported commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c. Routing of forces to be deployed. d. Movement data associated with deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces. f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and


assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. 2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and

evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Pub 5-00.2** is in the **Plans** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

